Justia U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Groves was convicted of possession of a firearm by a felon and possession of ammunition by a felon, 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1), and the district court sentenced him to the statutory maximum of 240 months in prison, 120 months on each count, to run consecutively. The Seventh Circuit court affirmed in 2009. In 2011, Groves filed a motion to vacate, set aside, or correct his sentence (28 U.S.C. 2255). The district court denied the motion. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting arguments that his trial counsel was constitutionally ineffective for failing to object to the Presentence Investigation Report’s characterization of his 1995 burglary conviction as a crime of violence under U.S.S.G. 2K2.1(a), 4B1.2(a)(2) and “in failing to fulfill movant’s intention to plead guilty.” The court noted extensive evidence that Groves wanted to go to trial and looked at counsel’s performance “as a whole.” View "Groves v. United States" on Justia Law

Montanez sued the City of Chicago and Officers Fico and Simon, alleging that Fico used excessive force while arresting him for drinking on a public way and Simon failed to intervene. He sustained minor injuries and sought damages under 42 U.S.C. 1983 and state-law. The state-law claims were dismissed as time-barred. The city conceded its obligation to indemnify, so the section 1983 claims proceeded to trial. Fico was found liable, Simon was cleared, and the jury awarded $1,000 in compensatory damages and $1,000 in punitive damages. Montanez’s lawyers submitted a bill for more than $426,000 in attorneys’ fees and about $6,500 in costs and expenses. The judge scrutinized the bill line-by-line, discounted entries where more than one partner oversaw the same activities, or where the lawyers researched or drafted motions that were never filed, excluded hours spent on a full-day mock trial and entries related to matters that were essentially administrative matters, and reduced the hourly billing rates. After these and other reductions, the final award of costs was $3,051.94 and the court awarded $108,350.87 in fees. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, referring to the city’s “scorched-earth” defense strategy and the need for trial judges to exercise their broad discretion to adjust bloated bills for attorney’s fees after the fact and case-management authority during the litigation. View "Montanez v. Simon" on Justia Law

The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA) allows civil claims against foreign governments for acts of state-sponsored terrorism, 28 U.S.C. 1605A. A 1985 EgyptAir hijacking by Abu Nidal terrorists, supported by the Syrian government, resulted in the shootings of Baker and Pflug, who survived with permanent disabilities. Rogenkamp was also shot and died. Ultimately, 58 of the 95 passengers and crew were killed. Several civilian contractors working with the U.S. military in Iraq were kidnapped in 2004 by al-Qaeda in Iraq, also sponsored by the Syrian government; some were killed. Under the FSIA, both sets of plaintiffs secured judgments against Syria, designated by the U.S. government as a state sponsor of terrorism. Both groups’ judgments remain unsatisfied, and both have sought to satisfy them in part by attaching Syrian assets. The district court held that the Gates plaintiffs’ liens on Illinois assets are entitled to priority over those of the Baker plaintiffs. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The Gates plaintiffs have complied with the requirements of the FSIA and have established a priority lien on the Syrian funds at issue, under the “winner-take-all system” established by the legislation. View "Gates v. AT&T Corp." on Justia Law

Valley, age 29, posed on the Internet as a teenage boy and persuaded more than 50 underage girls to send him sexually explicit photos of themselves and convinced at least one of those girls to meet for sex. While executing a search warrant at his mother’s home, where he lived, agents had learned that Valley was using file-sharing software to distribute child pornography and the photos received from the girls. Valley made incriminating statements during the search and, after his indictment, the court denied his motion to suppress. Before trial, an examining psychologist concluded that Valley, although a grandiose liar, did not suffer any mental illness. Valley’s public defender was permitted to withdraw, and substitute counsel was appointed. He entered conditional guilty pleas to two counts of receiving child pornography, 18 U.S.C. 2252(a)(2), reserving his right to appeal. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, finding that Valley was not in custody when he made incriminating statements and that the explanation for the sentence was adequate. The judge acknowledged Valley’s struggles with mental illness and behavior disorders, yet expressed concern about the danger he presents to the community, describing Valley as a “conniving, manipulative, self-absorbed young man,” interested in only his own pursuits, from whom the community needs protection. View "United States v. Valley" on Justia Law

Henderson has been an inmate since 1995. He was diagnosed with high blood pressure and diabetes 1999-2000. He received medical treatment. In 2009, he suffered diabetic hypoglycemia and tremulous convulsions and was taken to Stateville’s emergency room. A month later Henderson had surgery in order to undergo hemodialysis several times a week. In 2010, Henderson sued, alleging that health care providers and prison officials acted with deliberate indifference; that testing revealed that his toxic waste levels were “out of range;” but he was not notified nor treated until he had reached Stage 5 kidney disease. Henderson sought to proceed in forma pauperis and moved for recruitment of counsel (28 U.S.C. 1915(e)(1)), noting that he had a fifth grade education and a low IQ. The district court allowed him to proceed in forma pauperis, but denied recruitment of counsel. Henderson filed an amended complaint and a motion for a discovery order, with a request to depose defendants, and a settlement proposal. After problems during discovery, Henderson filed another motion for recruitment of counsel. Henderson’s discovery motions were denied. Henderson claimed that his documents had been confiscated during a shakedown. The court ultimately rejected the suit on summary judgment. The Seventh Circuit reversed, stating that Henderson needed counsel at every phase of litigation and there was a reasonable likelihood that counsel would have made a difference in the outcome. “In the sea of indigent litigants without counsel, Henderson should have stood out as someone who needed counsel the most.” View "Henderson v. Ghosh" on Justia Law

The American Society of Heating, Refrigerating and Air-Conditioning Engineers (ASHRAE) is composed of industry members, academicians, design professionals, and government officials. Its standards provide guidelines for refrigeration processes and design and maintenance of energy efficient buildings. Thermal manufactures liner insulation systems for nonresidential metal buildings. Thermal’s liner systems compete with “over-the-purlin systems,” which comprise about 90% of the market for metal building roof insulation systems. Since 1999, ASHRAE has published Standard 90.1, which rates the energy efficiency of insulation assemblies and has considerable influence in the commercial building industry. In 2011, the Department of Energy determined that Standard 90.1 would be the national commercial building reference standard; within two years every state had to certify that it had adopted a commercial building code that is at least as stringent as Standard 90.1. Until 2010, Standard 90.1 treated non-laminated metal building insulation assemblies, like Thermal’s liner systems, differently from other insulation assemblies. Owners had to obtain special permission to install liner systems. Thermal alleged that representatives of the North American Insulation Manufacturer’s Association and the Metal Building Manufacturers Association, both of which have voting members on ASHRAE’s Envelope Subcommittee, procured this result by providing inaccurate data. ASHRAE declined to accept results of tests commissioned by Thermal. Thermal sued, alleging unfair competition, violation of Wisconsin’s Deceptive Trade Practices Act, antitrust violations, and violation of the Lanham Act. The court rejected all of the claims. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. View "Thermal Design, Inc. v. Am. Soc'y of Heating, Refrigerating & Air-Conditioning Eng'rs, Inc." on Justia Law

Chicago Officer Brown submitted a probable cause affidavit, stating that confidential informant “Doe” had stated that a felon, known to Doe as “T.Y.,” possessed a semiautomatic and a .38-caliber revolver; that Doe had seen the guns in T.Y’s house the day before and many times during the last six weeks; that T.Y. needed the guns because he sold heroin; and that T.Y. was a member of a gang and part of a crew that robbed people. The affidavit described corroboration of the address and Does’ identification of a police photograph of Glover as “T.Y.” Glover had two felony convictions. Doe identified the house at Glover’s address. The affidavit did not include any information on Doe, an informant for six years. He had been affiliated with a gang; had 14 convictions, including four for crimes committed while working as an informant; had used aliases when questioned by police; and had previously been paid for information. That evening officers executed the warrant and found guns, ammunition, 14 grams of heroin, and drug paraphernalia. Doe was paid $450. After the district court denied a motion to suppress, Glover entered a plea, reserving his right to appeal. The Seventh Circuit reversed and remanded for a Franks hearing. The affidavit provided an insufficient basis for the warrant; it omitted all information regarding the informant’s credibility. The affidavit was not so “bare bones” that officers’ good faith reliance on it was unreasonable, but that omission is sufficient to raise an inference of reckless disregard for the truth that could undermine the good faith exception. View "United States v. Glover" on Justia Law

Mendoza convicted of drug conspiracy and other drug offenses, was sentenced to multiple terms of life imprisonment. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Mendoza then petitioned for relief under 28 U.S.C. 2255, claiming that he was denied due process when the district court moved one of his Spanish-speaking interpreters from the defense table to interpret for a Spanish-speaking witness at trial and that his trial counsel provided ineffective assistance in failing to object to this interpreter arrangement and failing to translate discovery and adequately review it with him. The district court held an evidentiary hearing and took testimony from Mendoza, his trial counsel, and the three interpreters who participated in the trial, then denied the petition. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, reasoning that none of the alleged errors changed the outcome of the trial. View "Mendoza v. United States" on Justia Law

A couple, driving through Madison, saw a man in a Jeep holding what appeared to be a handgun pointed at the ceiling of the Jeep. They called the police. Asked whether the driver was threatening anyone, the caller replied, “[N]o … we couldn’t tell if it was real.” She stated that the man had parked at Dexter’s Pub and that he had been driving “badly.” Officers Lomas, Chaney, and others arrived. As they approached the Jeep, Gibbs walked out of the bar. He matched a description that had been provided. Gibbs complied with instructions to put his hands on the wall. Lomas handcuffed Gibbs. Chaney frisked him. Gibbs stated that he was the driver of the Jeep. Lomas placed Gibbs in the squad car and explained that someone had seen him pointing a gun in the car. Gibbs stated that he had airsoft guns in his car and had been returning from an airsoft event where he had been a referee. Airsoft guns are replicas of firearms. Lomas claims that Gibbs consented to her looking in the Jeep. Gibbs testified that he had denied permission, but had offered to get the items for her. Lomas searched the Jeep and found airsoft guns and a plastic knife. The officers issued a misdemeanor citation for disorderly conduct, which was later dismissed. Gibbs sued Lomas under 42 U.S.C. 1983. He did not sue any of the other officers. The district court denied Lomas’s motion for summary judgment on the basis of qualified immunity. The Seventh Circuit reversed. Even if Gibbs had a constitutional right to be free from this arrest and search, that right was not clearly established at the time of the incident. View "Gibbs v. Lomas" on Justia Law

Newman and Misleveck escaped from a Wisconsin prison. Misleveck stole a shotgun and ammunition. They stole a car and kidnapped its driver. Newman kept control of her for five hours while Misleveck drove. They released her and stole a pickup truck. Pursued by police, they fled on foot and made it to Florida before being caught. Both were prosecuted in state court for escape, kidnapping, armed robbery, and other crimes. The sole federal charge was possessing the shotgun as felons, 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1). Both pleaded guilty. After changing lawyers, Newman moved to withdraw his plea, asserting that the record did not establish a factual basis for it. He claimed he did not touch the gun. The district court denied that motion and sentenced him to 120 months’ imprisonment. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, declining to decide Newman’s argument that in entering the plea he believed erroneously that simply being in the presence of a person with a gun was constructive possession of that gun. Newman and Misleveck undertook joint criminal activity: they engaged in a conspiracy. Every conspirator is liable for acts of other conspirators within the scope of the agreement. Misleveck used the shotgun to advance the joint venture of fleeing. Newman, well aware of this, remained his confederate. View "United States v. Newman" on Justia Law