Justia U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Garcia, previously a construction worker and then age 40, applied for social security disability benefits in 2010, claiming abdominal pain caused by cirrhosis of the liver, severe low platelet count, hepatitis C, and an umbilical hernia, all of which had been diagnosed by several physicians that year. All were caused or exacerbated by alcoholism, but he stopped drinking and alcoholism is no longer a “contributing factor” barring him from obtaining disability benefits, 42 U.S.C. 423(d)(2)(C). An ALJ ruled that Garcia is capable of doing limited sedentary work. The district court affirmed. The Seventh Circuit reversed, noting that Garcia would be a candidate for a liver transplant, but was not on the list because he was too sick for surgery. His platelet count was too low to for even a liver biopsy. Garcia has been repeatedly hospitalized and treated for pain with morphine and other opium derivatives, with limited success. He has lupus, anemia, colitis, anxiety and other psychological problems, and chronic fatigue. One physician described Garcia’s condition as “chronic and terminal.” The court stated that Garcia is “one of the most seriously disabled applicants for social security disability benefits whom we’ve encountered in many years … We are surprised that the Justice Department would defend such a denial.” View "Garcia v. Colvin" on Justia Law

Doss organized an identity theft ring, was indicted for, and pleaded guilty to, possessing with intent to use unlawfully or transfer unlawfully five or more identification documents, a violation of 18 U.S.C. 1028(a)(3); possessing, with intent to defraud, 15 or more counterfeit and unauthorized access devices, a violation of 18 U.S.C. 1029(a)(3); and aggravated identity theft, a violation of 18 U.S.C. 1028A(a)(1). The district court sentenced him to 78 months’ imprisonment on the first two counts and further sentenced him to a mandatory, consecutive two-year sentence on count three. The Seventh Circuit vacated his sentence. The district court committed plain error in imposing a sentencing enhancement under USSG 2B1.1(b)(11)(B), for “trafficking of any … unauthorized access device or counterfeit access device,” which resulted in an increased sentencing range on the grouped counts. Application Note 2 to section 2B1.6 precluded that increase for trafficking in unauthorized access devices because, under the facts presented here, that trafficking constituted a “transfer[] … of a means of identification.” View "United States v. Doss" on Justia Law

Diadenko began working at Schurz High School in 2009 and became aware of practices relating to Individualized Education Plans for the school’s special education department that, in her opinion, were problematic. After voicing her concerns to school administrators, Diadenko wrote Chicago Mayor Daley His office forwarded her letter to the Board of Education. A Chicago Public School investigator looked into Diadenko’s allegations, but in the interim Diadenko was suspended twice for violating school policies. Diadenko and three others filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging violations of their rights under the First and Fourteenth Amendments and under Illinois law by retaliation for speaking out and for refusing to engage in illegal activity occurring within the school. The court granted the defendants summary judgment. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Diadenko failed to present evidence that the principal was aware of her letter to the Mayor before taking disciplinary action against her. View "Diadenko v. Folino" on Justia Law

Inmate Verser began a hunger strike in response to perceived unwarranted prison discipline against him. Prison protocols involve moving a hunger striker to a separate cell after he misses three meals. Verser alleges that two prison officials deposited him in an isolated cell and held him down while two others punched him in the stomach in retaliation for his hunger strike and his previous grievance against another officer. The defendants deny that any assault occurred. Verser filed suit pro se under 42 U.S.C. 1983. The judge sent Verser back to the prison rather than keep him in the courthouse to await the verdict. When the jury then announced its verdict in favor of the defendants, no immediate effort was made to notify Verser. After the verdict, a juror made a statement: This was very hard for us. Many of us—the majority feel that the defendants all had a part to play in what happened to Mr. Verser, but, because there was a lack of evidence, we could not find the defendants guilty. The Seventh Circuit reversed and remanded. Verser‘s total exclusion from the proceedings prevented him from exercising his right to poll the jury (FRCP 48(c)) and a poll might have made a difference.View "Verser v. Corr. Officer Robinson" on Justia Law

In 2011, the Seventh Circuit reversed Loughry’ss convictions for child pornography offenses because the district court erred in admitting certain “hard core” child pornography videos found on Loughry’s computer. Following re-trial, Loughry was again convicted of 16 child pornography offenses. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting an argument that the district court erred in sending to the jury room a binder containing properly admitted evidence of child pornography collected from Loughry’s residence. Loughry claimed that the evidence was too prejudicial for jurors to examine during deliberations. There may be some special circumstances in which a court would abuse its discretion by failing to exclude properly admitted evidence from the jury room based on prejudice, but Loughry’s case does not qualify. The challenged exhibit was not unfairly prejudicial because the images and videos from his collection were highly probative of his identity as the internet user “Mayorroger” who advertised and distributed child pornography on a site called “the Cache.” View "United States v. Loughry" on Justia Law

The Debtor leased a building and, during liquidation in bankruptcy, assumed the lease, 11 U.S.C. 365, and sold the leasehold interest (and other assets) to Tenant. The bankruptcy judge approved the transaction in 2007, after Landlord did not object to the Debtor’s assertion that Landlord did not have any outstanding claim against the Debtor. The approval barred any claims based on pre‐sale events. The lease requires Tenant to maintain the roof. In 2010 the Landlord sued Tenant in state court, based on that obligation. By motion in the closed bankruptcy proceeding, Tenant asked the bankruptcy court to interpret the 2007 order as blocking the claim. The bankruptcy judge concluded that the order did not affect continuing obligations such as the duty to keep leased premises in good repair; Landlord requested a prospective remedy, not damages. The district court disagreed, ruling that Landlord can enforce the good‐repair clause only to the extent that defects in the roof first occurred after the lease’s assumption in bankruptcy. The Sixth Circuit dismissed an appeal for lack of jurisdiction, because the district court did not enter an injunction. The court expressed hope that the bankruptcy judge or the district judge will attend to several issues inherent in both opinions. View "Harrison Kishwaukee, LLC v. Rockford Acquisition, LLC" on Justia Law

Klinkhammer initiated a traffic stop after he clocked Hanson speeding. Hanson got out and Klinkhammer told Hanson to get back into his car. He later testified that Hanson was yelling and acting bizarrely. Hanson testified that Klinkhammer was screaming. Klinkhammer extended his baton and Hanson returned to the car. Klinkhammer approached, took Hanson’s license, and walked toward his cruiser, Hanson left the car again. Klinkhammer brandished his baton and eventually stated that Hanson was under arrest. Hanson ran for his car. Klinkhammer grabbed at Hanson’s shirt and struck him with the baton. Hanson got into his car, drove off and called 911, stating that Klinkhammer was endangering his life. The dispatcher told him not to move because backup was on the way, but Hanson drove to the police station. Another police car tried to block Hanson, but Hanson navigated around it. Hanson stopped at a red light; police surrounded his car with guns drawn. Hanson turned off his engine and put his hands up, but would not move, so the officers smashed a window to pull him out. Charged with felony fleeing‐and‐eluding, Hanson was not allowed to introduce testimony from a school principal with whom Klinkhammer had worked that Klinkhammer had a reputation as confrontational, aggressive and hot‐tempered. The court concluded that this was a “victimless crime” to which the exception for propensity evidence did not apply. Sentenced to 60 days in jail, Hanson petitioned for habeas corpus, claiming that the ruling abridged his right to present an effective defense. The Seventh Circuit affirmed denial, finding that the last state‐court decision addressing this claim was not contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, Supreme Court precedent. View "Hanson v. Beth" on Justia Law

Phusion manufactures and distributes an alcoholic beverage called “Four Loko.” Its original formula contained energy stimulants, such as caffeine, guarana, taurine, and wormwood. Phusion purchased a commercial general liability insurance policy and a umbrella policy from members of the Liberty Mutual Group. The policies include identical provisions, excluding coverage for bodily injury or property damage when the insured may be held liable by reason of causing or contributing to intoxication. Plaintiffs sued Phusion in separate state court actions, alleging injuries caused by consumption of Four Loko. Two cases involved traffic accidents, one involved a shooting, another involved paranoid behavior resulting in accidental death, and a fifth claim involved a death from heart trouble. Phusion notified Liberty, which sought a declaratory judgment regarding the scope of coverage. The district court examined the underlying cases in the context of comparable automobile exclusions and ruled that four of the five cases fell within the Liquor Liability Exclusion. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The Liquor Liability Exclusions in the policies are unambiguous and apply to Phusion. The allegations of simple negligence raised by the plaintiffs in the underlying complaints are not sufficiently independent from the allegations that Phusion caused or contributed to the intoxication of any person. View "Netherlands Ins.. Co. v. Phusion Projects, Inc." on Justia Law

Kim, his wife Ko, and their children are citizens of South Korea who were admitted to the U.S. in 2003, as nonimmigrant visitors for pleasure. Before an extension expired, Ko, obtained an F-1 visa, changing her status to that of a nonimmigrant student. As beneficiary of his wife’s application, Kim’s status was changed to that of spouse of a nonimmigrant student. In 2006, Ko’s F-1 status and, consequently, Kim’s F-2 status, were terminated. U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services stated that Ko was ineligible for reinstatement because she had stopped attending classes without informing the school of an illness that she later claimed. While Ko’s motion to reopen or reconsider was pending, Kim became the beneficiary of an approved immigrant visa as an alien worker and moved to adjust his status to that of lawful permanent resident. USCIS denied the application, finding that he was ineligible because he had failed to maintain continuous lawful status since entering the U.S. In 2009, DHS charged Kim removable under 8 U.S.C. 1227(a)(1)(B). Kim argued that his failure to maintain legal status was due to circumstances beyond his control. The IJ found Kim removable. The BIA dismissed an appeal. The Seventh Circuit denied a petition for appeal. View "Kim v. Holder" on Justia Law

Gogos, a pipe welder for 45 years, has taken blood pressure medication for more than eight years. He began working for AMS in December 2012 as a welder and pipe-fitter. The next month, his blood pressure spiked and he experienced intermittent vision loss and a red eye. His supervisor agreed that he could leave to seek immediate medical treatment. As Gogos left work, he saw his general foreman and stated that he was going to the hospital because “my health is not very good lately.” The foreman immediately fired him. After pursuing a charge with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, Gogos sued. He applied to proceed in forma pauperis and requested that the court recruit counsel, stating that he cannot afford an attorney; that he has only a grammar-school education; and that English is not his primary language. The district court dismissed, reasoning that Gogos’s medical conditions were “transitory” and “suspect.” The Seventh Circuit vacated, reasoning that Gogos stated a claim under the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. 12112.View "Gogos v. AMS-Mech. Sys., Inc." on Justia Law