Justia U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Apex, a manufacturer of electronics, and Sears entered into an agreement in 2003. In 2004, Sears implemented a program to create a return reserve on Apex’s account. The return reserve was an internal accounting mechanism used to place a negative dollar deduction on Apex’s account; Sears would hold back payment to Apex until the amount showing owed by Sears exceeded the amount of the reserve. In 2009 Apex filed suit, alleging that Sears breached the contract by refusing to pay $8,185,302 owed for goods delivered. The district court granted Sears summary judgment, finding that the action was barred by the four-year statute of limitations in Section 2–725 of the Uniform Commercial Code. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Apex was on notice that Sears was not going to pay the deductions after each invoice and even marked these “wrongful” deductions in its own Invoice Report. For more than four years, Apex sat on its right to sue. View "Apex Digital, Inc. v. Sears, Roebuck & Co." on Justia Law

Hamilton claimed that Lorincz, dying of Parkinson’s disease, hired her to help him at home. She was a friend of Lorincz’s daughter, a former physician who was serving jail time. After Hamilton had worked 88 hours, Lorincz gave her a check for $10,000. Hamilton told Lorincz’s other adult children, by phone, that their father was dying and had given her a $10,000 check. Knowing that Hamilton had a criminal conviction, they told the police that Hamilton was taking advantage of their impaired father and went to their father’s house. Although Lorincz told the police that he wanted Hamilton to have the money and wanted the police to leave, they remained for about two hours and learned that Hamilton had been a psychologist, but her license had been revoked after her felony conviction for a $435,000 Medicaid fraud, and that Lorincz already had professional home health aides when Hamilton had “rushed” to his side. Hamilton had a history of bizarre lawsuits against government officials. Hamilton claims that the police would not allow her to leave while they were there and, when they left, required her to leave without the check, although she wanted to stay. The district court dismissed her 42 U.S.C. 1983 suit alleging police misconduct. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. View "Hamilton v. Village of Oak Lawn" on Justia Law

Deported following a 1996 conviction for attempted first degree murder and armed violence, Lara, a citizen of Mexico, returned to the U.S. and was arrested for armed robbery and attempted armed robbery. After a second illegal return, he was convicted of illegal reentry in violation of 8 U.S.C. 1326(a) and (b)(2) and sentenced to 78 months’ imprisonment. On appeal, Lara argued that the district judge should have disqualified himself from hearing Lara’s motion to dismiss the indictment or erred in failing to dismiss the indictment because Lara was erroneously denied an opportunity to seek discretionary relief from deportation under the Immigration and Nationality Act section 212(c) in his first deportation proceeding in 1997–1998. The Seventh Circuit rejected the claims. The judge was not disqualified from ruling on Lara’s motion based on the judge’s service as INS District Counsel when Lara was first deported. The court did not reach the question of whether precedents interpreting 8 U.S.C. 1326(d) foreclose Lara’s collateral attack on his underlying deportation order because counsel conceded the issue. View "United States v. Lara-Unzueta" on Justia Law

Petitioners applied for asylum in the U.S., claiming that they had been persecuted as members of the “social group” of timberlands owners and would face risks if returned to Honduras. Organized squatters, “La Via Campesina,” invade agricultural lands and take over production; if they raise the national flag and assert that owners are not using the land, police and judges are unwilling to evict them. Timber lands remain out of production for years while trees mature, making them targets for campesinos, who cut and sell the timber. Petitioners assert that campesinos occupied their land in 2008 and that they fear for their lives should they return to assert ownership rights. An immigration judge denied asylum, finding (under 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(42)(A)) that the past and feared future harm do not amount to persecution; that the squatters’ acts did not occur because of petitioners’ membership in any particular group but were for profit, with indifference to who was injured; and that the squatters’ acts could not be imputed to the government. The BIA concluded that the campesinos are thieves whose own interests, rather than antipathy toward petitioners, led to the invasion and that Honduras is willing and able to control the campesinos; after petitioners obtained a court order, officers did remove the squatters. The Seventh Circuit denied a petition for review. View "Urbina-Dore v. Holder" on Justia Law

Bailey was convicted in Illinois state court of one count of murder and two counts of attempted murder. His trial counsel, Swano, had not filed a discovery motion and did not know that one of the eyewitnesses had testified before a grand jury. Swano received a transcript of the grand jury testimony after the witness left the stand, and entered into a stipulation that the witness had not told the grand jury that Bailey was at the murder scene. Illinois state courts rejected Bailey’s claim that Swano’s performance was constitutionally deficient. A federal district court denied habeas relief under 28 U.S.C. 2254(d). The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Bailey did not show a reasonable probability that the result of his trial would have differed but for Swano’s error. View "Bailey v. Hardy" on Justia Law

Crundwell, Comptroller of Dixon, Illinois since 1983, pleaded guilty to embezzling about $53 million from the city between 1990 and 2012. She used the money to support more than 400 quarter horses and a lavish lifestyle, which she had previously claimed to be the fruit of the horses’ success. During the last six years of her scheme, the embezzlement averaged 28% of the city’s budget. In exchange for her plea, the prosecutor limited the charge to a single count of wire fraud, 18 U.S.C. 1343. The crime’s impact on the population of Dixon played a major role in the district court’s decision to sentence her to 235 months’ imprisonment, substantially above the Guideline range of 151 to 188 months. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The district court pronounced a substantively reasonable sentence after giving Crundwell full opportunity to present evidence and arguments. The judge considered deterrence and addressed every one of her arguments. That he thought less of her cooperation than Crundwell herself did, and gave a lower weight to her age than she requested does not undermine the sentence’s validity. View "United States v. Crundwell" on Justia Law

Kraft sued Cracker Barrel Old Country Store for trademark infringement, Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. 1051, and obtained a preliminary injunction against the sale of food products to grocery stores under the name Cracker Barrel, which is a registered trademark of Kraft. Kraft has been selling cheese in grocery stores under that name for more than 50 years. Kraft did not challenge CBOCS’s right to sell the products under the name Cracker Barrel in CBOCS’s restaurants, in its “country stores” that adjoin the restaurants, or by mail order or online. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, noting the similarity of the logos, the products, and of the channels of distribution. View "Kraft Foods Grp. Brands LLC v. Cracker Barrel Old Country Store, Inc." on Justia Law

MERSCORP operates an online membership organization that records, trades, and forecloses loans on behalf of many lenders. Banks can register their mortgages on the system and assign the mortgages to MERSCORP, which then records them in the counties in which the mortgaged properties are located. MERSCORP has no financial interest in the mortgages. The underlying debts can be repeatedly assigned without transfers being recorded in a public‐records office, facilitating successive interbank sales of mortgages, often to create mortgage‐backed securities. Union County, Illinois filed a class action suit on behalf of all Illinois counties against MERSCORP and banks that do business with MERSCORP, claiming that MERSCORP is violating a statute that requires every Illinois mortgage be recorded; 765 ILCS 5/28 provides that deeds, mortgages, powers of attorney, and other instruments relating to or affecting the title to real estate “shall be recorded in the county in which such real estate is situated.” The district court dismissed, holding that Illinois law does not require that mortgages be recorded, without deciding whether to certify it as a class action. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, declining to certify the issue to the Illinois Supreme Court. View "Union Countyv. Merscorp, Inc." on Justia Law

Four white male Chicago police officers, in plain clothes, in an unmarked car, were driving in a high-crime area that is largely nonwhite. A woman signaled them and, when they stopped, stated that men were gathered in a lot nearby and one of them, wearing a white jacket, was selling “rocks” (crack cocaine). The officers drove past the lot and saw a juvenile and three men; Morrow, age 20, wearing what appeared to be a white jacket. Officer May parked and watched the men, through binoculars, from across the street. May saw Morrow selling drugs and Bell, age 14, collecting money. Passersby were attracted by the yells of “rocks, rocks” from two older men. The drugs were in a vial on the ground. After about 20 minutes with three sales, May radioed the other officers and told them to arrest the group. May picked up the vial. At the police station the four were searched. Bell had $100 on him. All were charged. Morrow was charged with felony possession of an illegal drug. After being acquitted, Morrow sued the officers under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging unlawful search and seizure and conspiracy. A jury exonerated all the defendants. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting claims of procedural error.View "Morrow v. May" on Justia Law

Balthazar lived in one of two apartments on the third floor. Police had a warrant to search the other apartment. Both had rear doors about opening on a common landing. The officers climbed the stairs to the landing and used a battering ram on the door of Balthazar’s apartment. According to Balthazar they entered the apartment, screaming profanities and pointing guns; handcuffed Balthazar and her cousin; ransacked the apartment, dumping food on the floor, opening drawers, flipping mattresses, and throwing clothing; and left after about 15 minutes when another officer appeared and said they were in the wrong apartment. The officers claim that, while they did hit the wrong door, they immediately realized the mistake and none of them entered Balthazar’s apartment. Balthazar’s attorney later claimed that even looking inside the apartment constituted an illegal search. Neither a claims adjuster who visited the apartment the day of the incident, nor the Independent Police Review Authority employee who took a report, noted complaints about anything other than damage to the door. A jury rejected Balthazar’s claims under 42 U.S.C. 1983. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. A search resulting from an innocent mistake is not unreasonable and does not violate the Fourth Amendment. Even accepting Balthazar’s alternative theory, simply looking inside does not always constitute a search. View "Balthazar v. City of Chicago" on Justia Law