Justia U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

The Berkowitz family has a history of IRS problems. Yair began participating in his father’s schemes in 1999, acquiring the information of dead people and federal prisoners to prepare fraudulent tax returns. Between 2003 and 2009, 58 individuals received refund checks in a conspiracy that involved more than 3,000 false state and federal tax returns. Yair received tax returns from Marvin in Israel, mailed the returns from various U.S. postal codes to avoid IRS suspicion, and controlled accounts where proceeds were deposited. When refund checks issued, Yair traveled to pick them up and made payments to co‐conspirators. In 2006, IRS agents told Yair that money he received from Marvin was obtained by fraud. Yair denied knowledge of the scheme. He began to reduce his direct involvement, but continued to receive money from the scheme and met with an undercover IRS agent about expanding the fraud. The scheme was uncovered. Yair, Marvin, and others were charged with conspiracy to defraud the IRS, wire fraud, and mail fraud. Yair pleaded guilty only to wire fraud based on a 2006 PayPal transfer of $250. At sentencing, the district court followed the Presentence Report’s recommendation and ordered Yair to pay more than $4 million in restitution along with his prison sentence; his liability was joint and several with his co‐defendants. The Seventh Circuit found the award appropriate and affirmed.View "Unted States v. Berkowitz" on Justia Law

Johnson was rejected for four promotions and was terminated in 2004, when her employer, General Board learned that Johnson had been recording conversations with co-workers without their consent. Johnson had filed charges with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission in 2001 and in 2003 and, after her termination, filed a charge, claiming sexual harassment, based on a video shown by a team leader, featuring male nudity. Johnson sued General Board, alleging race discrimination and retaliation in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and 42 U.S.C. 981, and sexual harassment in violation of Title VII. Johnson testified that a hiring official told her that her tendency to complain about discrimination might have contributed to the decision not to promote her. Most of Johnson’s claims were dismissed. Two remaining claims for retaliation were tried; a jury returned a verdict for the defendants. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting challenges to evidentiary rulings and to jury instructions. The district court failed to comply with FRCP 51(b), which requires the court to decide the content of final jury instructions and give the parties an opportunity to object before instructions and final arguments are delivered; the procedural error was ultimately harmless. View "Johnson v. Gen. Bd. of Pension & Health Benefits of the United Methodist Church" on Justia Law

In 2001 a burglar set fire to Frankton High School, causing millions of dollars in damages. According to the plaintiff, an officer coerced one of the suspects and others to accuse the plaintiff. The plaintiff was convicted of arson, burglary, and theft. He obtained post-conviction relief and was released from prison in 2006, after proving that a key witness had lied. In 2007 a retrial was scheduled. On advice of counsel, plaintiff deferred filing a civil rights suit pending retrial, but the trial kept getting rescheduled until charges were dismissed in 2010. In 2011, the plaintiff filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, claiming malicious prosecution, due process, violations, and other torts, by Indiana police officers, the town that employed them, and the sheriff. The district judge dismissed the claim as untimely and held that Indiana law provides an adequate remedy for malicious prosecution, barring recourse to section 1983. The Seventh Circuit reversed and remanded, finding that Indiana law does not provide an adequate remedy. The plaintiff alleged that the defendants intimidated him into delaying filing a civil suit until the criminal proceeding ended. If that is true, the limitations period did not start to run until then, so that his November 2011 filing was within the limitations period. View "Julian v. Hanna" on Justia Law

American Airlines filed for bankruptcy and implemented a plan to reduce labor costs. Anticipating a reduction in the number of AA mechanics, resulting in reduction in the number of Transportation Workers Union members, the national leadership of that union consolidated local unions and shuttered offices. The district court denied a motion by local unions for a preliminary injunction preventing the consolidation. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. TWU’s actions were within the scope of its authority; TWU reasonably exercised powers granted to it by the TWU Constitution. View "Transp. Workers Union of Am., AFL-CIO Local Unions v. Transp. Workers Union of Am., Int'l " on Justia Law

Thompson pleaded guilty to conspiring to possess and distribute cocaine and heroin, 21 U.S.C. 846, 841(a)(1), and was sentenced to 540 months in prison. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Thompson then moved to vacate under 28 U.S.C. 2255 alleging that the government breached agreements with him (and others who cooperated on his behalf) to recommend that he serve between 108 and 135 months in prison, and that his attorneys rendered ineffective assistance at the time he pleaded guilty, at sentencing, and on appeal. The district court denied the motion. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, noting that Thompson never moved to withdraw his guilty plea, nor did he mention any deals in his opportunities to address the district court directly. Thompson did not show prejudice as a result of any alleged failings on the part of counsel. View "Thompson v. United States" on Justia Law

In 2007 Hobart, Wisconsin passed an ordinance assessing stormwater management fees on all parcels in the village, including land owned by the Oneida Nation of Wisconsin, an Indian tribe, to finance construction and operation of a stormwater management system. Title to 148 parcels in Hobart, about 1400 acres or 6.6 percent of the village’s total land, is held by the United States in trust for the Oneida tribe (25 U.S.C. 465). Tribal land is interspersed with non-tribal land in a “checkerboard” pattern. The tribe sought a declaratory judgment that the assessment could not lawfully be imposed on it. Hobart argued that if that were true, the federal government must pay the fees; it filed a third‐party complaint against the United States. The district court entered summary judgment for the tribe and dismissed the third‐party claim. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, holding that the federal Clean Water Act did not submit the land to state taxing jurisdiction and that the government’s status as trustee rather than merely donor of tribal lands is designed to preserve tribal sovereignty, not to make the federal government pay tribal debts. View "Oneida Tribe of Indians of WI v. Village of Hobart, WI" on Justia Law

Davis was driving his tractor‐trailer on I-70 through Illinois toward St. Louis. The sleeping compartment had a hidden compartment in which Davis was hiding $304,980 in cash. Davis passed an unmarked police vehicle containing officers assigned to a DEA drug interdiction task force. The officers followed him until they observed Davis following another truck too closely and initiated a traffic stop. Preparing to issue a warning, the officers examined Davis’s log‐book and became suspicious because Davis had gone without work for long periods, but had expensive aftermarket parts on his truck. The officers then learned that Davis’s truck had previously been used in criminal activity. After Davis orally consented to a search, an officer handed Davis a written consent form to read and sign. Davis used his remote to unlock the truck for the officers, who began searching. Davis became agitated, but responded to the officers’ question of whether they still had consent, by scrawling something on the form and handing it over. After discovering the hidden cash, the officers found that Davis had scrawled “under protest.” Drug-sniffing dogs alerted to the cash. Davis was released, but the government sought forfeiture of the truck and money. The district court denied a motion to suppress, finding that Davis consented to the search. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, holding that the district court did not clearly err in finding the search consensual. View "Davis v. $304,980.00 in U. S. Currency" on Justia Law

Manpower, an international staffing firm, is the parent of Right Management in Paris, France. A building in which Right leased space collapsed, so that Right’s offices were inaccessible. Right relocated without having access and incurred replacement costs and lost income from the interruption of operations. A local insurance policy, issued by ISOP’s French affiliate, provided primary coverage, and a master policy, issued by ISOP and covering Manpower’s operations worldwide, provided excess coverage over the local policy’s limits. Right received $250,000 under the local policy pursuant to a provision covering losses caused by lack of access by order of a civil authority. Another $250,000 was paid under the master policy, exhausting the $500,000 sublimit under a similar lack‐of‐access provision. Manpower also claimed that, under the master policy, it was entitled to reimbursement for business interruption losses and the loss of business personal property: about $12 million. ISOP denied the claim. The district court held that Manpower was covered under the master policy for business interruption losses and loss of business personal property and improvements, but excluded Manpower’s accounting expert, without whom Manpower could not establish those damages and held that the master policy was not triggered because the losses were also covered under the local policy, which had to be fully exhausted before master policy coverage was available. The Seventh Circuit reversed exclusion of the expert and entry of judgment against Manpower on the business interruption claim, but affirmed judgment for ISOP on the property loss claim. The master policy did not provide coverage for Manpower’s property losses.View "Manpower, Inc. v. Ins. Co. of the State of PA" on Justia Law

Soto entered the U.S. in 1978 as an infant and became a lawful permanent resident in 1991 at age 13. She was convicted of theft in 2002, of passing a worthless check in 2003, and of possessing methamphetamine in 2005, a felony under Kansas law. In 2005, immigration authorities initiated removal on grounds of commission of an aggravated felony, of two crimes involving moral turpitude, and of a controlled substance offense, 8 U.S.C. 1227(a)(2)(A)(ii), (a)(2)(A)(iii), and (a)(2)(B)(i). At the time, the circuits were split on whether a drug possession conviction that was a state law felony but that would be a federal misdemeanor should be considered an aggravated felony for purposes of immigration. In 2006 the Seventh Circuit held that such convictions were not aggravated felonies for immigration purposes. Soto claims that an immigration officer and a legal aid organization stated that she had no chance of avoiding removal, so she signed a stipulation with an admission of the factual allegations, waiver of any right to seek relief from removal, and an acknowledgment that she signed voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently. Three weeks after removal, Soto returned to the U.S. illegally to live with her four U.S.‐born children and their U.S.‐citizen father, whom she married in 2009. In 2010 authorities discovered Soto and reinstated the 2005 order of removal using an expedited process. The Board of Immigration Appeals dismissed her appeal, filed from Mexico. The Tenth Circuit ruled that it lacked jurisdiction to review the 2005 order. Soto moved to reopen the 2005 removal order, arguing that the 90‐day deadline did not apply or was equitably tolled. The IJ and BIA rejected her arguments. The Seventh Circuit held that that her illegal reentry after her 2005 removal permanently bars reopening that earlier removal order.View "Cordova-Soto v. Holder" on Justia Law

Brown was the office manager and accountant for Indiana small businesses owned by the Walker family from 1989 until 2009. The family discovered that Brown was embezzling by using company credit cards and checks to pay for personal items and expenses. Brown stole hundreds of thousands of dollars, putting the businesses in financial straits and destroying their credit. Brown was charged with more than 150 counts of wire fraud, mail fraud, and tax fraud and pleaded guilty to a single count of each crime. The advisory guidelines sentencing range was 21 to 27 months’ imprisonment, but the district judge imposed a sentence of 60 months. Weeks later, without warning, the judge filed an amended judgment and attached a written “statement of reasons” to “supplement” his statements in open court. The judge recalculated the guidelines range, adding upward adjustments based on the amount embezzled, the duration of the scheme, and the vulnerability of one victims so that the range was 41 to 51 months. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The judge did not violate Fed. R. Crim P. Rule 32(h), which requires “reasonable notice” when the court is “contemplating” a departure from the guidelines; “departures” are obsolete. In addition, the statement was filed after Brown appealed, so the court lacked jurisdiction to substantively alter the sentence. Brown’s sentence did not change; in light of the court’s oral pronouncements, that sentence is reasonable. View "United States v. Brown" on Justia Law