Justia U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

An Illinois inmate sued under 42 U.S.C. 1983, claiming that a nurse practitioner and a correctional counselor were deliberately indifferent to his serious medical condition, hypertension (high blood pressure). He had been diagnosed in 2007 at age 22 and did not receive his prescribed medication for a three-week period in 2009. The district judge dismissed, reasoning that the nurse practitioner did not know that plaintiff was not receiving his medication and the correctional counselor, not a member of the prison’s medical staff, assumed the medical staff would deal with it. The Seventh Circuit affirmed after criticizing the failure, by the court and lawyers, to use scientific resources to determine the effect on the plaintiff’s health of a temporary interruption in the medication. “The legal profession must get over its fear and loathing of science.” The court also noted “that this plainly meritless suit was filed … more than four years ago. … A stronger judicial hand on the tiller could have saved a good deal of time, effort, and paper.” View "Jackson v. Pollion" on Justia Law

Patrolling officers spotted a car driven White, with Lyons as a passenger. Officer Dodd recognized White from previous encounters, some of which involved attempts to flee arrest; Dodd knew that White’s license had been suspended and activated the squad’s emergency lights. White accelerated, drove two blocks, and ran a red light before pulling over. Officers Dodd and Burns suspected an attempt to conceal contraband, retrieve a weapon, or get a head start in a foot chase. While others frisked White, Officer Burns observed Lyons, whose hands were shaking and who avoided eye contact. Lyons stated that he did not have any weapons; Burns announced that he intended to frisk Lyons, who then said, “I have a gun.” Burns handcuffed Lyons; Dodd lifted Lyons’s shirt, revealing a loaded firearm in his waistband. Lyons was charged with possession of a firearm as a felon. Denying a motion to suppress, the district court found reasonable suspicion that Lyons illegally possessed a firearm or other dangerous item, triggered by his appearing nervous, his being in a car driven by someone with a suspended license, who attempted to flee, and his association with White. Lyons was sentenced to 210 months, under the Armed Career Criminal Act, 18 U.S.C. 924(e). The Seventh Circuit affirmed the conviction, but remanded for resentencing because the court failed to state the reasons supporting its sentence, and incorrectly believed it was required to impose five years of supervised release.View "Unted States v. Lyons" on Justia Law

The Gulfport Mississippi apartment complex was damaged in Hurricane Katrina. Its insurer, RSUI paid actual-cash-value proceeds. The parties began negotiating for additional replacement-cost proceeds. During negotiations, the named-insured contracted to sell the property in its unrepaired state to Edgewood and notified RSUI of its intention to assign the claim for replacement-cost proceeds. RSUI responded that if the property was sold before repair, there could be no recovery of replacement-cost proceeds. The sale closed. The seller and Edgewood sought a declaration that the insurer was obligated to pay the claim with a related breach-of-contract action. Edgewood repaired the property. The litigation continued for years until it became clear that there had been no assignment. The district court dismissed the claims. The Seventh Circuit affirmed in part and reversed in part. Absent an assignment, Edgewood lacks standing; the seller still owns the claim and remains a proper plaintiff. The seller had an insurable interest when the policy issued and at the time of the loss; the sale of the property in its unrepaired state did not extinguish its right to recover. Although the policy specifies that replacement-cost proceeds will not be paid until the property is repaired, it does not require that the insured complete the repairs itself. View "Southland Mgmt. Corp. v. RSUI Indem. Co." on Justia Law

Williams was returning home from work late at night. He smelled smoke, saw that his neighbor’s house was on fire, and went to the porch of the burning home to rouse anyone who might be inside. Chicago police officers O’Brien and Byrne also spotted the smoke and found Williams on the porch. They arrested him on suspicion of arson. A prosecutor declined to file arson charges that night. Officers O’Brien and Byrne then charged Williams with criminal trespass, but that charge was dismissed. Williams brought suit against O’Brien and Byrne under 42 U.S.C. 1983 alleging false arrest in violation of his Fourth Amendment rights and against the officers and the City of Chicago under state law for malicious prosecution on the trespass charge. The district court granted the defendants’ summary judgment. The Seventh Circuit reversed and remanded for trial. Whether there was even arguable probable cause to arrest and charge Williams depends on disputed issues of fact. View "Williams v. City of Chicago" on Justia Law

Lavalais is the only black police officer employed by the Village of Melrose Park, which has about 75 officers. He has been a Melrose Park officer for more than 20 years. In 2010, Lavalais filed a charge with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC), alleging race discrimination. He filed a second charge in January 2011, alleging that he was disciplined for filing the first charge. In early February 2011, Lavalais was promoted to sergeant and placed on the midnight shift. More than a year later, he was denied a requested a change of assignment from the midnight shift, and again filed a charge of discrimination with the EEOC. The EEOC issued a right‐to‐sue letter. The district court dismissed his claims under Title VII and 42 U.S.C. 1983. The Seventh Circuit vacated dismissal of the discrimination claims, but affirmed dismissal of the retaliation claims. View "Lavalais v. Vill. of Melrose Park" on Justia Law

Officers responded to reports of gunfire in a Chicago public housing complex. Two people stated that “gangbangers” were running guns and drugs into the building and pointed to apartment 501. No one answered when they knocked, so the officers entered the apartment with guns drawn. They found Perry and ordered him to get down against the wall, then searched the apartment, finding chunks of crack cocaine, clear Ziploc bags, and razor blades in a bedroom. Perry ran for the door, knocking an officer down. Perry claimed that he fled because the officers started punching him. Perry ran down to the third floor. Officer Keithley followed him, gun drawn, while Watts secured the apartment. Keithley testified that Perry popped out and rushed him, grabbed him, and tried to grab his gun. Keithley said he tried to punch Perry and his gun went off, striking Keithley in the arm. Perry again attempted to escape, knocking Keithley off-balance. Keithley shot at Perry while falling; one bullet struck Perry in the thigh, and another struck him in the back. Perry denied reaching for Keithley’s gun. Perry was acquitted of attempted murder, aggravated battery with a firearm, and disarming a peace officer. Perry filed civil rights claims against the officers and the city. A jury rejected his claims. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting claims of evidentiary errors. View "Perry v. City of Chicago" on Justia Law

Orillo, her husband (a doctor), and another owned Chalice, a home health care provider. Chalice was an enrolled provider with Medicare and could seek reimbursement of home health care through that program. Orillo falsified forms by altering the codes and information that had been completed by the Chalice nurses to make the patient’s condition appear worse and the health care needs greater than the actuality. Those alterations caused Medicare software to generate different reimbursement rates Orillo also aided her husband in paying kickbacks to a Chicago doctor in return for referrals of Medicare patients. Orillo pled guilty to healthcare fraud, 18 U.S.C. 1347 and paying kickbacks to physicians for patient referrals under a federal health care program, 42 U.S.C. 1320a-7b and 18 U.S.C. 2, and was sentenced to 20 months’ imprisonment. Orillo conceded that her scheme caused a loss, to Medicare, in excess of $400,000, and agreed to entry of a $500,000 forfeiture judgment.The district court determined that the loss amount for the healthcare fraud count was $744,481 and ordered her to pay that amount in restitution. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting Orillo’s argument that the loss and restitution amount should be limited to only those stemming from visible alterations. View "United States v. Orillo" on Justia Law

In 2000, the Schuchmans purchased homeowner’s insurance from State Auto to insure a residence in Junction City, Illinois. About 10 years later, a fire severely damaged the insured house and the Schuchmans made a claim against the homeowner’s policy. After a lengthy investigation, State Auto denied the claim on the basis that the Schuchmans were not residing on the “residence premises,” as that term is defined by the policy, and were maintaining a residence other than at the “residence premises,” in violation of the policy’s Special Provisions. The district court entered summary judgment in favor of State Auto. The Seventh Circuit reversed, agreeing that the term “residence premises” is ambiguous and should be liberally construed in favor of coverage. View "Schuchman v. State Auto Prop. & Cas.Ins. Co." on Justia Law

Convicted of sex trafficking in violation of 18 U.S.C. 1591(a), and sentenced to 50 years in prison. Sawyer admits that he forced at least seven girls whom he knew to be minors to work as prostitutes for his benefit. He argued that his conviction should be vacated because the jury was instructed improperly on one element of the offense. The Seventh Circuit rejected the argument and affirmed. By agreeing to the instructions at trial, Sawyer waived his argument. Even if he had not waived the point, the instructions were correct in explaining that the government had to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Sawyer’s conduct affected interstate commerce to prove guilt but that Sawyer need not have known or intended that his conduct would have an effect on interstate commerce. Sawyer stipulated that his conduct had such an effect. The court rejected an argument that the jury should have been instructed to acquit if the government did not prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he actually knew or intended that his conduct affected interstate commerce. The statutory term “knowingly” does not modify “in or affecting interstate commerce,” which merely established a basis for congressional jurisdiction. View "United States v. Sawyer" on Justia Law

Philpot, former Clerk of Lake County, Indiana, took $25,000 in incentive payments from a federally funded child‐support fund (42 U.S.C. 658a(a)) without the required approval of the county fiscal body. The Indiana Department of Child Services disburses those federal funds to the counties, Ind. Code 31‐25‐4‐23(a), which have a relatively free hand in directing the money, although “amounts received as incentive payments may not, without the approval of the county fiscal body, be used to increase or supplement the salary of an elected official.” Philpot had used the funds to provide himself and staff members with bonuses. Convicted of mail fraud, 18 U.S.C. 1341, and theft from a federally funded program 18 U.S. 666(a)1A, he was sentenced to 18 months in prison. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, despite claims concerning whether Philpot “knowingly” violated the statute and the fact that Philpot had voluntarily returned the funds. View "United States v. Philpot" on Justia Law