Justia U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Hernandez pleaded guilty to conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute cocaine, 21 U.S.C. 846, and two counts of possession with intent to distribute cocaine, 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1). At sentencing, the district court found that Hernandez was responsible for more than 150 kilograms of cocaine and sentenced him to 210 months’ imprisonment, followed by four years of supervised release. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The record showed that Hernandez knowingly and voluntarily pleaded guilty. The court conducted a thorough plea colloquy, ensuring that Hernandez was provided an interpreter at every stage, and advised Hernandez of his rights. The court ensured that he understood his rights and that he was fully aware of the nature of the charges, the consequences of his plea, and the possible punishment. There is no indication that the district court judge thought he had to impose a higher mandatory minimum sentence as a result of finding Hernandez responsible for a larger amount of cocaine than the charging document attributed to him.b View "Unted States v. Hernandez" on Justia Law

While executing a search warrant, police found illegal drugs and a firearm in Scott’s home. Scott was indicted for two drug offenses and two firearms offenses. The affidavit submitted to obtain the warrant described two controlled drug buys in which detectives used a confidential informant to purchase heroin from Reynolds. On each occasion, after meeting the CI, Reynolds drove alone to Scott’s house and returned to the CI with the requested heroin. The affidavit contained one sentence describing an audio recording of a conversation between Scott and Reynolds, in Scott’s driveway, during the first controlled buy. The district court denied a motion to suppress. Scott pled guilty to possessing a controlled substance with the intent to distribute, 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1), and was sentenced to 120 months of imprisonment. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, holding that there was sufficient evidence apart from the driveway conversation to establish probable cause for the search warrant so that it was not necessary to reach the issue of whether Scott had a reasonable expectation of privacy in his driveway conversation. View "United States v. Scott" on Justia Law

In 1981, Hooper was convicted of three murders and sentenced to death. The Supreme Court of Illinois affirmed, but ordered a new penalty trial. That trial ended in another capital sentence, which was affirmed. State court collateral review left the convictions in place, but the Governor commuted the sentence to life imprisonment. The district court denied a petition under 28 U.S.C. 2254. The Seventh Circuit vacated, finding that the Supreme Court of Illinois applied the U.S. Supreme Court’s Batson decision unreasonably to Hooper’s situation in concluding that the evidence did not make out a prima facie case of race discrimination in jury selection. The venire drawn for Hooper’s trial had 63 members; seven were black. Two of the seven were removed on challenges for cause. The prosecutor exercised peremptory challenges against the remaining five. The decisions of the trial judge, who was subsequently convicted of accepting bribes, are entitled to no deference. The Seventh Circuit acknowledged that a fruitful Batson hearing may not be possible 32 years after the trial and that a new trial, 33 years after the crime, may be challenging. View "Hooper v. Ryan" on Justia Law

In 1999 Brooks, an assembly-line operator for Prairie Packaging, was seriously injured on the job and lost his left hand, wrist, and forearm. He filed a workers’ compensation claim seeking recovery for permanent and total disability, which remains pending. Prairie treated Brooks as a disabled employee on a company-approved leave of absence, so that he continued to receive healthcare coverage. Pactiv acquired Prairie in 2007 and continued this arrangement. In 2010 Pactiv sent Brooks a letter instructing him to submit documents verifying his ability to return to work; failure to submit would mean termination of employment. Because his injury was totally disabling, Brooks did not submit verification and Pactiv fired him; he lost his healthcare coverage under the employee-benefits plan. Brooks sued Pactiv and Prairie under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act, 29 U.S.C. 1001–1461, for benefits due and breach of fiduciary duty and asserted an Illinois law claim for retaliatory discharge. The district court dismissed. The Seventh Circuit affirmed with respect to ERISA because Brooks did not allege that the employee-benefits plan promised him post-employment benefits. Pactiv acted as an employer, not as a fiduciary, in terminating Brooks’s employment and cancelling his health insurance. The court reinstated the state law claim. View "Brooks v. Pactiv Corp." on Justia Law

Eads, age 26, was charged with possession and distribution of child pornography and tampering with a potential witness. The district court cautioned him, but he chose to represent himself and stipulated that the images constituted child pornography, but claimed that he was being framed and that the images belonged to someone else. Over Eads’s objection, the district court allowed the government to introduce photographs and short video clips of the child pornography discovered on Eads’s home computer to show he knowingly possessed and distributed these images and telephone calls Eads made to his wife urging her to recant her earlier statements. Eads was convicted and the district court sentenced him to 480 months’ imprisonment. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, finding that the court adequately cautioned Eads about proceeding pro se, that the images were not unfairly prejudicial because the additional evidence of his guilt was overwhelming, and that there was sufficient evidence ofEads’s attempts to corruptly persuade his wife to testify falsely. View "United States v. Eads" on Justia Law

After the mutual funds, known as the Lancelot or Colossus group, folded in 2008, the trustee in bankruptcy filed independent suits or adversary actions seeking to recover from solvent third parties, including the Funds’ auditor, law firm, and some of the Funds’ investors, which the Trustee believes received preferential transfers or fraudulent conveyances. The Funds had invested in notes issued by Thousand Lakes, which was actually a Ponzi scheme, paying old investors with newly raised money. In these proceedings the trustee contends that investors who redeemed shares before the bankruptcy received preferential transfers, 11 U.S.C. 547, or fraudulent conveyances, 11 U.S.C. 548(a)(1)(B) and raised a claim under the Illinois fraudulent-conveyance statute, using the avoiding power of 11 U.S.C. 544. The bankruptcy court dismissed the claims against the law firm that prepared circulars for the Firms. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. No Illinois court has held that failure to report a corporate manager’s acts to the board of directors exposes a law firm to malpractice liability. The complaint does not plausibly allege that alerting the directors would have made a difference. View "Peterson v. Winston & Strawn, LLP" on Justia Law

After the mutual funds, known as the Lancelot or Colossus group, folded in 2008, the trustee in bankruptcy filed independent suits or adversary actions seeking to recover from solvent third parties, including the Funds’ auditor, law firm, and some of the Funds’ investors, which the Trustee believes received preferential transfers or fraudulent conveyances. The Funds had invested in notes issued by Thousand Lakes, which was actually a Ponzi scheme, paying old investors with newly raised money. In these proceedings the trustee contends that investors who redeemed shares before the bankruptcy received preferential transfers, 11 U.S.C. 547, or fraudulent conveyances, 11 U.S.C. 548(a)(1)(B) and raised a claim under the Illinois fraudulent-conveyance statute, using the avoiding power of 11 U.S.C. 544. The bankruptcy court rejected the claims, citing the statutory exception: “the trustee may not avoid a settlement payment or transfer made to a financial participant in connection with a securities contract, except under section 548(a)(1)(A) of this title.” The Seventh Circuit affirmed. A transfer from the Funds to each redeeming investor occurred “in connection with” a securities contract. View "Peterson v. Somers Dublin, Ltd." on Justia Law

Weigle and Moore were experienced mechanics employed by Truckers 24‐Hour in Indianapolis; they undertook a job to rebuild the braking system on a semi‐truck trailer. The trailer somehow moved as both were working underneath it, causing the support stands to tip over and the trailer to come crashing down. The support stands were designed by SPX. In a suit against SPX, the mechanics alleged inadequate warnings and defective design under the Indiana Product Liability Act, Ind. Code 34‐20‐1‐1. The district court granted SPX summary judgment, finding that the warnings were adequate as a matter of law and that, as a result, the support stands were not defective under Indiana law. The Seventh Circuit affirmed as to the inadequate‐warnings claims, but vacated with respect to the defective‐design claims. A reasonable fact finder could determine that the SPX support stands were in a defective condition that was unreasonably dangerous. That the SPX support stands differ from most others on the market tends to show that their design is not contemplated by reasonable expected users. View "Weigle SPX Corp." on Justia Law

Evansville police received a tip that Hodge had sent text messages containing sexually explicit images of Hodge and a child. Under questioning, Hodge identified himself in the images. Police seized a computer and data storage equipment from his home and found many images of the child, whom Hodge identified as his nine-year-old niece, engaged in sexual and sadistic acts with Hodge and Hodge’s wife. Hodge was indicted on seven counts of production of sexually explicit material involving a minor, 18 U.S.C. 2251(a) and (e), two counts of conspiracy, 18 U.S.C. 2251(a), and two counts of distribution, 18 U.S.C. 2252(a)(1). Hodge’s wife and another were also indicted. Hodge entered a guilty plea. During his sentencing hearing, Hodge offered testimony in mitigation from psychiatrist Cady. The district court discussed some of Cady’s findings in explaining the sentence, but neglected to mention other findings, most notably contentions that Hodge’s history of sexual and psychological abuse as a child contributed to his decision to commit his offenses and that Hodge was unlikely to reoffend. The Seventh Circuit upheld the sentence of 1380 months’ imprisonment, stating that Hodge’s arguments would reduce sentencing to a “checklist.” View "United States v. Hodge" on Justia Law

Gray’s friend Johnson offered to act as co‐borrower to help Gray buy a house, if Gray promised that she would only be on the loan as a co‐borrower for two years. In return, Johnson received a finder’s fee from the daughter of the builder-seller (Hinrichs). Mortgage broker Bowling sent their application to Fremont, a federally insured lender specializing in stated‐income loans, with which the lender typically did not verify financial information supplied by applicants. Bowling testified that he told both women that they would be listed as occupants, that their incomes would be inflated, and what the monthly payment would be. The closing proceeded; Gray and Johnson received a $273,700 mortgage from Fremont and, on paper, a $48,300 second mortgage from Hinrichs. Gray and Johnson acknowledge that the application that they signed contained several false statements. Bowling became the subject of a federal investigation. Sentenced to 51 months’ imprisonment, he agreed to testify against his clients. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the convictions of Gray and Johnson under 18 U.S.C. 1014, which prohibits “knowingly” making false statements to influence the action of a federally insured institution. Rejecting an argument that the district court erred by denying an opportunity to present testimony to show Bowling’s history of duping clients, the court stated that his prior wrongdoing was not very probative of Gray’s and Johnson’s guilt. View "United States v. Gray" on Justia Law