Justia U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

In 2002, Taylor was convicted on eight counts for initiating inappropriate relationships with children. After trial, Taylor’s retained attorney withdrew. With new counsel, Taylor moved for a new trial, alleging a variety of errors including ineffective assistance of counsel. The trial court agreed and vacated four counts, noting counsel’s failure to impeach or even cross-examine some witnesses. The Illinois Appellate Court affirmed the remaining convictions and the Illinois Supreme Court rejected a Petition for Leave to Appeal in 2004. Seeking state post-conviction relief, Taylor argued that trial counsel represented him while simultaneously under indictment for bribery Illinois, on four felony bribery charges. The Illinois Appellate Court affirmed dismissal of the petition. Continuing to have trouble with attorneys he hired, Taylor turned to an online group, ACDG, which found attorneys to represent him in continuing appeals. Taylor claims that one of those attorneys gave him incorrect information about the deadline for filing a petition of habeas corpus in federal court. When ACDG confirmed to Taylor that it would not represent him in federal post-conviction review, Taylor filed a pro se petition, which was dismissed. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, stating that Taylor does not meet the standard for equitable tolling.View "Taylor v. Dexhiemer" on Justia Law

Brock was convicted of three counts of possessing a firearm as a convicted felon, 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1), and was sentenced to a 15-year mandatory minimum term of imprisonment under the Armed Career Criminal Act, 18 U.S.C. 924(e)(1). At trial, Brock’s wife had testified that she had seen Brock handle at least one firearm and that, before the government search, he had asked her to move two guns to the car. No other witness testified that Brock had used the firearms or had known they were in the home, so Mrs. Brock’s testimony was important to prove that Brock knowingly possessed the firearms. The district court found that the marital evidentiary privileges had been waived when Mrs. Brock testified at a pretrial detention hearing. The Seventh Circuit agreed that spousal communication privilege had been waived and that Brock lacked standing to challenge the finding that the separate spousal testimonial privilege was waived. The court vacated the sentence however, noting its recent holding that unlawful possession of a sawed-off shotgun no longer counts as a violent felony. View "USA v. Michael Brock" on Justia Law

Defendant remained in the driver’s seat of his vehicle during a staged drug transaction involving an undercover officer. His loaded gun was found in a secret compartment in the vehicle, at a distance from where defendant was seated and accessible only by performing a complicated sequence of steps that would necessitate folding down seats. Convicted of attempting to possess cocaine with the intention of distributing it, 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1), 846, and of possessing a firearm “in furtherance of any such crime,” 18 U.S.C. 924(c)(1)(A), defendant was sentenced to 60 months for the gun crime, to run consecutively to a 175-month sentence for the drug crime, and challenged the gun conviction. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, reasoning that defendant “possessed” everything in the vehicle and may have been emboldened to agree to the transaction by the existence of a place to store the drugs and of a loaded gun in a location from which they were not likely to be snatched. View "United States v. Brown" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, a pretrial detainee in a maximum-security tier of Chicago’s Cook County Jail, sued a guard, Anderson, under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging that Anderson failed to protect him from an attack by other inmates. Plaintiff claimed that Anderson had released the inmates from their cells and allowed them to congregate in a dark corridor, where the attack occurred, and that Anderson left her post after doing so. The district judge granted summary judgment in favor of Anderson, refusing to allow plaintiff to testify that he overheard prisoners in the dayroom ask Anderson to let the prisoners in the other half of the tier out of their cells so that they could go to the dayroom too. The Seventh Circuit reversed and remanded, stating a jury could draw an inference of deliberate indifference and that the proffered testimony was not inadmissible hearsay. Plaintiff sought to testify to what he heard, not to the truth of anything said. The court also criticized the judge’s refusal to request assistance of counsel for the plaintiff. View "Junior v. Anderson" on Justia Law

A.M., a 14-year-old girl, told a worker at a children’s center that she had been sexually abused for three years by Nania. A.M. had babysat for Nania’s twin daughters for several years. Officers searched Nania’s home and recovered a computer containing many images of child pornography and a VHS cassette that showed Nania sexually abusing his stepdaughter, S.M., who later stated that Nania had sexually exploited her for years and that she had attempted suicide to escape the abuse. Nania was convicted of the sexual abuse itself in Illinois state court. In federal court, he pled guilty to producing child pornography, 18 U.S.C. 2251(a). At his federal sentencing hearing, Nania argued that the conduct involved in the offenses overlapped to such an extent that the sentences should run concurrently. The district court disagreed and ordered that Nania serve his 330-month federal prison term consecutively to his state sentences, which total 72 years. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. View "United States v. Nania" on Justia Law

Stern represented Allen in a discrimination suit, after which they became romantically involved. Allen and her husband had separated and had executed a settlement agreement awarding Allen $95,000, to be paid in installments. A month later, Allen visited a bankruptcy attorney, Losey, giving Stern’s name as “friend/referral” on an intake form. In filing for bankruptcy, Allen did not disclose the marital settlement. While her bankruptcy was pending, Allen received the money. A month after her bankruptcy discharge, Allen transferred the settlement proceeds to Stern, who opened a CD in his name. The attorney for Allen’s ex-husband informed the bankruptcy trustee that Allen failed to disclose the settlementand the discharge was revoked. Allen pleaded guilty to making a false declaration in a bankruptcy proceeding, 18 U.S.C. 152(3). She told a grand jury that Stern had not referred her to Losey and was convicted of making a material false statement in a grand jury proceeding, 18 U.S.C. 1623. The court admitted Losey’s client-intake form as evidence of perjury. Stern was convicted of conspiring to commit money laundering, 18 U.S.C. 1956(h). The Seventh Circuit affirmed Allen’s conviction, holding that the intake form was not a communication in furtherance of legal representation and was not subject to attorney-client privilege. Reversing Stern’s conviction, the court held that the judge erred in excluding Stern’s testimony about why he purchased the CDs. View "United States v. Stern" on Justia Law

Elliot, which provides construction and maintenance services, owns and leases bucket trucks. In 1996, Elliot entered into a lease with TECO, a manufacturer of such trucks, agreeing agreed to hold TECO harmless from liability arising from injuries resulting from use, operation, or transportation of the vehicle or its location or condition. In 2000, Large was injured while operating a truck, which his employer, Elliot, had leased from TECO. Large sued TECO. TECO’s successor in interest (Mobile) filed a third-party complaint against Elliot, seeking defense and indemnification pursuant to the lease. Mobile later settled with Large without Elliot’s participation, leaving the third-party complaint against Elliot as the only outstanding issue. After a change in Virginia law, Mobile again moved for summary judgment, which the district court granted, holding Elliot responsible to defend and indemnify Mobile. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting Elliot’s argument that a later invoice superseded the terms of the lease, eliminating Elliot’s duty to defend and indemnify except in the case that Elliot violated obligations under the invoice by failing to either adequately train Large in the use of the truck or to provide him with copies of the truck’s operation and maintenance manuals. View "Large v. Mobile Tool Int'l, Inc." on Justia Law

In 1993, Zambrano, a lawful permanent U.S. resident, pleaded guilty to aggravated sexual abuse of a minor, an aggravated felony that made him deportable. He served four years of probation. Until 1996, permanent resident aliens facing deportation could apply for a discretionary Section 212(c) waiver. Zambrano, having been in the U.S. since 1979 and not having served any jail time for his felonies, likely would have obtained, a Section 212(c) waiver had his deportation order been entered before 1996. His removal proceedings began in 1998, after enactment of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act and the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act. Section 212(c) waivers were replaced with narrower discretionary relief, “cancellation of removal,” under which the Attorney General may cancel removal for certain lawful permanent residents, but not for those convicted of aggravated felonies. 8 U.S.C. 1229b(a)(3). Zambrano was removed 2000. A decade later, back in the U.S, he was charged with illegal reentry, 8 U.S.C. 1326. Zambrano pleaded guilty, but on the eve of sentencing, moved to withdraw his plea, based on the Supreme Court’s 2011 decision, Judulang v. Holder. The district court denied the motion and sentenced Zambrano to 12 months and one day. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. View "United States v. Zambrano" on Justia Law

At age 43 Townsend robbed a bank, pretending to have a gun; 36 days later he robbed a payday lender while carrying a gun. He pleaded guilty to violating 18 U.S.C. 2113(a) and was sentenced to 41 months’ imprisonment, the low end of the Sentencing Guidelines range. Townsend sought a downward departure under U.S.S.G.5K2.20, for behavior that was aberrant. Townsend had lived a law-abiding life until he got into financial distress. The judge said that he understood why Townsend had committed the crimes but that it is essential to enforce the law to deter people from dealing with economic hardship by turning to bank robbery. Townsend robbed two financial institutions, more than a month apart, and was outside the escape hatch created by 5K2.20. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, declining to read “single criminal transaction” as equivalent to “multiple crimes with a single motivation.” The court noted the trial judge’s reasoned consideration of Townsend’s personal circumstances. View "United States v. Townsend" on Justia Law

After working at the company for four months, Benes charged his employer with sex discrimination. The EEOC arranged for mediation in which, after an initial joint session, the parties separated and a go-between relayed offers. Upon receiving a settlement proposal that he thought too low, Benes stormed into the room used by his employer’s representatives and said loudly: “You can take your proposal and shove it up your ass and fire me and I’ll see you in court.” The firm fired him. He filed suit under the anti-retaliation provision of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. 2000e–3(a), abandoning his claim of sex discrimination. A magistrate judge granted the employer summary judgment, finding that Benes had been fired for misconduct during the mediation, not for making or supporting a charge of discrimination. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, stating that section 2000e–3(a) does not establish a privilege to misbehave in mediation, but only bans retaliation “because [a person] has opposed any practice made an unlawful employment practice by this subchapter, or because he has made a charge, testified, assisted, or participated in any manner in an investigation, proceeding, or hearing under this subchapter.” View "Benes v. A.B. Data, Ltd." on Justia Law