Justia U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Ramos was arrested in 2007 and charged with residential burglary. After an Illinois state court acquitted him of that charge, he brought an action under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging that Chicago and five police officers violated his constitutional rights under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments in conducting a false arrest and malicious prosecution, and also asserting state law claims for malicious prosecution and indemnification. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants on the section 1983 claims and declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Ramos’ state law claims. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Based on a report of a burglary and a description of the suspect, the officers had reasonable suspicion that criminal activity was ongoing, sufficient to justify a “Terry” stop. Ramos’ failure to produce a valid driver’s license provided probable cause for his arrest. View "Ramos v. City of Chicago" on Justia Law

After pleading guilty to possession with intent to distribute cocaine and possession of a firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking crime, defendant was sentenced to 168 months of incarceration, applying a relatively recent sentencing enhancement under U.S.S.G. 2D1.1(b)(12) for “maintain[ing] a premises for the purpose of manufacturing or distributing a controlled substance.” The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Considering the frequency and significance of the illicit activities conducted on the premises, application of the enhancement was clearly warranted; the judge did not improperly consider the defendant’s personal characteristics. View "United States v. Flores-Olague" on Justia Law

Morris died after a 2004 collision in Indiana; he was a passenger in Sampson’s vehicle. Sampson was insured by Mid-Century. The Estate made a claim for $50,000, the highest allowable amount. Nuzzo, a citizen of Ohio, was the assigned claims adjustor. The Estate ultimately filed a wrongful death suit. An Indiana state court awarded $1.2 million. Sampson assigned his rights against Mid-Century for an agreement that the Estate would not pursue collection against Sampson personally. In 2011, the Estate sued Mid-Century in California state court, alleging that its bad faith failure to pay the claim resulted in the excess jury verdict against Sampson. The court dismissed on forum non conveniens grounds. The Estate then sued Mid-Century and Nuzzo in Ohio state court, alleging tortious bad faith failure to pay the claim and breach of contract. The case was removed to an Ohio federal district court, then transferred to the district court in Indianapolis, which found that claims against Nuzzo were potentially viable under Ohio law, but that Indiana law governed both claims, so that Nuzzo was fraudulently joined. The court dismissed claims against Nuzzo and denied the Estate’s motion to remand. The Seventh Circuit vacated with instructions to remand, finding that Nuzzo was not fraudulently joined. View "Morris v. Nuzzo" on Justia Law

Hakim was an Accenture employee for nearly 10 years before being let go as part of a workforce reduction. During part of his tenure with the company, he participated in the company’s pension plan. In 1996, Accenture amended the plan to exclude a number of employees in various departments. In 1999, Hakim was promoted to a position in which he was no longer eligible to participate in the plan under the terms of the 1996 amendment. Upon his 2003 termination, at age 39, Hakim signed a release in exchange for separation benefits that waived all claims that arose prior to signing the release. In 2008, while employed elsewhere, Hakim sought additional pension benefits from Accenture, arguing that the notice of the 1996 amendment to the plan (which was emailed to employees) was insufficient and violated ERISA’s notice requirements, 29 U.S.C. 1054(h). His claim was denied by Accenture. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Accenture, holding that Hakim knew or should have known about his claim when he signed the release, and thus waived his claim. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. View "Hakim v. Accenture U.S. Pension Plan" on Justia Law

Parker was employed as a bank teller, assigned to reconcile temporary checks to temporary check issuance forms. Temporary checks were blank checks kept behind the counter for customer use. Investigation of a 2006 robbery at the branch led to the allegation that Parker stole eight temporary checks, drawn on the accounts of four customers, and cashed them for a total of $76,450. Some of the funds were returned, the actual loss to the Bank was approximately $49,890. Parker was represented by four different appointed counsel and eventually proceeded pro se; in 2011, the district court ordered a competency evaluation. Although represented by counsel, Parker filed an unsuccessful pro se motion to dismiss on several grounds, including an alleged speedy trial violation. More than 18 months after her arraignment, Parker’s jury trial commenced. Convicted of three counts of bank fraud, 18 U.S.C. 1344, and of embezzlement by a bank employee, 18 U.S.C. 656, she was sentenced to 30 months’ imprisonment, including an enhancement for obstruction of justice. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the conviction, but vacated the sentence. The district court’s comments did not clarify whether it found that Parker’s denial of involvement in the scheme was willful. View "USA v. Ruby Parker" on Justia Law

Davenport showed his gun to his friends at a bar. A bar employee observed him and called the police, and Davenport, a felon on probation, was arrested and charged with violating 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1). He pleaded guilty and was sentenced as an armed career criminal to 192 months’ imprisonment. Davenport filed a notice of appeal, but his appointed lawyer filed an Anders motion to withdraw. The Seventh Circuit granted the motion and dismissed the appeal. In challenging the voluntariness of his plea, Davenport could not meet the stringent plain-error standard on the record before us. The district court ensured that he understood the charge against him, Fed.R.Civ.P. 11(b)(1), the penalties he faced (from 15 years to life in prison, a fine of up to $250,000, and up to 5 years of supervised release), id. at (H)-(M), and the various trial and appellate rights he was waiving by pleading guilty. The court’s single omission from the list of waived rights was Davenport’s right to testify if he went to trial, but such an oversight does not constitute plain error unless the error actually renders the defendant’s conviction unjust. View "United States v. Davenport" on Justia Law

The defendant was a member of a six-man gang of thieves that stole trucks and sold the cargoes to fences. The district court ruled that he was a leader or organizer and increased his base offense level by four levels, raising the guidelines range from 41 to 51 months to 63 to 78 months for conspiring to transport, and transporting, stolen motor vehicles and goods in interstate commerce, 18 U.S.C. 371, 312, 2314. The judge imposed a below-guidelines sentence of 58 months. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting an argument that defendant was a “mere manager or supervisor.” The defendant used his information about what the fences would buy to direct the other members. The fences paid him for the cargoes and he split the money, acting as a paymaster and as a recruiter. Without him or someone in his position the gang would have fallen apart. View "United States v. Rosales" on Justia Law

Husband, Sirbu, and wife, Prodan, entered the U.S. as nonimmigrant tourists in 2009 and overstayed their visas. They then filed a timely application for asylum, withholding of removal, and relief under the Convention Against Torture. Sirbu’s persecution claim is based on politically motivated mistreatment that occurred in Moldova between 2000 and 2009; he claims to fear prosecution based on his active opposition to the Communist Party. The government responded by charging them as removable under 8 U.S.C. 1227(a)(1)(B). An immigration judge denied relief. The Board of Immigration Appeals affirmed. The Seventh Circuit granted their petition for review and remanded, finding that the immigration judge and the Board applied the wrong legal standard in holding that the facts did not “compel” a finding of past persecution. If the Board concludes that Sirbu has demonstrated past persecution, the burden will shift to the government to prove that changed circumstances mean that Sirbu’s fear of persecution in Moldova is no longer well-founded. View "Sirbu v. Holder" on Justia Law

Peoples Bank loaned Debtors $214,044, secured by a mortgage recorded in 2004. In 2008, Debtors obtained a $296,000 construction loan from Banterra, secured with a second mortgage on the same property. Banterra was aware of the first mortgage, but did not know was that in 2007, Debtors obtained a second loan from Peoples, for $400,000, secured by another mortgage on a different piece of property. The 2004 Peoples mortgage contained a cross-collateralization provision, stating that “In addition to the Note, this Mortgage secures all obligations … of Grantor to Lender … now existing or hereafter arising,” and a provision that “At no time shall the principal amount of the Indebtedness secured by the Mortgage … exceed $214,044.26 … “Indebtedness” … includes all amounts that may be indirectly secured by the Cross-Collateralization provision.” In 2010 Debtors filed a Chapter 11 bankruptcy petition. The balance due on Peoples 2004 loan was then $115,044.26. Debtors received permission and sold the property for $388,500.00. Out of these proceeds, Peoples claimed the balance due on the 2004 loan plus partial payment of the 2007, up to the cap. The Bankruptcy Court found in favor of Peoples. The district court reversed. The Seventh Circuit reversed, upholding the “plain language” of the cross-collateralization agreement. View "Peoples Nat'l Bank v. Banterra Bank" on Justia Law

Following a high-speed chase, an assault on an officer, and a four-hour standoff at a hotel, Brown was arrested and charged with unlawful possession of a firearm by an armed career criminal, bank robbery, interference with interstate commerce by robbery, and brandishing a firearm during a crime of violence. Brown pleaded guilty to unlawful possession of a firearm, 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1) and 924(e) without a plea agreement and moved to continue the remaining counts of the indictment until after his sentencing on the firearm possession charge. Prior to sentencing, Brown objected to four factual representations contained in his Presentence Investigation Report and objected to the PSR’s application of a two-level enhancement for reckless endangerment during flight. The district court imposed an above-guidelines sentence of 400 months’ imprisonment. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The district judge articulated her view of the disputed facts and explained how they impacted her ultimate sentencing determination. Taken together, the undisputed facts surrounding Brown’s flight demonstrate that Brown “recklessly created a substantial risk of death or serious bodily injury to another person” when he fled from law enforcement on the day of his arrest, U.S.S.G. 3C1.2. View "United States v. Brown" on Justia Law