Justia U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

The Pekin Board of Fire and Police Commissioners determined that Simmons, an officer of the city’s police department, had disobeyed an order. It suspended him without pay for 20 days. A state court of appeals reversed, concluding that the chief of police lacked authority to issue the order. Campion, a psychologist, had concluded that Simmons was unfit for duty. Simmons told the chief that he had been evaluated by other psychologists who thought him able to serve. The chief ordered Simmons to ensure that these other psychologists provided Campion with their conclusions, supported by evaluations and data. The appellate court held that the chief could require an officer to provide no more than a psychologist’s bottom line. Simmons then sued under 42 U.S.C.1983, contending that the due process clause requires the city to make up the pay he lost. The district court dismissed, holding that Illinois requires back pay only when the board rules in an officer’s favor, while here the favorable ruling came from a court. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, noting that the district judge should not have used a section 1983 suit to resolve a claim that rests entirely on a proposition of state substantive law. View "Simmons v. Gillespie" on Justia Law

In 2008 Stein pleaded guilty to misdemeanor battery in Wisconsin, after he struck his live-in girlfriend, breaking two of her teeth and bruising her face. As part of Stein’s plea bargain, the state prosecutor dismissed a domestic-abuse surcharge that normally would apply. Stein, an avid hunter, wanted to preserve the ability to possess and use guns. His attorney advised in open court that he would not violate federal law by possessing and using the guns that he already owned. The state judge warned Stein that “there’s no guarantees” he could possess guns after his conviction. At a hearing in 2009 on his request for early termination of his probation, Stein received new information making it clear that his attorney had given him bad advice. Stein subsequently admitted to possessing guns and the district judge ruled that evidence concerning Stein’s knowledge of his legal status was irrelevant and rejected his proposed jury instruction. Stein was convicted for possessing a firearm following a misdemeanor conviction for a crime of domestic violence, 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(9). The Seventh Circuit affirmed. View "United States v. Stein" on Justia Law

Belmont did not pay subcontractors and suppliers on some projects. Gad, its CEO, disappeared. West Bend Mutual paid more than $2 million to satisfy Belmont’s obligations and has a judgment against Belmont, Gad, and Gizynski, who signed checks for more than $100,000 on Belmont’s account at U.S. Bank, payable to Banco Popular. Gizynski told Banco to apply the funds to his outstanding loan secured by commercial real estate. Banco had a mortgage and an assignment of rents and knew that Belmont was among Gizynski’s tenants; it did not become suspicious and did not ask Belmont how the funds were to be applied. Illinois law requires banks named as payees to ask the drawer how funds are to be applied. The district judge directed the parties to present evidence about how Belmont would have replied to a query from the Bank. Gizynski testified that Gad, as CEO, would have told the Bank to do whatever Gizynski wanted. The judge found Gizynski not credible, but that West Bend, as plaintiff, had the burden of production and the risk of non-persuasion. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting an argument based on fiduciary duty, but reversed an order requiring Banco to pay West Bend’s legal fees View "W. Bend Mut. Ins. Co v. Belmont St. Corp." on Justia Law

Johnson Controls, a Wisconsin manufacturer of building management systems and HVAC equipment, and Edman Controls entered into an agreement giving Edman exclusive rights to distribute Johnson’s products in Panama. In 2009, Johnson breached the agreement by attempting to sell its products directly to Panamanian developers, circumventing Edman. Edman invoked the agreement’s arbitration clause. The arbitrator concluded that Johnson had breached the agreement and that Edman was entitled to damages. Johnson sought to vacate or modify the arbitral award, challenging the way in which the award took account of injuries to Edman’s subsidiaries and the arbitrator’s alleged refusal to follow Wisconsin law. The district court ruled in Edman’s favor. The Seventh Circuit affirmed and upheld the district court’s award of attorney fees. View "Johnson Controls, Inc. v. Edman Controls, Inc." on Justia Law

Bracey, an inmate at the Wisconsin Secure Program Facility, was injured in a 2005 altercation with officers after refusing to exit his cell as requested by officers executing a random search. Two days later, Bracey filed a complaint claiming that an officer “viciously attacked” him; by the time he notified the prison that tapes of the incident probably existed, the tapes had been recorded over. Bracey filed suit in 2010 alleging that corrections officers used excessive force and spoliation in failure to download and preserve video from the prison security cameras. Bracey requested court assistance in recruiting counsel, 28 U.S.C. 1915(e)(1). The district court concluded Bracey had made adequate efforts to find counsel but found the allegations sufficiently straightforward and Bracey sufficiently competent to handle the case himself. It denied a motion to compel disclosure of information relating to the destruction of the videotapes and denied requests for spoliation sanctions. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Bracey did not meet his burden of establishing a duty to preserve the videotape and destruction of that video in bad faith. View "Bracey v. Grondin" on Justia Law

In 2003, Congress created Health Savings Accounts to help people with high-deductible health plans save for health care costs by providing tax-preferred treatment for money saved for future medical expenses, 26 U.S.C. 223. Banas and others started a company that created a suite of software products that allowed savers to manage their Health Savings Accounts online. By 2009, the company had more than 100 employees. Venture capital and private equity firms thought the company was a solid investment and bought stock, but the company had provided counterfeit financial documents and had even “faked” customer calls. The owners started raiding clients’ Health Savings Accounts. By the time Banas and Blackburn were stopped, they had misappropriated more than $18,000,000 in client funds. Banas admitted his guilt, accepted responsibility for his actions, and has worked to secure some degree of restitution. The district judge sentenced Banas to 160 months of imprisonment for wire fraud, 18 U.S.C. 1343, well below the Guidelines range. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, particularly noting the impact of the crime on victims. View "Unted States v. Banas" on Justia Law

Tompkins began working in 1978 and was a participant in the Fund, a multi-employer pension fund established and administered under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act, 29 U.S.C. 1001. In 1999, Tompkins was granted a disability pension based on chronic asthmatic bronchitis, which he attributed to working with cement dust for 22 years. Tompkins’s application included agreement to be bound by all the Fund’s rules and regulations, although he did not inquire about those rules or make any effort to find out what they were. Upon receiving his first monthly payment of $2,115.43, he was required to sign a Retirement Declaration that provided notice of disqualifying employment for plan participants receiving retirement pensions but did not include the rules and regulations specific to disability pensioners. In 2007, the Fund suspended his disability pension, claiming that his full-time employment in 2005 and 2006 indicated that he no longer met the definition of “total and permanent disability.” The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the Fund. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Although the Fund acknowledged ambiguity, it based its decision on a reasonable interpretation. View "Tompkins v. Cent. Laborers' Pension Fund" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs were riding in the family’s 1978 station wagon in 2007, in heavy rain with limited visibility. Williams, a recently hired substitute letter carrier for the Postal Service, was in a postal truck, parallel parked on the side of the road with the front of the truck sticking out. Williams had visited a friend and, in violation of USPS rules, was away from his designated route. The vehicles collided, damaging the station wagon. Plaintiffs claim that Williams refused to call police and left the scene, afraid of losing his job. Williams first denied involvement, then resigned. After exhausting administrative remedies, plaintiffs sued under the Federal Tort Claims Act, seeking $45 million. They did not offer any expert testimony on the cause of the collision. Williams did not appear at trial, but in a deposition stated that his vehicle was stationary at the time of the collision. Asked to reconcile this a with the fact that the back end of the car came into contact with the postal truck, Williams responded that he had no explanation and that it was “mystical.” The district court declined to find that Williams breached his duty of ordinary care. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. View "Furry v. United States" on Justia Law

Thomas was sentenced to 65 years’ imprisonment for murder. Indiana courts affirmed the conviction and rejected collateral attack. A federal district judge denied Thomas’s petition for habeas corpus, declined to issue a certificate of appealability, and certified that the appeal had been taken in bad faith, 28 U.S.C. 1915(a)(3). Thomas sought to proceed in forma pauperis. Under section 1915, appeal may not be taken in forma pauperis if the trial court certifies in writing that it is not taken in good faith. The Seventh Circuit rejected an argument that the prohibition does not apply to collateral attacks. Appellate fees are authorized by 28 U.S.C. 1913, which predated the Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1996 (PLRA). If Section 1915 were entirely inapplicable to collateral attacks, just because several of its subsections were rewritten by the PLRA, then there would be no basis for excusing prepayment of the fees and prisoners would be worse off. View "Thomas v. Hank" on Justia Law

Kristofek, a part-time police officer in Orland Hills, arrested a driver for traffic violations, but the driver turned out to be the son of a former mayor of a nearby town. Kristofek was ordered to let him go. Kristofek disagreed with what he believed was political corruption and expressed his concerns to fellow officers, supervisors, and eventually the FBI. When Police Chief Scully found out about this conduct, he fired him. Kristofek sued, bringing First Amendment retaliation claims against Scully and the village under 42 U.S.C. 1983. The district court dismissed, finding that Kristofek’s speech did not involve a matter of public concern, principally because his sole motive was to protect himself from civil and criminal liability. The Seventh Circuit reversed. The complaint did not allege that Kristofek’s only motive was self-interest, and the mere existence of a self-interest motive does not preclude the plausibility of mixed motives, which is consistent with protected speech. Kristofek plausibly pled, “albeit barely,” that Scully had at least de facto authority to set policy for hiring and firing, sufficient to sustain a “Monell” claim against the village. View "Kristofek v. Village of Orland Hills" on Justia Law