Justia U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Articles Posted in March, 2013
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Westmoreland was convicted first for conspiracy to distribute a controlled substance, and in a second trial, for additional counts stemming from the murder of the wife of his partner in drug-dealing: causing the death of a person through the use of a firearm during a drug trafficking crime; using interstate commerce facilities to commit murder for hire; conspiring to commit murder for hire; tampering with a witness by committing murder; and causing the death of a witness through use of a firearm. His convictions were affirmed in 2001 and 2002. In 2002 he moved for a new trial, based on outrageous conduct, including the fact that a state police officer had an affair with his wife and a recantation. The court took no significant action before denying the motion in 2010. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, finding that Westmoreland did not present “newly discovered evidence” and was not prejudiced by allegedly ineffective assistance of counsel. View "United States v. Westmoreland" on Justia Law

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In 2006 a teenager accused Gakuba of kidnapping and raping him. State charges are pending Gakuba sued under 42 U.S.C. 1983, claiming that investigating police barged into his Rockford hotel room without a warrant and seized his wallet and other items after obtaining Gakuba’s video rental records from Hollywood Video to corroborate the accuser’s story that he had spent time watching videos in Gakuba’s room. He also sought damages under the Video Privacy Protection Act, 18 U.S.C. 2710. The district court dismissed without prejudice, granting Gakuba leave to amend his complaint if the indictment concluded in his favor. The court advised Gakuba that certain claims would be barred on immunity grounds. The Seventh Circuit vacated. Gakuba’s claims of damages resulting from illegal searches, seizures, and detentions involve constitutional issues that may be litigated during the course of his criminal case. Monetary relief is not available to him in his defense of criminal charges and his claims may become time-barred by the time the state prosecution has concluded, so the district court should have stayed rather than dismissed Gakuba’s civil-rights claims. The court noted that Hollywood Video employees knowingly disclosed his rental information to the police without a warrant. View "Gakuba v. O'Brien" on Justia Law

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The Illinois Department of Children and Family Services removed Woods, then seven years old from his parents’ home in 1991 and placed him in a residential treatment facility. There had been many reports of sexual abuse among residents of the facility and Woods, claiming to have been abused by another resident, filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983. The district court dismissed the suit as untimely because Woods failed to bring his claim within two years of its accrual, rejecting Woods’s contention that the 20-year limitations period applicable in Illinois to personal injury claims based on childhood sexual abuse applied. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The limitations period applicable to all Section 1983 claims brought in Illinois is two years, as provided in 735 ILCS 5/13-202, and this includes claims involving allegations of failure to protect from childhood sexual abuse. View "Woods v. IL Dep't of Children & Family Servs." on Justia Law

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Companies underwriting workers’ compensation insurance participate in a reinsurance pool administered by the National Workers Compensation Reinsurance Association. Insurers share in the pool’s profit or loss according to the volume of business they underwrite. When the pool is profitable, it is beneficial to have a larger book of business; when the pool loses money, a smaller book means that the underwriter needs to contribute less toward the losses. The class contends that AIG underreported the size of its business in losing years, causing the pool’s other members to bear a disproportionate share of the losses and sought$3.1 billion. Some of the insurers had independent claims against AIG. AIG advanced its own claims against Liberty Mutual. The district judge approved a settlement. Liberty Mutual appealed, arguing that its share would not compensate it adequately for its stand-alone claims against AIG and that the conflicts of interest within the reinsurance pool meant that the case never should have been certified as a class. After argument, Liberty Mutual settled with AIG. The Seventh Circuit dismissed the appeal, holding that the settlement does not jeopardize the interests of the unrepresented class members. View "Am. Int'l Grp. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co" on Justia Law

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Northington worked for H & M. She dated a fellow employee who was also involved with employee Sims. Sims made threats. Northington reported Sims’ behavior to manager Collins, who was then dating (subsequently married) Sims’ mother, the assistant manager. Sims ultimately physically assaulted Northington away from H & M property. The state court issued a protective order. Northington provided the order to the Union, but not to H & M. Northington complained to H & M officers, but did not complain that the harassment was based on race or gender. Based on her behavior during a safety inspection, the inspector suspected that Northington was under the influence of drugs. Northington left the testing facility without giving a required urine sample. Three company officers concurred in terminating her employment, unaware of her criminal complaint against Sims. Northington claimed retaliation in violation of Title VII. The district court found that H & M’s conduct in deleting inactive email accounts was negligent but not willful; assessed H & M costs and fees; deemed specific facts admitted; and precluded H & M from making certain arguments, but granted H & M summary judgment, finding that Northington did not establish that she had participated in protected activity under Title VII. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The discovery sanction did not preclude summary judgment. View "Northington v. H & M Int'l" on Justia Law

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In 2004, Harmon contracted to provide Chicago Bulls rookie Gordon with financial and consulting services for the “duration of [his] playing career,” but outlining a compensation arrangement only for the length of Gordon’s rookie contract with the Bulls, which ended in 2008. In 2007, Gordon became dissatisfied with Harmon’s services, based in part on what he viewed to be a breach of a fiduciary duty relating to a bad investment, and prematurely terminated the agreement. Gordon sued first, claiming Harmon had breached a promissory note between the parties and had breached his fiduciary duties. Harmon asserted counterclaims for breach of the agreement and tortious interference with prospective business advantage. The district court dismissed Harmon’s counterclaims. Harmon refiled his breach of contract claim in Illinois state court and also alleged malicious prosecution, abuse of process, and tortious interference with prospective business advantage. After Gordon removed the case to federal court, the district court ruled in favor of Gordon, concluding that the parties had intended their agreement to last only for the length of Gordon’s rookie contract. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. View "Harmon v. Gordon" on Justia Law

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Pietkiewicz worked in auto-body repair until he engaged in securing financing with six false identities to buy at least 12 cars. He would make small down payments, then abscond with the vehicles. Although these cars were equipped with tracking systems, no signals have been detected, indicating that either Pietkiewicz has disabled the systems or that the cars are no longer in the U.S. Only one car has been recovered. It was found in Canada, inside a shipping container destined for Europe. Convicted in an Ohio federal court of fraud with identification documents, Pietkiewicz was sentenced to six months’ imprisonment and two years of supervised release. After his release, he was charged in an Illinois district court with mail fraud, 18 U.S.C. 1341, and pleaded guilty. The district court denied a motion for downward variance, adopting the PSR’s calculations of an offense level of 24 and criminal history category of II, and imposed a sentence of 71 months’ imprisonment, two years’ supervised release, and $428,461.34 restitution. The Seventh Circuit vacated. The record is silent on the court’s reasoning for possibly using Pietkiewicz’s conduct from the Ohio offense to enhance the sentence but denying a sentence reduction based on the Ohio imprisonment. View "United States v. Pietkiewicz" on Justia Law

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Anchor Mortgage Corporation and its CEO, Munson, were convicted under the False Claims Act, 31 U.S.C. 3729(a)(1), of making false statements when applying for federal guarantees of 11 loans. The district court imposed a penalty of $5,500 per loan, plus treble damages of about $2.7 million. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting an argument that defendants not have the necessary state of mind, either actual knowledge that material statements were false, or suspicion that they were false plus reckless disregard of their accuracy. The court noted that Anchor submitted bogus certificates that relatives had supplied the down payments that the borrowers purported to have made, when it knew that neither the borrowers nor any of their relatives had made down payments and represented that it had not paid anyone for referring clients to it, but in fact it paid at least one referrer. View "United States v. Munson" on Justia Law

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Plaintiff bought a used pickup truck in 2011 for $28,000 and financed the purchase with a six-year installment contract at an interest rate of 23.9 percent. The dealer assigned the contract to AmeriCredit. After making the first installment the plaintiff sent AmeriCredit a copy of the installment contract that he had stamped “accepted for value and returned for value for settlement and closure,” and told AmeriCredit to collect the balance under the contract from the U.S. Treasury. AmeriCredit repossessed the truck, sold it, and billed the plaintiff $11,322.28 to cover the difference. The plaintiff sued AmeriCredit and its officers for $34 million in compensatory damages and $2.2 billion in punitive damages. The district judge could not make sense of the pro se complaint and dismissed it as frivolous. The Seventh Circuit vacated and remanded with directions that the judge either dismiss without prejudice or dismiss with prejudice, as a sanction; vacate the default judgment in favor of AmeriCredit on its counterclaim; and dismiss the counterclaim without prejudice. The court noted the earmarks of the “Sovereign Citizens” movement. View "Baba-Dainja El v. AmeriCredit Fin. Servs., Inc." on Justia Law

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In 1999 the Sellers conveyed businesses to CT Acquisition Corp. The price was to be paid over time. The Sellers insisted on a surety bond (put up by Frontier Insurance) and personal guarantees by the principals of CT Acquisition. The Guarantors also promised to indemnify Frontier and promised to post collateral on Frontier’s demand. CT Acquisition did not pay, the Guarantors failed to keep their promise, and the Sellers turned to Frontier, which did not pay because it was in financial distress. Frontier demanded that the Guarantors post collateral. The district court read the agreement to require collateral only after Frontier’s obligation to the Sellers had been satisfied, or at least quantified. The suit was dismissed as unripe. Meanwhile the Sellers had sued Frontier and obtained judgment of $1.5 million. Frontier then filed another suit against the Guarantors. The district court concluded that, Frontier’s obligation having been quantified, the Guarantors must post collateral and, following remand, ordered the Guarantors to deposit with the Clerk $1,559,256.78, The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting the Guarantors’ argument that they need not post collateral until Frontier has paid the Sellers. View "Frontier Ins. Co. v. Hitchcock" on Justia Law