Justia U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Vahora is a Muslim citizen of India. In 2002, a train caught fire in Gujarat, India. Many Hindu pilgrims and activists were killed, and violence between Hindus and Muslims followed. Vahora testified that he and several Muslim friends were shot and that Hindu leaders continued to pursue him during the four years he remained in India before travelling to Guatemala, then to the U.S. He applied for asylum one year after arriving. An immigration judge ruled that, assuming the application was timely, and even accepting Vahora’s testimony as true, Vahora had not presented a cognizable claim of past persecution or shown that he had a well-founded fear of future persecution because he did not demonstrate that the Indian government was unable or unwilling to protect him. The Board of Immigration Appeals affirmed, finding that the persecution of which Vahora complains was not carried out by persons the government of India was unable or unwilling to control. The Seventh Circuit denied review, noting that Vahora never sought help from any authorities. View "Vahora v. Holder" on Justia Law

Wang was involved in a high-volume conspiracy that produced an estimated 7,000 phony identification documents by altering valid passports to match customers’ identification information, creating fake documents to prove Illinois residency, and helping customers obtain state identification cards or driver’s licenses. Wang participated from 2008 until 2009, connecting customers with document manufacturers, transporting them to state facilities, collecting payments, and retrieving false passports for reuse. At sentencing, Wang received a nine-level increase to his base offense level because the district court held him accountable for more than 100 false documents. The court denied Wang’s request for a minor participant reduction, set his offense level at 21, and calculated his guideline range as 37 to 46 months’ imprisonment on the conspiracy count. The court imposed a term of imprisonment of 37 months on that count and a consecutive, mandatory sentence of 24 months on the aggravated identity theft count. 18 U.S.C. 1028A. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, noting the scope of Wang’s jointly undertaken criminal activity, his demonstrated commitment to the conspiracy, and his active, essential role in many aspects of the scheme. View "Unted States v. Wang" on Justia Law

Mann operated a home day care center. While she was gone, her husband, a licensed day care provider, and Thompson, a newly-hired assistant, remained at the center. The children were left alone in the basement for about 10 minutes. One child hit another with a tray. A complaint was made to DCFS, which determined that Thompson was working without a background search or a medical evaluation. DCFS determined that Mann had failed to provide proper supervision, shut down the center, and prohibited Mann and her husband from providing child care pending full investigation. DCFS entered Mann’s name into the Illinois database concerning child abuse and neglect. DCFS concluded that the violation was “substantiated,” and after supervisory review, recommended license revocation. After another level of review, a corrective plan was recommend rather than revocation. Mann entered into a plan and had the report expunged and her name removed from the database. Mann sued DCFS employees under 42 U.S.C. 1983. The district court dismissed, finding that Mann was not unconstitutionally deprived of a protected liberty interest relating to imposition of the protective plan or deprived of due process when she was prohibited from running her facility during the investigation. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. View "Mann v. Vogel" on Justia Law

Wabash is a power generation cooperative. Northeastern purchases electricity from Wabash and resells it. In 1977, they entered into a contract: Northeastern agreed to purchase electricity from Wabash for 40 years at rates to be set by the Wabash board of directors “[s]ubject to the approval of the Public Service Commission of Indiana.” Revised rates would not be effective unless approved by the “applicable regulatory authorities,” and the federal Rural Electrification Administration. In 2012 Northeastern sought a state court declaratory judgment that Wabash breached the contract by taking action in 2004 that had the effect of transferring regulation of its rates from the Indiana Commission to the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission. Wabash removed the case under 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a), arguing that the claim arises under the Federal Power Act, 16 U.S.C. 791a. The district court denied remand and granted a preliminary injunction. The Seventh Circuit vacated, holding that federal courts lack subject matter jurisdiction. Northeastern’s claim is limited to construction of the contract and does not necessarily raise a question of federal law. While Northeastern may eventually use a favorable state court judgment to seek permission to terminate its obligations under the tariff filed with FERC,that cannot be achieved in this suit View "NE Rural Elec. Membership Corp. v. Wabash Valley Power Assoc." on Justia Law

More than 10 years ago, Obeid and his twin Esawi were indicted for conspiracy to smuggle pseudoephedrine from Canada into the U.S., to be used in Mexico for methamphetamine production. They smuggled at least 215 million tablets and were involved in money laundering related to the scheme. Each pleaded guilty, with sentencing to be deferred while they assisted in the ongoing investigation. At Obeid’s sentencing, the government noted that much of the cooperation being attributed to Obeid actually had been provided by Esawi because the brothers possessed the same information. The district court sentenced Obeid to 178 months in prison, a 45 percent discount from the low end of the guidelines range. Before Obeid’s sentencing, the government entered into another plea agreement with Esawi , agreeing to seek a further reduction for continuing cooperation. Esawi received an additional 24-month reduction. Obeid never attempted to negotiate such an agreement or to provide further cooperation, but spent years challenging his sentence before filing a “motion to compel the government to seek an additional reduction under [Rule 35(b)].” The district court denied the motion. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, reasoning that the motion should have been filed under 28 U.S.C. 2255 and was, therefore, not timely. View "United States v. Obeid" on Justia Law

Eastland is the proprietor of the rap duo Phifty-50, which, according to its web site, has to its credit one album (2003) and a T-shirt. Eastland has registered “PHIFTY-50” as a trademark. It also claims a trademark in “50/50” and contends that Lionsgate and Summit infringed its rights by using “50/50” as the title of a motion picture that opened in 2011. The district court dismissed, finding the movie’s title descriptive because the film concerns a 50% chance of the main character surviving cancer. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, stating that the complaint fails at the threshold: it does not allege that the use of “50/50” as a title has caused any confusion about the film’s source, and any such allegation would be too implausible to support costly litigation. The phrase 50/50 or a sound-alike variant has been in use as the title of intellectual property for a long time. If there is any prospect of intellectual property in the phrase 50/50, Eastland is a very junior user and in no position to complain about the 2011 film. View "Eastland Music Grp. LLC v. Lionsgate Entm't Inc." on Justia Law

In 1996 Beloit agreed to build high-speed paper-making machines for Indonesian paper companies. Two of the companies executed promissory notes in favor of Beloit reflecting a principal indebtedness of $43.8 million. The paper companies guaranteed the notes; Beloit assigned them to JPMorgan in exchange for construction financing. The machines were delivered in 1998 but did not run as specified. In 2000 the parties settled claims pertaining to the machines but preserved obligations under the notes. JPMorgan sued for nonpayment. The district court held that warranty-based claims were foreclosed by the settlement and that other defenses lacked merit; it awarded JPMorgan $53 million. After the appeal was filed, JPMorgan issued citations to discover assets. Although the companies raised an international conflict-of-law question, the district court ordered compliance with the citations. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The settlement waived implied warranty defenses and counterclaims. The fraud defense is also mostly barred; to the extent it is not, the evidence was insufficient to survive summary judgment. The court also rejected defenses that the notes lacked consideration; that the notes were issued for a “special purpose” and were not intended to be repaid; and that JPMorgan is not a holder in due course. The discovery order was not appealable. View "JPMorgan Chase & Co., N.A. v. Asia Pulp & Paper Co., Ltd." on Justia Law

Teruggi worked for CIT from 1997 until his 2009 discharge, as vice president. In 2002, Teruggi suffered a workplace injury to his right hand. In 2006, doctors amputated the little finger on his right hand and removed the connecting bones to his wrist. Teruggi filed a workers’ compensation claim and requested reasonable accommodation with respect to computer use. After other incidents involving sharing email, Terruggi, then 59 years old, was discharged for failure to protect confidential information. He sued, alleging retaliation and discrimination under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. 621, and the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. 12101. The district court granted summary judgment in CIT’s favor, finding that Teruggi’s “mosaic of circumstantial evidence” less than convincing. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The bits of evidence Teruggi offered were essentially isolated events or comments with no apparent connection to the termination decision and did not support a reasonable inference of discrimination or retaliatory discharge, either individually or collectively. View "Teruggi v. CIT Group/Capital Fin., Inc" on Justia Law

In 2010 the U.S. and Wisconsin sued, alleging that defendants polluted the Lower Fox River and Green Bay with PCBs, and had liability under the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act, 42 U.S.C. 9601, for response costs and destruction of natural resources, estimated at $1.5 billion. The Justice Department submitted a proposed consent decree, negotiated among the state, defendants (Brown County and the City of Green Bay), and Indian tribes. The U.S. offered $4.5 million because federal agencies might have contributed to the pollution. Menasha opposed the decree and counterclaimed against the U.S. for costs that Menasha would incur if found liable. Ordinarily a non-party to a consent decree is not bound by it, but approval of the consent decree would otherwise extinguish Menasha’s claims. Menasha sought information under the Freedom of Information Act, claiming that U.S. attorneys, being from defense and prosecution teams, actually have adverse interests, and that their communication concerning the case resulted in forfeiture of attorney work product privilege. The district court held that Menasha was entitled to the documents. The Seventh Circuit reversed, reasoning that Menasha’s claim actually amounted to assertion that the federal attorneys “ganged up” to reduce federal liability and that the documents are privileged. View "Menasha Corp. v. U.S. Dept. of Justice" on Justia Law

After a 2008 Indiana flood, the President authorized the Federal Emergency Management Agency to provide disaster relief under the Stafford Act, 42 U.S.C. 5121–5207. Columbus Regional Hospital was awarded approximately $70 million, but suit under the Tucker Act, 28 U.S.C. 1346, 1349, claiming that it was entitled to about $20 million more. The district judge granted FEMA summary judgment. In response to the Seventh Circuit’s questioning of subject-matter jurisdiction, the Hospital argued that the Court of Federal Claims was the right forum and requested transfer. FEMA argued that the district court had jurisdiction. The Seventh Circuit agreed with FEMA, holding that the suit was not for “money damages.” The Hospital wants money, but not as compensation for FEMA’s failure to perform some other obligation, but as “the very thing to which [it] was entitled” under the disaster-relief program. The court noted that only the district court can serve as a forum for all of the Hospital’s legal theories, then rejected all of those theories. View "Columbus Reg'l Hosp. v. Fed. Emergency Mgmt. Agency" on Justia Law