Justia U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Starting in 2002, Smith sought a place on Beloit’s “tow list,” to be called when police required towing services. Chief Wilson denied these requests. Smith, who is African-American, attributed his exclusion to racial bias. In 2008, Wilson’s subordinates made allegations that, in everyday conversation, Wilson referred to “niggers,” “towel heads,” and “spics.” Several officers specifically recalled that Wilson used such slurs about Smith. Smith filed claims under Title VI, 42 U.S.C. 2000d, 42 U.S.C.1981, and 42 U.S.C. 1983. A jury returned a verdict finding that race was a “motivating factor” in Wilson’s decision not to include Smith on the list, but that Wilson would not have added Smith to the list even if race had played no part in Wilson’s thinking. The district court concluded that the mixed verdict precluded relief. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting arguments that the jury’s second finding (that his company would have been left off the tow list regardless of race) was contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence; that Smith was entitled to some relief because he succeeded in demonstrating that improper racial considerations at least partially motivated Wilson; and that instruction on the allocation of the burden of persuasion was incorrect. View "Smith v. Wilson" on Justia Law

Indiana Code 35-42-4-12 prohibits certain individuals required to register as sex offenders (Ind. Code 11-8-8) from knowingly using a social networking web site, an instant messaging, or chat room program that the offender knows allows access or use by a person who is less than 18 years of age. Violation constitutes a Class A misdemeanor; subsequent violations constitute Class D felonies. The law does not differentiate based on the age of victim, the manner in which the crime was committed, or the time since the predicate offense. It provides a defense if the individual did not know the website allowed minors or upon discovering it does, immediately ceased use, and exempts persons convicted of consensual “Romeo and Juliet relationships” where the victim and perpetrator are close in age. In 2000, Doe was convicted of child exploitation. He challenged the law on First Amendment grounds on behalf of a class of similarly-situated sex offenders. The district court rejected the challenge. The Seventh Circuit reversed, finding the law unconstitutional. Though content neutral, it is not narrowly tailored to serve the state’s interest. It broadly prohibits substantial protected speech rather than specifically targeting the evil of improper communications to minors.View "Doe v. Prosecutor, Marion County" on Justia Law

From 2008 until his 2010 arrest, Dickerson sold crack cocaine to Vankuiken. In August 2010, Dickerson proposed to trade crack cocaine for guns. Vankuiken took five stolen guns, unloaded, to Dickerson’s Kankakee apartment. Dickerson and Vankuiken then drove to a storage facility, where Dickerson left the guns in a rental unit, then returned to Dickerson’s apartment, where Dickerson gave Vankuiken several bags of crack cocaine. Vankuiken was later arrested on suspicion of stealing the guns and agreed to cooperate, directing officers to Dickerson’s storage unit, where they found a cache of weapons and accessories, including three machine guns and two handguns. The officers then arranged for Vankuiken to make a controlled purchase of crack cocaine from Dickerson, after which they lawfully searched Dickerson’s apartments, where they recovered 125.6 grams of crack cocaine and a loaded gun. Dickerson was convicted of knowingly possessing firearms in furtherance of drug distribution under 18 U.S.C. 924(c). The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting arguments that the statute does not cover such guns-for-drugs exchanges; that jury instructions stating otherwise were in error; and that a discrepancy between the offense date charged in the indictment and the date for which the government offered evidence at trial required reversal. View "Unted States v. Dickerson" on Justia Law

In 2011, the Wisconsin Legislature passed Act 10, a budget repair bill proposed by recently-elected Governor Walker. Act 10 significantly altered state public employee labor laws, creating two classes of public employees: “public safety employees” and all others, “general employees.” The Act prohibited general employees from collectively bargaining on issues other than “base wages,” imposed rigorous recertification requirements on them, and prohibited their employers from deducting union dues from paychecks. The Act did not subject public safety employees or their unions to the same requirements. The enactment was controversial and received nationwide publicity. Unions filed suit, challenging the limitations on collective bargaining, the recertification requirements, and a prohibition on payroll deduction of dues, under the Equal Protection Clause. They also challenged the payroll deduction provision under the First Amendment. The district court invalidated Act 10’s recertification and payroll deduction provisions, but upheld the limitation on collective bargaining. The Seventh Circuit held that the Act is valid in its entirety. Act 10 is viewpoint-neutral and, while “publicly administered payroll deductions for political purposes can enhance the unions’ exercise of First Amendment rights, [states are] under no obligation to aid the unions in their political activities.” The classifications and recertification requirement survive rational basis review. View "WI Educ. Ass'n v. Walker" on Justia Law

Roddy, born in 1964, suffers from several serious medical problems, including severe lower back pain attributable to degenerative disc disease. When her pain became unbearable, she stopped working and applied for disability insurance benefits. She was unsuccessful before the Social Security Administration. An administrative law judge found that there were jobs in the national economy within her capabilities, although she no longer could perform her old job as a shift manager at a Taco Bell restaurant. The district court affirmed. The Seventh Circuit vacated and remanded. The ALJ improperly discounted the opinion of a physician and improperly considered Roddy’s testimony about her ability to do housework. View "Roddy v. Astrue" on Justia Law

Boroczk has five children and, between 2006 and 2008, approximately 300 still images and multiple videos of his three- to five-year-old daughter and two-year-old son engaging in sexually explicit conduct. In addition, authorities found approximately 8,452 still images and 186 videos of child pornography on Boroczk’s computer. He was charged with possessing child pornography, 18 U.S.C. 2252A(a)(5)(B), and with manufacturing child pornography, 18 U.S.C. 2251(a). Boroczk admitted to taking pornographic pictures of his kids, to touching them sexually, and sending pornographic images over the internet. Although he initially claimed that he did not think he had done anything wrong and that his children seemed to be having a good time, his level of remorse later “dramatically improved” and a doctor stated that Boroczk’s clinical prognosis for successful long-term rehabilitation was excellent. Another doctor noted research showing that incest sexual offenders recidivate at a lower rate than extra-familial sexual offenders. The government argued that all of the relevant sentencing factors favored the maximum possible sentence, 18 U.S.C. 3553(a). The district court imposed a 70-year sentence. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, noting that Boroczk had described himself as a “kingpin” of child pornography. View "United States v. Boroczk" on Justia Law

Chen illegally entered the U.S. in 2006. Shortly thereafter, his wife gave birth to the couple’s second child in China. Chinese authorities then forcibly sterilized her. Chen filed for asylum, withholding of removal, and relief under the Convention Against Torture, arguing that he suffered persecution when he learned that his wife had been forcibly sterilized. While his removal proceedings were pending, Chen began practicing Falun Gong, a spiritual practice, then supplemented his requests for relief from removal arguing that he feared future persecution because of his Falun Gong activities. Concluding that Chen had not suffered past persecution and lacked a well-founded fear of future persecution, an Immigration Judge denied relief. The Board of Immigration Appeals affirmed. The Seventh Circuit denied an appeal. There was substantial evidence to support a conclusion that Chen had not shown that his Falun Gong practices were likely to attract the attention of the authorities.View "Chen v. Holder" on Justia Law

Bogie attended a comedy show featuring Joan Rivers, who told a joke about Helen Keller, offending an audience member who had a deaf son. The audience member heckled Rivers; their brief exchange was filmed and was part of the documentary. When Rivers exited to a backstage area, closed to the public, Bogie gained entry and expressed frustration with the heckler and sympathy for Rivers. Rivers responded with an expression of sympathy for the heckler. The film shows at least three others present. The interaction was filmed and included in the documentary entitled Joan Rivers: A Piece of Work. Bogie’s conversation lasted 16 seconds in the film’s 82 minutes, 0.3 percent of the entire film. The documentary was distributed nationwide. Bogie alleges that she was portrayed in the film as having approved of condescending and disparaging remarks by Rivers toward Wisconsin, its citizens, and the heckler. Bogie’s complaint alleged that her privacy was invaded by the distribution of the film and that the film misappropriated her image for commercial purposes without her consent. The district court dismissed. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, reasoning that the footage was “incidental,” newsworthy, and not used for advertising. View "Bogie v. Rosenberg" on Justia Law

In 2001, Suggs was convicted of conspiracy to possess cocaine with intent to distribute and was sentenced to 300 months. He challenged his conviction and sentence under 28 U.S.C. 2255, succeeding on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel regarding sentencing. On remand, the district court sentenced him to 240 months. After his 2009 resentencing, Suggs obtained new information that he argues was withheld in violation of Brady v. Maryland. A key witness has recanted and claims that his first statement to law enforcement did not implicate Suggs. The government agreed that if this were Suggs’ first 2255 motion, the evidence would require an evidentiary hearing, but sections 2244(a) and 2255(h) restrict “second or successive” motions to circumstances that do not apply. The Seventh Circuit denied permission to bring a second challenge, 28 U.S.C. 2255(h), finding that his new evidence did “not come close to showing that no reasonable fact-finder would have found him guilty.” Suggs filed a new 2255 motion, arguing that the new evidence challenge should not be barred because his resentencing imposed a new judgment. The district court dismissed. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, reasoning that the Supreme Court’s 2010 decision, Magwood v. Patterson, did not address this situation. View "Suggs v. United States" on Justia Law

The Chaudhry family, citizens of Pakistan, lawfully entered the U.S. in 2003, under a business visitor visa. Before the expiration of that status, Chaudhry and his employer Amtal obtained a status change to skilled worker, extending Chaudhry’s lawful nonimmigrant status through January 21, 2005. Amtal filed a Form I-140 petition that sought to designate Chaudhry a multi-national executive or manager; Chaudhry simultaneously submitted Form I-485 for adjustment of status to lawful permanent resident. CIS rejected both applications because Chaudhry no longer worked for Amtal. Supported by his new employer, Sarus, Chaudhry submitted new documents. CIS approved Sarus’s I-140 employment-based visa petition in 2007, but in 2008, rejected Chaudhry’s I-485 adjustment-of-status application because more than 180 days had elapsed between the expiration of lawful nonimmigrant status and the filing of the final adjustment application. The IJ rejected Chaudry’s argument that he remained in lawful status through the date CIS rejected his first and second adjustment applications. The Board acknowledged that “unlawful presence” and “unlawful status” are distinct concepts, but held that the pendency of prior adjustment applications had no bearing on Chaudhry’s nonimmigrant status after it expired. The Seventh Circuit denied an appeal. View "Chaudhry v. Holder" on Justia Law