Justia U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Johnson, an African-American woman, age 67, worked for 16 years as a legal assistant at the U.S. Attorney’s Office until her voluntary retirement in 2007.Weeks before her retirement, Johnson had a verbal altercation with another legal assistant, Mosley. Management eventually decided that the office would best be served by Johnson’s reassignment to another floor, rather than by a formal reprimand. Johnson’s salary and benefits did not change. Her duties and some working conditions were altered. She sued the Department of Justice for discrimination based on her age, sex and race. She asserted that the trier of fact could infer discriminatory intent from a “mosaic of evidence” comprised of the DOJ’s arguably contradictory witness statements and from her assertions that similarly situated employees had received preferential treatment. She also contended that she could make out a prima facie case of discrimination because she belonged to a protected class, had met her employer’s legitimate expectations, suffered an adverse employment action when reassigned to the file room and was treated differently than similarly situated employees. The district court entered summary judgment for the DOJ. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. View "Johnson v. Holder" on Justia Law

Based on a scheme that involved purchasing large quantities of cell phones, defaulting on payment, and shipping them for resale, Natour was convicted of four counts of interstate transportation of stolen property, 18 U.S.C. 2314. At sentencing, the district court attributed to him a loss amount of approximately $292,000 and determined that he was “in the business of receiving and selling stolen property,” U.S.S.G. 2B1.1(b)(4), resulting in a 14-level increase to the base offense level under the Guidelines. The district court sentenced Natour to 28 months’ imprisonment on all counts, to run concurrently, followed by three years of supervised release, and ordered restitution in the amount of $104,742.16. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, first rejecting a claim that the conviction violated the Grand Jury Clause. The terms used in 18 U.S.C. 2314 are not of a wholly independent character, and the offense conduct proved at trial and stated in the jury instructions were within the charges approved by the grand jury. The court properly applied the Sentencing Guidelines to. Natour as a person in the business of receiving and selling stolen property and the court used both an acceptable method and evidence-based mathematical figures in arriving at a loss calculation. View "United States v. Natour" on Justia Law

Porter, a civilian police department employee, worked the “auto desk,” where employees process information about towed, stolen, repossessed, or recovered vehicles, 24 hours per day, seven days a week. In 2005 she was assigned to a group that has Fridays and Saturdays off. She requested reassignment because she was involved in her church. The request was granted. She then requested to work a later shift to attend classes as a student minister. The request was granted. Weeks later, Porter took leave due to a car accident and pregnancy complications. Following three months of FMLA leave, Porter took a medical leave for another six months. She returned and was assigned to the Friday/Saturday days-off group. She was told that her request would be accommodated when an opening became available in the Sunday/Monday group. Between returning to work on July 16, 2006, and November 12, 2006, Porter was absent 34 days, including 16 Sundays. Porter claimed that she was harassed by her supervisors and filed internal grievances. Porter sued, alleging that the city failed to accommodate her religious practice, discriminated against her, and retaliated against her for engaging in protected activity, 42 U.S.C. 2000e. The district court granted the city summary judgment. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. View "Porter v. City of Chicago" on Justia Law

Hible was charged with conspiracy involving distribution of cocaine and crack cocaine; distribution of cocaine; and distribution of crack cocaine (21 U.S.C. 841, 846). The government filed notice under 21 U.S.C. 851 that it would seek an enhanced sentence due to Hible’s prior felony drug conviction. The law in effect at the time had a mandatory minimum penalty of 10 years’ imprisonment and a maximum penalty of life imprisonment for a defendant who distributed 5 grams or more of crack cocaine and had a prior felony drug conviction. In January 2011, Hible pleaded guilty distribution of 5 grams or more of crack cocaine, initially asserting that he should be sentenced under the new Fair Sentencing Act of 2010, under which he faced no mandatory minimum term of imprisonment and a maximum term of not more than 30 years, 21 U.S.C. 841(b)(1)(B)(iii), (C). The district court reviewed the presentence report, which recommended an offense level of 39, criminal history category VI, and an advisory range of 360 months to life and imposed a sentence of 240 months. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Hible waived his right to appeal , having failed to assert any right to be sentenced under the FSA at his sentencing. View "United States v. Hible" on Justia Law

American citizen-civilians, employees of a private Iraqi security services company, alleged that they were detained and tortured by U.S. military personnel while in Iraq in 2006, then released without being charged with a crime. Plaintiffs sought damages and to recover seized personal property. The district court denied motions to dismiss. In 2011, the Seventh Circuit affirmed in part, holding that plaintiffs sufficiently alleged Secretary Rumsfeld's personal responsibility and that he is not entitled to qualified immunity. On rehearing en banc, the Seventh Circuit reversed, stating that a common-law claim for damages should not be created. The Supreme Court has never created or even favorably mentioned a nonstatutory right of action for damages on account of conduct that occurred outside of the U.S. The Military Claims Act and the Foreign Claims Act indicate that Congress has decided that compensation should come from the Treasury rather than from federal employees and that plaintiffs do not need a common-law damages remedy in order to achieve some recompense. Even such a remedy existed, Rumsfeld could not be held liable. He did not arrest plaintiffs, hold them incommunicado, refuse to speak with the FBI, subject them to loud noises, or threaten them while they wore hoods. View "Vance v. Rumsfeld" on Justia Law

A chiropractor pleaded guilty to defrauding health insurers and to money laundering and was sentenced to 70 months (the bottom of the guidelines range) and to pay restitution of almost $2 million. At the guilty-plea hearing the judge asked the defendant whether he was “currently under the influence of any drugs, medicine, or alcohol,” and the defendant answered: “prescription medications.” He told the judge that he was taking medicines for “high anxiety, depression, adult attention hyperactivity disorder, and depression,” but stated that he was “thinking clearly.” He waived his right to appeal, but six weeks later moved to retract the plea, claiming that he had been taking psychotropic drugs, rendering his plea involuntary. The judge denied the motion because the defendant had presented no evidence that switching from Prozac to Lexapro could have the dramatic effects he claimed it had, and because at the plea hearing he had been alert and responsive and exhibited no signs of confusion. The Seventh Circuit affirmed.View "Unted States v. Hardimon" on Justia Law

Milwaukee police officers were investigating gunshots heard near an intersection and learned that one person had been shot in the leg and was recovering at a hospital. An officer approached a backyard shared by two duplexes on one of the streets and noticed bullet holes and a trail of spent casings in the area, including five casings next to one of the duplexes and a casing in the yard itself. Without a warrant, he entered the backyard and found and seized a rifle, which belonged to Schmidt, who was subsequently indicted as a felon in possession of a firearm (18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1) and 924(a)(2)). The district court denied his motion to suppress. Schmidt pled guilty and was sentenced to 21 months. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting an argument that any danger had dissipated by the time of the search given the heavy presence of police and passage of a few hours’ time. A reasonable officer could have believed that there were other exigent circumstances, i.e., wounded victims in the backyard; the officer’s warrantless presence in the backyard was justified even if the backyard were curtilage and the scope and breech of the rifle were in plain view once he was there. View "United States v. Schmidt" on Justia Law

Sanchez testified that he, José, and friends were outside of José’s house when three unmarked police cars pulled up. Officers demanded to know what the men were doing and ordered them to empty their pockets for a pat-down. Officer Caballero seized keys and walked toward the dwelling. Sanchez protested. A swearing match ensued and Sanchez was handcuffed. Caballero nodded at officers who forced Sanchez to the pavement. Sanchez testified that the officers hit and kicked him. José called 911. The police left the scene without arresting anyone. The officers testified that they had tried to break up a fight between Sanchez and Jose; they filed contact cards without mention of a fight. Caballero wrote that José was “loitering”; Peterson wrote that Sanchez “made a suspicious movement as if to conceal something.” Sanchez sued under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging false arrest, excessive force, and failure to intervene in misconduct of another. A jury found in defendants’ favor. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Although the parties and the court apparently misapprehended the prospective liability of defendants for the acts of unnamed officers, and the jury was not properly instructed as to the potential liability of officers for failing to intervene, none of the errors warranted reversal. View "Sanchez v. City of Chicago" on Justia Law

Nunez illegally entered the U.S. in 1992. In 1998, his father’s I-130 Petition on Nunez’s behalf was approved. In 1999, Nunez was convicted of misdemeanor battery. Nunez contends that, on that date, he was illegally removed, but the record only shows that Nunez was subjected to expedited removal a week later, when he attempted to enter California with a resident-alien card for “Mendoza-Gutierrez.” Under oath, Nunez stated that the card was not his; that he lacked documentation to enter; that he had no immigration applications pending; and that he previously had never been in the U.S. Nunez was informed that he could not re-enter for five years. Nunez re-entered in 1999. The IJ concluded that Nunez was not eligible for cancellation of removal because he had not remained physically present in the U.S. for 10 years prior to application, 8 U.S.C. 1229b(b)(1). Before the Board ruled, his wife became a citizen and filed an I-130 petition. Following remand, an IJ held that Nunez was ineligible for adjustment of status because he had illegally re-entered. The Board agreed, although the previous removal order never had been reinstated. Nunez was ineligible for cancellation because he was not physically present for 10 years. The Seventh Circuit denied appeal. View "Nunez-Moron v. Holder" on Justia Law

Lynch was injured while working at a jobsite as a mechanic for Metropolitan Rail (Metra), when the top rail of a chain-link fence he was installing fell and struck him on the back of his neck and shoulders. In his suit under the Federal Employers’ Liability Act, 45 U.S.C. 51, the district court granted summary judgment in favor of Metra. The Seventh Circuit vacated and remanded, finding that Lynch adequately raised material issues of fact concerning whether Metra was negligent. View "Lynch v. NE Reg'l Commuter R.R.Corp." on Justia Law