Justia U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

In 2000, Townsend’s Pontiac was stolen by means of breaking a window. The car was seen at a bank 15 miles away. Two armed men stepped out, wearing gloves, dark clothes, and masks. The attempted robbery failed; they fled without any money. Later that day, police found Townsend’s Pontiac, containing the masks, gloves, jacket, and sweatshirt. Investigators recovered latent prints; for reasons unknown, the fingerprints were not immediately analyzed. Investigators also recovered a hair from the gloves and a DNA sample from a mask. having a “mixed,” partial profile, with incomplete DNA sequences from two people. The profile was uploaded in 2001 and immediately registered multiple “hits” on unknown individuals. In 2008, Indiana upgraded its equipment to allow for more sensitive testing, retested the hair, and extracted a complete DNA profile. The database hit on Hagler. Police picked him up and collected a fresh DNA sample. Hagler’s DNA matched that on the mask as a “major contributor;” his brother was likely the minor contributor. One recovered print matched Hagler. Hagler and his brother were first indicted for attempted robbery, 18 U.S.C.2 & 2113, in 2009. Hagler was ultimately convicted. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting an argument that the prosecution was untimely. View "United States v. Hagler" on Justia Law

Omni, a technology consulting agency, hired Messier to work as a temporary programmer for Thrivent pursuant to an agreement between Omni and Thrivent. After leaving Omni and Thrivent, Messier had a difficult time finding a new job and began to suspect that Thrivent was saying negative things about him to prospective employers who called for reference checks. The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission alleges that during these reference checks, Thrivent was revealing information about Messier’s migraine condition to prospective employers in violation of the medical record confidentiality requirements of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. 12111. The district court found that Thrivent learned of Messier’s migraine condition outside the context of a medical examination or inquiry, so that the confidentiality provisions did not apply, and granted summary judgment to Thrivent. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, finding that Thrivent had no duty to treat its knowledge of Messier’s migraine condition as a confidential medical record because Messier had volunteered the information in responding to an inquiry about his absence from work. View "Equal Emp't Opportunity Comm'n v. Thrivent Fin. for Lutherans" on Justia Law

Vrljicak arrived in the U.S. from Serbia under a work visa, which expired September 30, 2009.He did not leave and was in unauthorized status on July 14, 2010, when he applied for asylum on the ground that his native land would persecute him because of his sexual orientation. The Board of Immigration Appeals agreed with the IJ that Vrljicak took too long to seek asylum, 8 U.S.C. 1158 (a)(2)(B), but held that he is entitled to withholding of removal and remanded. The Seventh Circuit denied review, rejecting a challenge that the Board should have excused his delay under 8 C.F.R. 1208.4(a)(5)(iv), which reads: “The applicant maintained Temporary Protected Status, lawful immigrant or nonimmigrant status, or was given parole, until a reasonable period before the filing of the asylum application.” View "Vrljicak v. Holder" on Justia Law

Holloway was arrested without a warrant and detained. Although Holloway had a probable cause determination the day after his arrest and an initial appearance in front of a judicial officer within three days, he was detained for nine days without having any charges filed against him. During his time in jail, Holloway received care from the medical staff. Before his detention, Holloway had been taking prescribed Oxycontin and other medications to treat chronic pain caused by his Klippel-Trenaunay Syndrome. The jail physician did not believe that Oxycontin was necessary to treat Holloway’s chronic pain and, instead, prescribed non-narcotic pain medications and other medications to prevent narcotic withdrawal symptoms. After the prosecutor did not file charges against Holloway within the time allowed by the court, Holloway was released from jail and was admitted to a hospital, where he resumed his regimen of Oxycontin. Holloway sued (42 U.S.C. 1983), alleging that the sheriff violated his rights by detaining him without charges for nine days and that the jail physician and two attending nurses violated his constitutional rights by acting with deliberate indifference to his serious medical condition. The district court granted summary judgment for defendants. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. View "Holloway v. Delaware Cnty. Sheriff" on Justia Law

Plowman was a local government official in Indianapolis when he accepted a bribe from an undercover FBI agent. He was videotaped discussing payment for “taking care of” a zoning variance. The agent gave Plowman $5,000. Prior to trial, the government filed a motion in limine seeking to preclude Plowman from arguing an entrapment defense. The district court granted the motion. A jury then convicted Plowman of federal-funds bribery, 18 U.S.C. 666(a)(1), and attempted extortion under color of official right, 18 U.S.C. 1951(a). Plowman was sentenced to 40 months in prison. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. To argue entrapment to a jury, Plowman needed to provide sufficient evidence of both inducement and a lack of predisposition, but he failed to establish the first element. View "United States v. Plowman" on Justia Law

Ray was convicted of reckless homicide and reckless endangerment, arising from a retaliatory shooting that left an 11-year-old girl dead and two others injured. At trial, the state called Detective Phillips to describe a signed statement that Ray gave during his police interview. Phillips read from Ray’s statement and recounted his own out-of-court statements informing Ray that co-actors had implicated Ray. Neither co-actor testified, but defense counsel did not object to Phillips’s testimony. Wisconsin courts rejected direct appeal and denied post-conviction relief. In his first federal habeas petition, the Seventh Circuit found that Ray’s constitutional rights were violated when the state introduced out-of-court statements made by individuals who did not testify, but remanded to allow the state to assert that Ray’s state post-conviction motion was untimely. On remand, the district court placed the burden of proof on Ray, finding that he did not timely give his motion to a prison official for mailing. The Seventh Circuit reversed, holding that the prisoner mailbox rule governs whether a state post-conviction document is “properly filed” because Wisconsin has not clearly rejected it. The state failed to rebut Ray’s testimony and documents showing that he timely gave his state post-conviction motion to a prison official. View "Ray v. Pollard" on Justia Law

Iain and Norene were married in Chicago in 1993. They lived in Seattle until 1998 when they moved to Australia. Their eldest child was born in the U.S. in 1997; two younger children were born in Australia. Although Norene and Iain initially intended to stay in Australia for five years, they stayed 12 years. In 2010, they traveled to the U.S., planning that Norene and the children would remain for six months to one year, but Norene filed for divorce in Illinois. Iain offered Norene primary custody, but wanted to be guaranteed custody of the children for nine weeks of their summer vacation and for two weeks over the Christmas holidays, and asserted that the couple’s residence was Australia. Norene did not accept Iain’s offer of settlement. Iain immediately filed a request for the return of the children with the Australian Central Authority charged with administering the Hague Convention, then filed a petition for return in Illinois (International Child Abduction Remedies Act, 42 U.S.C. 11601), which the district court denied. The Seventh Circuit remanded, stating that further fact-finding was necessary to determine which court should resolve custody. View "Walker v. Walker" on Justia Law

Defendant pleaded guilty to seven counts of violation of child pornography laws, 18 U.S.C. 2251(d)(1), 2252(a)(1), (a)(2), (a)(4), and was sentenced to 30 years’ imprisonment, followed by supervised release for the rest of his life, and payment of restitution to two women, “Amy and Vicky,” in the amount of $3,367,854.00 and $965,827.64; pornographic images of them, as girls, were found in the defendant’s possession. On appeal, the government defended the sentence but not the restitution award, and challenged allowing Amy and Vicky to intervene (rather than merely to be heard under the Criminal Victims’ Rights Act, 18 U.S.C. 3771(a)(4)). The Seventh Circuit affirmed the prison sentence and the calculation of the victims’ losses, but vacated the order of restitution and remanded for determination of how much to subtract from Amy’s losses to reflect restitution that she has received in other cases and determination of whether the defendant uploaded any of Amy’s or Vicky’s images. Defendant will not be permitted to seek contribution from other defendants convicted of crimes involving pornographic images of the two girls and the girls will not be permitted to intervene in the district court. View "United States v. Laraneta" on Justia Law

The underlying suits arise from alleged defects in Kenmore-brand Sears washing machines sold in periods beginning in 2001 and 2004. One asserted a defect that causes mold; the other asserted a defect that stops the machine inopportunely. The district court denied certification of the class complaining of mold and granted certification of the class complaining of sudden stoppage. The Seventh Circuit affirmed certification of the stoppage claims and reversed denial of certification for the mold claims. Rule 23(b)(3) conditions maintenance of a class action on a finding “that the questions of fact or law common to class members predominate over any questions affecting only individual members.” The basic question in the litigation is: were the machines defective in permitting mold to accumulate and generate noxious odors? The question is common to the entire mold class, although the answer may vary with the differences in design. The individual questions are the amount of damages owed particular class members. It is more efficient for the question whether the washing machines were defective to be resolved in a single proceeding than for it to be litigated separately in hundreds of different trials View "Butler v. Sears, Roebuck & Co." on Justia Law

During unrelated civil litigation against Illinois Department of Corrections officials, Eichwedel, an inmate, pro se, filed motions that the district court denied as “frivolous.” The state revoked six months of Eichwedel’s good-conduct credits. Illinois law establishes penalties for prisoners who file frivolous motions against the state, 730 ILCS 5/3-6-3(d). A state trial court denied relief; the appellate court declined review. Rejecting a federal habeas petition, the district court concluded that the Supreme Court never has recognized a First Amendment right to file frivolous motions. The Seventh Circuit certified to the Supreme Court of Illinois the question: was the State required to establish, in order to revoke a prisoner’s good-conduct credit, either that the court making the finding of frivolousness had determined specifically that the filing satisfied one of the definitions of frivolousness in 730 ILCS 5/3-6-3(d) or that the court had otherwise made its intent to invoke 730 ILCS 5/3-6-3(d) known? After Eichwedel was released, the court withdrew the certification as moot. While the underlying situation may occur again and may not be resolved before a prisoner’s release date, the chance of this situation happening to Eichwedel is simply too speculative to constitute a continuing controversy between him and IDOC. View "Eichwedel v. Chandler" on Justia Law