Justia U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Defendant, a U.S. citizen, had a romantic relationship and lived with an illegal alien, who was later arrested on drug charges. After being deported to Mexico, he returned illegally and again lived with defendant. When he was again arrested on drug charges, defendant was convicted under 8 U.S.C. 1324(a)(1)(A), (iii), as one who knowingly or in reckless disregard of the fact that an alien was in the U.S. in violation of law, concealed, harbored or shielded such alien. The statute also covers attempts and transportation. The district judge sentenced her to two years' probation and to pay a $200 fine. The Seventh Circuit reversed, distinguishing between "harboring" and providing shelter, without concealing or shielding from detection.

Defendant was convicted of 14 counts of willfully assisting in preparation of tax returns containing materially false and fraudulent claims, including phony medical and business expenses and charitable donations. The evidence at trial proved tax loss of $31,849. At sentencing, the government proposed a tax loss figure of $1.6 million by identifying 662 returns that contained materially false claims similar to those proven at trial and eliminating contested returns. The district court discounted the loss to $400,000- to $1-million to compensate for possible selection bias in a sample of 100 returns and imposed a sentence of 42 months. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The tax loss figure was not outside the realm of permissible computations. The district court considered defendant's family circumstances as well as substantial aggravating circumstances, including her education, financial and intellectual abilities, knowledge of the tax code and duty to provide truthful information, and that her actions caused the IRS to audit her clients. Defendant also failed to appear for a sentencing hearing, was dishonest to the court, frivolously denied the court had jurisdiction over her, and similarly asserted she was an independent sovereign protected by the Eleventh Amendment.

Petitioner, a Chinese woman, applied for asylum and for withholding of removal on the ground that because of her opposition to China's "one child"” policy she faces persecution if she is returned to China. She had been briefly jailed for resisting officers who came for her pregnant cousin. She came to the U.S. in 1999, married, and gave birth to two children who live in China with their grandparents and claims she faces sterilization. She applied for asylum seven years after the expiration of the one-year deadline. The BIA denied relief under 8 U.S.C. 1231(b)(3)(A). The Seventh Circuit denied review, reasoning that the alleged jail time and beatings may have been the result of resisting arrest or other factors, rather than based on opposition to government policy.

Convicted of attempted murder, criminal confinement, domestic battery, and invasion of privacy, defendant was sentenced to 51 years in prison. He was unsuccessful at seeking post-conviction relief in Indiana state court and filed a federal habeas corpus petition under 28 U.S.C. 2254, claiming ineffective assistance of trial counsel. The district court denied the petition. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The court looked at counsel's performance as a whole and deferred to the Indiana Court of Appeals conclusion that counsel's decisions to pursue alibi and misidentification defenses were strategic in nature and reasonable under the circumstances. Counsel's decision to lie, during opening statements about petitioner's whereabouts, was "troubling" but did not change the analysis. It is unlikely that a different result would be reached, absent counsel's errors.

Plaintiffs filed a class action, alleging violation of the Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. 216(b), and the Illinois Minimum Wage Law, 820 ILCS 105/1, based on denial of overtime pay. For the IMWL claim, the district court certified two classes: "hourly" and "assistant branch manager." The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting an argument that the certification order did not comply with the commonality requirement of FRCP 23(c)(1)(B). The court referred to the 2011 Supreme Court decision, Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, and concluded that the defendant's unofficial policy concerning overtime provided the "common answer" that will potentially resolve the case.

Defendant pleaded guilty to possession of a firearm by a felon, 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1). The district court set a base offense level of 24, U.S.S.G. 2K2.1(a)(2), relying in part on a California first-degree residential burglary conviction as a crime of violence, and imposed a sentence of 93 months. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The burglary conviction qualified as a violent felony under the Armed Career Criminal Act, 18 U.S.C. §924(e)(2)(B), as a crime that otherwise presents a serious potential risk of injury rather than under the enumerated crime of "burglary of a dwelling," but it nonetheless qualifies as a crime of violence under §4B1.2(a)(2).

In November 2010 Ladish agreed to be acquired by Allegheny for $24 cash plus .4556 shares of Allegheny stock per share. At the closing price after the announcement, the package was worth $46.75 per Ladish share, a premium of 59% relative to Ladish's trading price before the announcement. The transaction closed in May, 2011. Ladish became ATI. Investors' reactions implied that Allegheny bid too high: the price of its shares fell when the merger was announced. No Ladish shareholder dissented and demanded an appraisal. But one shareholder filed a suit seeking damages, claiming breach of federal securities law and Wisconsin corporate law by failing to disclose material facts. The district court granted judgment on the pleadings in defendants' favor. On appeal, the shareholder abandoned federal claims. The Seventh Circuit affirmed on the state law claims, citing the business judgment rule.

Plaintiff was arrested for drinking on a public way. A search incident to arrest turned up a heroin packet and a baggie of crack cocaine, so drug possession charges were added. He was jailed for 12 days before bonding out. The drinking charge was dismissed and, at a preliminary hearing, a state judge concluded there was no probable cause for the drug charges. Plaintiff filed a 42 U.S.C. 1983 suit against the officers. After the jury returned a verdict for defendants, plaintiff argued that the court erred in allowing an assistant prosecutor to testify that low-weight cases are routinely thrown out, as an expert, without proper disclosures and foundation. The district court rejected the argument, stating that the prosecutor never offered an opinion, but testified as to her experience on the narcotics call in the state court, offering factual statements based on her personal observations. The Seventh Circuit held that plaintiff was entitled to a new trial. The prosecutor testified based on her specialized knowledge and non-disclosure of her planned testimony as an expert was not harmless.

Plaintiff, certified by the city as a minority-owned business eligible for favored treatment, sells a variety of products. The city is virtually its only customer. Early in 2005 the city began to suspect that plaintiff was a broker rather than a wholesaler, which would make it ineligible to bid for contracts as an MBE. Plaintiff had only six employees, though it claimed to have a warehouse. The city never completed its investigation, so plaintiff retains its certification. The city also believed that the company had shorted it on a shipment of aluminum sign blanks, and ultimately debarred it from dealing with the city. The company sued immediately and obtained a temporary restraining order; debarment was in effect for only eight days. The city abandoned its attempt to debar the company. The district court then ruled in favor of defendants. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Claims by the principals in the company were frivolous, given that they continued to be employed by the company. The temporary diminution in business did not amount to destruction of the company nor did it constitute retaliation. Plaintiff did not prove breach of contract.

Plaintiff alleged that while he was a pretrial detainee, asleep in his cell, a guard opened the door, allowing another inmate to enter and attack him. He sustained injuries to his head and eyes. He requested medical attention, but received none for five days. He was locked down for 72 hours following the attack. The district court screened the 42 U.S.C. 1983 complaint under 28 U.S.C. 1915A and held a brief telephonic merit-review hearing, then dismissed. The Seventh Circuit vacated, reasoning that even if plaintiff's condition did not worsen from the delay, deliberate indifference to prolonged, unnecessary pain can itself be the basis for an Eighth Amendment claim. Although the evidence may not ultimately substantiate plaintiff's allegations, if proven the conditions are severe enough to have required more prompt attention. On remand the district court should give plaintiff, who was acting pro se, an opportunity to amend his complaint to name the officers who ignored his injuries.