Justia U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

ESBC, billing agent for the Fire Department, determined that each of the individual defendants owned a vehicle involved in a collision to which the Fire Department responded and each had insurance coverage, and billed response costs incurred for each collision. The defendants refused to pay and ESBC sought a declaration that defendants were liable under the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act, 42 U.S.C. 9601. Under CERCLA, the owner of a “facility” from which hazardous substances have been released is responsible for response costs that result from the release. Insurer-defendants counterclaimed for injunctive relief from ESBC’s billing practices and alleging violation of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, 15 U.S.C. 1692, unjust enrichment, unlawful fee collection, fraud, constructive fraud, and insurance fraud. The district court granted defendants judgment on the pleadings and dismissed counterclaims without prejudice. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Motor vehicles for personal use fall under the "consumer product in consumer use” exception to CERCLA’s definition of facility

In 2007, plaintiff applied for admission to the Indiana Bar. The Board of Law Examiners requested that he attend hearings to investigate his application and be evaluated by mental health professionals and ultimately denied the application. After exhausting appeals to the Indiana Supreme Court and the United States Supreme Court, plaintiff brought suit, claiming that evaluation of his application focused on his religious beliefs (ostensibly Roman Catholic) and violated his constitutional rights. The district court dismissed without prejudice for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine and found that the defendants were immune from civil suit. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, reasoning that the gravamen of the claim under 42 U.S.C. 1983 required review of a state court decision and could have been raised in his appeals.

In 2007, defendant was convicted of attempting to coerce or entice a minor to engage in sexual activity, 18 U.S.C. 2422(b), and received a 262-month prison term. The Seventh Circuit vacated the sentence. On remand, the district court, relying in part on USSG 2G1.3(d) imposed a sentence of 210 months in prison. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Where a conviction under 18 U.S.C. 2422(b) involves multiple minors, USSG 2G1.3(d) directs a sentencing court to treat the relevant conduct with each person as a separate count. Unlike the statute, however, 2G31.(d) does not contain an "attempt" provision. This means that the government must prove that each relevant person was a minor. The defendant failed to raise whether the "victim" fell within the definition of "minor" at his first sentencing hearing; the remand did not give him the right to raise any and all sentencing arguments and the district court was within its discretion in refusing to consider the argument.

The court issued an directing the attorney to show cause why she should not be subject to discipline, up to and including disbarment, for abandonment of her client in a criminal case. She ignored two previous orders directing her to explain her inaction on her client's opinion, gave incomplete responses to two others, and did not respond to final order. The Seventh Circuit concluded that the attorney is unfit to practice law, stating that abandonment of a client in a criminal case is reprehensible and ignoring orders entered by a court is inexcusable. The court ordered refund of all fees she may have been paid for handling the case.

Plaintiff, active in Wisconsin’s "open carry" movement, carried a holstered handgun into stores and was arrested for disorderly conduct. His gun was confiscated, but eventually returned. He was not prosecuted. He sued arresting officers and municipalities under 42 U .S.C. 1983, asserting false. He claimed retention of his guns was an unconstitutional seizure and violation of the Privacy Act because officers obtained his Social Security number during booking. The district court granted defendants summary judgment on all claims. In 2011, Wisconsin adopted a concealed-carry permitting regime and amended its statutes to clarify that openly carrying a firearm is not disorderly conduct absent circumstances indicating criminal or malicious intent. WIS. STAT. 947.01(2). Also in 2011, plaintiff was convicted of homicide, mooting his claim for prospective declaratory relief. The Seventh Circuit affirmed with respect to damages claims. The officers are entitled to qualified immunity. At the time, the state constitutional right to bear arms was new, Wisconsin law was unclear, and the Supreme Court had not decided a case applying the Second Amendment to States. It was reasonable for officers to believe that the circumstances gave them probable cause for a disorderly conduct arrest. Delayed return of the handguns was not a "seizure."

Defendant entered a plead of guilty to selling a firearm to a felon, distributing ecstasy, and possessing a firearm in furtherance of a drug-trafficking crime. The government recommended a 68-month sentence, the bottom of the guidelines range. Defendant argued that 64 months was enough. The judge stated that although the guidelines are not binding, "judges are told that [they] are to be followed" and imposed the 68-month sentence suggested by the government. The Seventh Circuit vacated and remanded for resentencing. The district judge apparently rejected the request for a modest below-guidelines sentence simply because it was modest and below the guidelines; it was unclear whether he gave adequate consideration to defendant's argument.

After a 1999 auto accident, plaintiff had severe back pains and was diagnosed with a Chiari malformation, a protrusion of brain tissue into the spinal canal. After three operations on her brain and spine, her vision and speech problems lessened, but she developed hydrocephalus, a buildup of cerebrospinal fluid in the brain that required installation of a shunt in her brain. She has not worked since the auto accident and was last insured for social security disability benefits in June 2005 (when she was 34 years old), so only if she was disabled from full-time work by that date is she eligible for benefits. An administrative law judge found her capable of sedentary work. The Seventh Circuit reversed, finding that the ALJ failed to bridge the gap between medical testimony and plaintiff's testimony and his conclusion.

Plaintiffs challenged the school district practice of giving preference to the boys' Friday and Saturday night basketball games, asserting that non-primetime games result in a loss of audience, conflict with homework, and foster feelings of inferiority. The district court dismissed the claims under Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972, 20 U.S.C. 1681(a) and an equal protection claim, 42 U.S.C. 1983 on grounds of sovereign immunity. The Seventh Circuit vacated. Plaintiffs presented a genuine question of fact that such practices violate the statute. Defendants are "persons" within the meaning of section 1983, subject to suit under that statute.

Defendant has three prior felony armed robbery convictions, all arising from a crime spree that occurred more than 35 years ago. Since his 1990 release from prison, he has lived a fairly crime-free life. After his step-mother reported that he was selling guns that were part of his father's estate, he entered a plea of guilty as a felon in possession of a firearm. The district court imposed the mandatory minimum sentence under the Armed Career Criminal Act, 15 years in prison followed by three years of supervised release, 18 U.S.C. 922(g) and 924(e)(1). The Seventh Circuit affirmed, acknowledging some sympathy for the defendant, but stating that his arguments were for the legislature.

Illinois law provides that workers at public works projects must be paid not less than general prevailing rate of hourly wages for work of a similar character on non-federal public works in the locality, 820 ILCS 130/3. The public body awarding the contract is required to determine prevailing wage, but the Department of Labor conducts annual investigations of prevailing wage for each type of construction and demolition work in each locality and, in practice, public bodies simply adopt that determination. Landscape contractors who do non-federal public works projects sued the Department, arguing that it violated the due process clause by delegating ascertainment of prevailing wage to private entities, namely a labor union and contractors with which it has a collective bargaining agreement. The district judge granted summary judgment in favor of the Department. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, noting that the contractors did not object to the prevailing wage determination.