Justia U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

In 2006, plaintiff was a citizen of California and agreed to relocate to Illinois to work for defendant. When he quit about five months after moving, his family was still in California. He filed suit in state court, seeking relocation benefits the company allegedly promised. The company, which has its principal place of business in California removed to federal court, asserting that plaintiff was a citizen of Massachusetts. Plaintiff had a home in Massachusetts when the case was removed, was registered to vote there, and had a Massachusetts driver's license. The district court ordered arbitration under one of the contracts between the parties. The Seventh Circuit affirmed dismissal and denied sanctions. Relocation benefits are "employment related" and subject to arbitration under the agreement. The court noted that the company also failed to follow the rules. The company "should be able to tell the difference between residence and domicile, and should not have any difficulty complying with Rule 38."

The city bought land with the intention of transferring it to an adjoining Catholic high school for an athletic complex. In exchange, the city was to have the right to use the complex at specified times. In response to opposition by residents, the district court granted a preliminary injunction. Rather than appeal, the city moved to modify the injunction to permit it to sell to the school at appraised value. The district court denied on the ground that by not opening bidding the city was sending a message of endorsement of Catholicism. The city then obtained modification to allow it to sell the property to the highest bidder, sold to the high school, and appealed. The Seventh Circuit dismissed the appeal as moot and untimely.

Defendants committed a kidnapping for ransom to extract payment of a drug debt, abducting the victim in Indiana, taking her to Illinois, and holding her for two days before federal agents rescued her. They entered pleas of guilty to kidnapping, 18 U.S.C. 1201(a)(1)-(2) and appealed their sentences of 168 and 235 months. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Application of a six-level enhancement, U.S.S.G. 2A 4.1(b)(1) for kidnapping demanding a ransom was not impermissible double counting There is no general prohibition on double-counting; the default rule is that the same conduct may determine the base offense level and also trigger cumulative application of enhancements and adjustments unless a specific guideline instructs otherwise. U.S.S.G. 1B1.1 cmt. n.4. The judge adequately addressed arguments in mitigation. Finding no nonfrivolous issues for appeal the court granted counsels' motion to withdraw.

Petitioner, using a fake Italian passport, came to the U.S. in 2002, at age 23. Less than a year later, she applied for asylum and withholding of removal, claiming that she feared returning to Albania because, as a young woman living alone, she would be kidnapped and forced into prostitution and that police would not protect her because she is Christian and supports the Democratic party, which was not in power. She claimed that she was harassed by the leader of a Muslim gang and that police had taken no action. An IJ granted asylum, concluding that she belonged to a particular social group comprised of young women targeted by traffickers for prostitution, and that the Albanian government was unwilling or unable to protect women such as her. The decision was vacated by the BIA. The Seventh Circuit denied review, finding that the proposed "group" to which petitioner belongs is defined solely by the persecution feared by its members and lacks the type of common, immutable characteristics otherwise required of a particular social group. Substantial evidence supported a conclusion that she did not establish well-founded fear of persecution if she returns to Albania.

Defendant was sentenced to 60 months for bankruptcy fraud, 144 months for obstruction of justice, and 120 months for possession of child pornography, all to run concurrently. The Seventh Circuit remanded with directions that to vacate either the bankruptcy fraud conviction or the obstruction of justice conviction, recalculate the intended loss, and resentence defendant. On remand the district judge imposed the same total sentence but reduced the special assessment by $100. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, noting that appeal after remand is limited to issues that could not have been raised in the prior appeal. Vacating defendant’s conviction for obstructing justice for double jeopardy reasons did not provide a compelling reason for a shorter sentence. The overall sentence was within the adjusted combined guidelines range (135 to 168 months) for multiple counts of conviction. U.S.S.G. 3D1.4, 5G 1.2(d). The court rejected defendant's arguments concerning the child pornography charge, which involved pictures he had taken of his 16-year-old sister-in-law and had used to try to blackmail his ex-wife. The only changed circumstance, a defiant allocution, undermines rather than supports the challenge to the sentence reimposed on remand.

Plaintiff was terminated from his position as Senior Humane Officer for the city after refusing to support defendant's successful mayoral campaign and brought suit, claiming that the position of SHO was not subject to political termination and that his dismissal violated the First and Fourteenth Amendments. The district court, relying on an official job description, found that the SHO was a policy-making position, and that plaintiff could be dismissed for political reasons. The Seventh Circuit affirmed on the basis that city ordinances authorized the SHO to exercise policy-making discretion.

Under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, 20 U.S.C. 1400, states receive federal funding for education of disabled children if local schools provide a "free appropriate public education" to all resident children with disabilities. Local districts must identify children with disabilities, determine whether they require special-education services, and develop individualized education programs (IEPs) tailored to each student's specific needs. In 2001, students with disabilities sued Milwaukee Public Schools and the Wisconsin Department of Public Instruction, alleging IDEA violations. The case became focused on "child find" requirements. DPI settled by agreeing to order MPS to meet compliance benchmarks. The district court approved the settlement over MPS's objection and ordered MPS to set up a court-monitored system to identify disabled children who were delayed or denied entry into the IEP process, implement hybrid IEP meetings, and craft compensatory-education remedies. The Seventh Circuit vacated the class-certification order and liability and remedial orders. IDEA claims are highly individualized, making the case unsuitable for class-action treatment. The claims lack commonality required by Rule 23(a)(2). DPI's settlement was vacated as requiring more of MPS than DPI had the statutory authority to demand.

Abbott created Hospira for its Hospital Products Division. Before the spin-off, HPD employees had access to Abbott's pension plan. Hospira did not offer a pension plan. The spin-off included reciprocal two-year no-hire policies. When HPD employees became Hospira employees, non-vested pension rights in the Abbott plan were eliminated. Retirement-eligible HPD employees were effectively prevented from retiring from Abbott then joining Hospira. A certified class of Hospira employees alleged that violation of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act, 29 U.S.C. 1140, by using the spin and no-hire policy to get rid of pension liability and deter HPD employees from exercising pension benefits before the spin. They alleged that Abbott breached its fiduciary duty by failing to disclose that Hospira would not offer pension benefits. The district court entered judgment for Abbott and Hospira on all counts. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. ERISA claims failed because Abbott and Hospira did not act with the requisite intent to interfere with plaintiffs' pension benefits. The breach-of-fiduciary-duty claim failed because Abbott had nothing to do with the Hospira benefits plan and because Abbott reported truthfully to HPD employees that benefits might change after the spin.

Defendant entered a plea of guilty to manufacturing marijuana, 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1), and possession of a firearm by an unlawful user of a controlled substance, 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(3). He was convicted of possession of a firearm in furtherance of a drug-trafficking crime, 18 U.S.C. 924(c) and sentenced to 60 months in prison, to be served consecutively to his 13-month sentence for the plea counts, followed by three years of supervised release, and a $300 special assessment. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting a claim that section 924(c) was void for vagueness, a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, and a challenge to expert testimony.

An associate, dismissed from the law firm after five years, sought bonuses and fees with respect to cases on which he worked that settled after his departure. He filed attorney's liens in Illinois state courts. When that strategy failed, he filed in federal court. The district court granted the defendants summary judgment. The Seventh Circuit reversed with respect to contract claims and claims under the Illinois Wage Payment and Collection Act (820 ILCS 115/2), but otherwise affirmed. No court has ever decided whether plaintiff's employment agreement entitled him to compensation for work he did on the cases at issue and he made a plausible case that the agreement entitles him to some portion of the revenues. His contract required the firm to give him 30 days' notice before terminating his employment, but it failed to do so.