Justia U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

In 2009, lender issued plaintiff a four-month trial loan modification, under which it agreed to permanently modify the loan if she qualified under Home Affordable Mortgage Program guidelines, implemented by the Department of the Treasury to help homeowners avoid foreclosure during the decline in the housing market. Plaintiff filed a putative class action, claiming that she did qualify and that lender refused to grant her a permanent modification. She alleged violations of Illinois law under common-law contract and tort theories and under the Illinois Consumer Fraud and Deceptive Business Practices Act. The district court dismissed, finding that HAMP does not confer a private federal right of enforcement action on borrowers. The Seventh Circuit affirmed in part and reversed in part. Plaintiff stated viable claims under Illinois law for breach of contract or promissory estoppel, fraud, and unfair or deceptive business practices. Claims of negligent misrepresentation or concealment were not viable. HAMP and its enabling statute (12 U.S.C. 5219(a)) do not contain a federal right of action, but neither do they preempt otherwise viable state claims.

In 2003, the airline established guidelines that address accommodating employees who, because of disability, can no longer do essential functions of their current jobs, even with reasonable accommodation. The guidelines specify that the transfer process is competitive, so that an employee in need of accommodation will not be automatically placed into a vacant position, but will be given preference over similarly qualified applicants. The EEOC challenged the policy under the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. 12101. The district court ruled in favor of the airline. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting an argument that the Supreme Court's 2002 ruling, U.S. Airways, Inc. v. Barnett, invalidated a prior holding that the ADA does not mandate reassignment.

Environmental groups obtained an injunction against timber harvest projects planned for the Chequamegon-Nicolet National Forest. The district court lifted the injunction after finding that the defendants took appropriate corrective action to comply with the National Environmental Policy Act, 42 U.S.C. 4321. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting an argument that a project proposed after presentation of draft environmental impact statements should have been included in the cumulative impacts analysis of the final EIS. The Forest Service's failure to supplement was not arbitrary; the agency complied with applicable rules by making clear that it lacked sufficient information to meaningfully discuss the subsequently-proposed project.

Defendant pled guilty to knowingly possessing a firearm while being an unlawful user of controlled substances, 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(3) and was sentenced to 46 months' imprisonment. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, upholding application of a 4-level increase under U.S.S.G. 2K 2.1(b)(6) for using or possessing the firearm in connection with another felony offense--discharge of the firearm in a residential neighborhood with others present, a felony under Illinois law. The court rejected defendant's claim that the shooting was self-defense.

Defendant was convicted of a drug offense and is in prison in Texas. The district court sentenced him to 262 months in prison as a career offender under USSG 4B1.1, assuming that a prior walkaway escape from a halfway house was a qualifying felony. Absent career offender status, the guidelines range would have been 120 to 150 months. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. His attorney failed to file a petition for certiorari. The Supreme Court later held, in another case, that walkaway escape is not a crime of violence. After a complicated series of motions under 28 U.S.C. 2255 and 28 U.S.C. 2241, involving a Texas district court and the Seventh Circuit, the Seventh Circuit denied pending motions. The court noted that defendant would not be sentenced as a career offender today and likely would receive a much lower sentence; taxpayers are footing the bill. There is no judicial procedure to remedy the situation; only the executive branch can grant relief. The court called the claims being "batted around" between circuits with differing views of how the merits may be heard "an untenable and unseemly waste of judicial resources."

The Illinois company sells title insurance through its attorney title agent program, in which it pays the consumer's real estate attorney to conduct title examination and determine whether title is insurable. Plaintiffs contend that the payment is designed to compensate for referrals, not actual services, and that the program violates Section 8 of the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act, 12 U.S.C. 2601(a), which prohibits kickbacks and fee splitting. The district court twice denied class certification under FRCP 23(b)(3), concluding that an individual determination of liability would be required for each class member. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, noting that class actions are rare in RESPA Section 8 cases and that plaintiffs cannot establish the sole recognized exception, namely that the company split fees with attorneys who performed no services on a class-wide basis.

Redbox rents DVDs, Blu-ray discs, and video games from automated retail kiosks and was sued under the Video Privacy Protection Act, 18 U.S.C. 2710. The district court held that Act provisions requiring destruction of records containing personally identifiable information can be enforced by suit for damages. After deciding to accept the interlocutory appeal because it will materially advance the ultimate termination of the class action, the Seventh Circuit reversed. The court noted the placement of the damages remedy in the statute, after description of a prohibitions on knowing disclosure of personally identifiable information, but before prohibition on use of such information before tribunals or the record-destruction mandate. The court also noted the "unsuitability" of those provisions to damage awards.

Plaintiffs brought a putative class action under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act, 29 U.S.C. 1001, to recover benefits under long-term disability benefit plans maintained by their former employers. The plans provide for reduction of benefits if the disabled employee also receives benefits under the Social Security Act, as both plaintiffs do. They dispute calculation of the reduction, claiming that the plans do not authorize inclusion in the offset of benefits paid to dependent children. Both plans require offsets for "loss of time disability" benefits. The district court dismissed. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, holding that children's Social Security disability benefits paid based on a parent's disability are "loss of time disability" benefits under the language of the plans.

An off-duty police officer, Glover, shot and killed Prado during a late-night road incident. Glover claimed that Prado had tried to run him over and had a gun, which was not found. He claimed he was complying with a department rule, requiring officers to act even when off duty. Glover was placed on desk duty. An inquest jury found justification, but a year later Glover was charged with homicide and perjury and suspended from the force. He committed suicide. Prado's estate brought excessive-force and loss-of-life claims (42 U.S.C. 1983) and named the city a defendant under a statute that requires the city to pay judgments assessed against employees for acts committed within the scope of employment. The jury found that Glover used unreasonable force under color of law, but found that he was not within the scope of employment. The Seventh Circuit reversed. Because of the risk that jurors would mistakenly intuit that if the officer used excessive force, he must have acted outside the scope of employment so that refusal to give the modified scope-of-employment instruction was prejudicial error. Under Wisconsin law an employer who retains an employee after he commits a tort does not ratify his conduct.

County sheriff deputies responded to a call indicating that Marc had left the home he shared with his parents and was possibly a danger to himself and others. Officers located Marc and determined that he should be involuntarily committed. During initial evaluation at a hospital, officers discovered Marc's wallet, but their search was not thorough enough to discover that the wallet contained a razor blade. Later, still in police custody, Marc regained possession of the razor blade during transport to a mental health facility. He used the blade to commit suicide in the back of a squad car. His father filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging that the officers were deliberately indifferent to Marc's risk of suicide. The district court entered summary judgment for the defendants. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The totality of the officers' actions did not indicate deliberate indifference.