Justia U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

The LLC was organized in 1999 to own and operate 100 fast-food restaurants. Khan owned 40% of the common units. Remaining common units, and all preferred units, were owned by Sentinel. Plaintiffs, restaurant managers, claim that they accepted lower salaries because Khan told them that he would acquire full ownership and would reward top managers with equity. In 2005, Khan became the sole equity owner, but did not distribute common units to any managers. Plaintiffs calculated that the price paid for Sentinel's interest implied that the business was worth about $48 million; in 2005, 20 managers qualified for units, so each lost about $1.2 million. The district court held that plaintiffs had not adequately estimated damages. The Seventh Circuit reversed, stating that value is what people will pay. The judiciary should not reject actual transactions prices when they are available.

While the FBI executed a search warrant at his father’s business, officers looked for defendant at his father’s house. They climbed to the deck and, through a window, saw defendant asleep, with a pill bottle nearby. They telephoned the father and stated, incorrectly, that the bottle was next to defendant. The father gave permission to enter. Officers woke defendant and began questioning. He stated he had child pornography on a laptop in his car and agreed to provide evidence from his apartment, though agents told him that he did not have to do so. Driving to the apartment with officers, he used his cell phone. His father told him not to talk. After entering the apartment, agents read defendant his Miranda rights. He admitted operating a server for child pornography, having pornography on his computer, and transferring child pornography to an external drive. He signed consent forms, after being advised that he could refuse the search. The district court suppressed evidence and statements obtained in the father's home and car ride, but did not suppress evidence obtained at the apartment. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Apartment evidence was sufficiently attenuated from the original illegal entry that it was purged of unconstitutional taint.

Plaintiff was hired as a teller in 1980 and promoted to branch manager in 1995. She received an overall rating of "improvement needed" on 2004 and 2005 performance evaluations, based on complaints from customers and employees about negative attitude and unprofessional behavior. Complaints continued until she was terminated in 2006 at age 44. The district court entered summary judgment for the bank on her retaliation claims under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. 621. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, holding that plaintiff did not show retaliation for her objection to age discrimination. Complaints about pension plan contributions and about staff cutbacks did not qualify. She filed a claim with the EEOC after she was fired.

A fight broke out during a New Year's party at a pub. Several patrons were wounded and a security guard was killed. Plaintiff, an off-duty police officer whose wife was a manager at the pub, was present and was later arrested. After the charges were dropped, he sued for false arrest (42 U.S.C. 1983). The district court denied defendant's motion for a finding of qualified immunity. The Seventh Circuit reversed. While there was not "arguable probable cause" for the murder charge, the charge of assisting a criminal was supported by the plaintiff's "hazy" and changing account of events and a videotape of events.

Plaintiff worked as a manager for defendant, a food broker, from 2001 until she quit in 2007. She sued under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the Equal Pay Act, 29 U.S.C. 206(d), claiming that the company maintained a hostile work environment, in which conditions for women were inferior to those for men, and paid women less than men for the same work. The district court granted summary judgment to the company. The Seventh Circuit remanded with respect to claims about salary, holding that the evidence was sufficient for a reasonable jury to find discrimination rather than random assignment of salaries. The court affirmed with respect to hostile environment, noting that the offender responsible for most of the obnoxious conduct had been disciplined and had quit two years before plaintiff left.

For about seven years, defendant aided undocumented immigrants in filing claims for Illinois unemployment benefits, charging a fee of $80 plus one benefit check, and using social security numbers of unsuspecting, law-abiding citizens. She arranged with a state employee to process the applications as though the undocumented aliens were citizens. She was convicted of eight counts of mail fraud and sentenced to 96 months' imprisonment. The Seventh Circuit affirmed application of sentencing guideline enhancements: for being an organizer or leader of a criminal activity that involved five or more participants or was otherwise extensive, for unauthorized use of any means of identification unlawfully to produce or obtain any other means of identification, and for an offense with 50 or more victims.

Defendant was convicted as felon in possession of a firearm, 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1), a user in possession of a firearm, 922(g)(3), and possession of marijuana and cocaine base, 21 U.S.C. 844(a). The Seventh Circuited affirmed, upholding the court's decision to permit an FBI agent and an Illinois state trooper to testify as both expert and fact witnesses. The trooper's challenged testimony did not rise to the level of expert opinion. The court took precautions with respect to the FBI agent: the government laid a proper foundation; defendant had full opportunity to cross-examine; most of the government's questions eliciting expert testimony signaled to the jury that the agent was relying on his expertise; and the court gave the standard jury instruction for opinion testimony requiring special knowledge or skill, informing the jurors that they could disregard the testimony and give it whatever weight they thought it deserved.

In 2008, acting on a tip, police obtained a warrant and raided a house where defendant and others were staying. After apprehending defendant on his way out, police searched and found a pistol and a crack cocaine close to defendant's personal effects in a room where he was alleged to be staying. He was convicted of possessing more than five grams of crack cocaine with intent to distribute (21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1)), possession of a firearm in furtherance of a drug crime (18 U.S.C. 924(c)(1)(A)), and possession of a firearm by a convicted felon (18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1)) and was sentenced to 20 years in prison. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the firearm conviction and vacated the drug convictions. The court upheld admission of evidence that defendant had the pistol in his possession two months earlier. The officers could rely in good faith on issuance of the search warrant. The court improperly admitted evidence of a 2000 conviction for felony possession of cocaine with intent to distribute in violation of the character evidence prohibition of Rule 404(b).

Plaintiff was terminated from her position as a lead technologist in a medical radiology department. She admits that there were issues with her job performance, but claimed discrimination on account of her race (white) because the employer terminated her employment rather than demoting her as it had some employees of other races. The district court entered summary judgment for the employer in her suit under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. 2000e, and 42 U.S.C. 1981. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, noting that the plaintiff did not provide direct or indirect evidence of a discriminatory reason for the decision to terminate her position.

Insurers sought a declaration that they had no duty to defend or indemnify in tort suits brought against the insured village, concerning discovery of "perc," a carcinogenic common dry cleaning solvent, in one of its wells and the village's continued use of the well without disclosure. The district court, relying on a pollution exclusion in the policies, granted summary judgment for the insurers. The exclusion refers to "actual, alleged or threatened discharge, dispersal, seepage, migration, release or escape of 'pollutants'" and excludes from coverage expenses for "cleaning up ... or in any way responding to, or assessing the effects of pollutants." After exploring the reasons for the exclusion, the Seventh Circuit affirmed. The court rejected an argument that this was not a pollution case, because the amount of perc in the water was below the maximum level permitted by environmental regulations. The complaints actually filed "describe in copious detail the conduct giving rise to the tort suits, and in doing so inadvertently but unmistakably acknowledge the applicability of the pollution exclusion."