Justia U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Employers must maintain a log of work-related deaths, injuries, and illnesses, 29 C.F.R. 1904.4(a); an incident is "work-related" if "the work environment either caused or contributed to the resulting condition." Employees in the company's packing department fill containers, a process requiring repetitive hand movements, and pronation. When an employee developed lateral epicondylitis, painful swelling of ligaments and tendons around a joint, in her right arm, the company did not log the injury. The Department of Labor assessed a $900 penalty for failing to log a work-related injury. An ALJ sustained the penalty. The Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission declined review. The Seventh Circuit vacated, holding that substantial evidence was not enough to sustain the administrative decision. The ALJ was required to take account of competing evidence and inferences; the ALJ ignored strong indications that its favored witness was wrong. The court noted that inclusion of the work-relatedness requirement, requiring employers to judge the source of injury, "is a puzzle."

Sanchez rose through the ranks of Chicago politics and became Commissioner of Streets and Sanitation. He was a leader of the Hispanic Democratic Organization, and, acting as a city official and a political operative, participated in a scheme to award city jobs to campaign workers in violation of orders and consent decrees, known as the Shakman decrees, enjoining the city from patronage hiring for most positions. Del Valle managed campaigns staffed by Sanchez's branch of the HDO and had significant influence in choosing individuals for positions. On retrial, Sanchez was convicted of mail fraud, 18 U.S.C. 1341 and Del Valle of perjury, 18 U.S.C. 1623. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting arguments concerning the court's handling of testimony about driving while intoxicated and arguing with a police officer; denial of severance; and the government's failure to prove economic loss. City jobs are money or property for purposes of mail fraud and the indictment sufficiently alleged deprivation of money or property.

Hanners, then a Master Sergeant with the Illinois State Police, used his work computer to send an email to 16 fellow employees, including pictures and descriptions of "fictitious Barbie Dolls," depicting stereotypical area residents. After investigation, an EEO officer concluded that, although the email related to race, sexual orientation, parental status, pregnancy, family responsibilities, and the characteristics of gender, no person receiving it reported being offended. The EEO officer recommended discipline for Hanners and three employees who had forwarded the email. The disciplinary review board recommended, and the director imposed a 30-day suspension. Hanners's promotion rating was reduced. The district court granted summary judgment for defendants in his suit under 42 U.S.C. 1981, 1983. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Hanner did not establish that individuals outside the protected class (Caucasians) received systematically better disciplinary treatment or identify any instance where defendants engaged in behavior or made comments suggesting discriminatory attitude against Caucasians generally or against him because he is Caucasian.

Following a vote by employees of the truck transportation company, the NLRB certified a local union as representative for the employees. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, upholding the Board's decision that a ballot with irregular markings should be counted as indicating the clear intent of the voter. The ballot, which had an apparent erasure of a vote for a competing union, was the deciding vote.

Defendant, convicted of unlawful possession of a firearm, 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1), was sentenced to 113 months. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, upholding the court's refusal to exclude evidence regarding gang affiliation. The evidence was admissible to show the defense witness's bias in favor of his fellow gang member. The court attempted to reduce prejudicial impact by directing that the proper name of the gang not be used, denying admissibility of gang tattoos, and reserving the ultimate question of admissibility until after hearing direct examination of the witness. The court directed that the government could ask questions on the subject only if the defense witness first raised it. The jury was instructed that membership in a street gang could not be considered in finding that defendant was more or less likely to have committed the charged offense.

In 1989 Dominguez was arrested and in 1990 he was convicted of home invasion and sexual assault. In 2002 he was exonerated by DNA; in 2005 he received a pardon. Under Illinois law, his claim for malicious prosecution accrued in 2002. Under federal law, constitutional claims (42 U.S.C. 1983) accrued in 1989 and 2002. Wrongful arrest claims accrue on the date of arrest, but wrongful conviction claims accrue when conviction is invalidated. The Seventh Circuit affirmed an award of about $9 million for malicious prosecution and concealment of exculpatory evidence. The city has been insured by different companies and each asserted that the policy for another year applied. None provided a defense. The district court held that the issuer of the "occurrence" policy in force at exoneration must defend and indemnify. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The city's misconduct occurred in 1989 and 1990, but the policy does not define the "occurrence" as misconduct by a law-enforcement officer. It defines the occurrence as the tort under state or federal law, and, in both, the tort occurs witn its last element, exoneration. Until then, Dominguez could not establish "malicious prosecution" or "violation" of section 1983.

In 2009, fire severely damaged the insureds' home. They submitted a claim to under their homeowners’ policy the next day. The insurer began requesting documents, authorizations, and interviews and learned that the insureds had at least two businesses, held numerous personal and business accounts, and were involved in several lawsuits. A fire investigator concluded that the fire was intentionally set. The insurer requested additional documents: detailed phone records, bank histories, tax returns, and mortgage information and reminded the insureds that proof of loss was due by May 2. The insurer granted extensions; on the day of the final deadline the insureds delivered almost 1,000 pages of documents. Several months later, the insurer had not received most of the requested documents or an explanation why they could not be produced. After initially acknowledging their failure to produce the documents, the insureds attempted to impose a deadline for settlement of the $2.6 million claim. The district court entered summary judgment for the insurer in the insureds' breach of contract suit. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The insureds failed to perform the specific "duties after loss" listed in the policy.

In 2006, plaintiff, then in ninth grade, was reported as having a knife. The school board held a hearing and entered an expulsion order. Plaintiff was conditionally reinstated for the next school year. In 2007 an administrator learned that the statement, "Only one bullet left, no one to kill but myself," appeared on plaintiff's backpack. Three more incidents involving threats or physical violence followed. Following meetings, he was permanently expelled and enrolled in private school. The state superintendent reversed the expulsion, but plaintiff remained in private school. Seen using the public school gym facilities, plaintiff was asked to leave; he became agitated and confrontational. The school barred him from the premises and he was subsequently cited for trespass. The district court entered summary judgment for the district with respect to his many claims under 42 U.S.C. 1983. He appealed with respect to the ban on entering school grounds. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. As a member of the public, plaintiff does not have a protected liberty interest in accessing school grounds; defendants had no obligation to provide him with process in connection with the ban.

Petitioner, serving a 60-year sentence for attempted murder, burglary-battery, and bail jumping, received full collateral review by federal courts, and his first application under 28 U.S.C. 2244(b) for permission for a second collateral attack was denied. Intending to file a second 2244(b) application, he asked to be excused for untimely filing and for an order requiring the prison to allow him expanded use of the copier. The court rejected those claims, but exercised its discretion to excuse petitioner from compliance with Rule 22.2(a)(4) and (5), requiring submission of copies of documents from prior cases, and Appellate Rule 21(d), requiring submission of multiple copies of pleadings. Analysis of timeliness must wait for the papers to which the question applies. Petitioner adequately alleged that prison action frustrated his attempt to file an application, but did not identify underlying legal claims frustrated by the delay.

Petitioner, a Mexican citizen who has lived in the U.S. for many years and is a lawful permanent resident, was ordered removed because of two Illinois convictions for possessing and trafficking in cocaine. He sought cancellation of removal, based on having lawful permanent resident status for at least five years and having resided here for at least seven years without conviction of an aggravated felony, 8 U.S.C. 1229b(a). The BIA affirmed denial, citing petitioner's long history of arrests and convictions. The Seventh Circuit denied an appeal, rejecting a claim that the BIA overlooked mitigating circumstances in the form of family hardship. Petitioner's parents, wife, and children are U.S. citizens and do not plan to relocate to Mexico if the petitioner is sent back there. His parents claim that they would be afraid to visit because of violence in Mexico.