Justia U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

In 1989, petitioner illegal entered the U.S. from Mexico. He married another illegal alien in 1992 and they have three children, 5-18 years old, who are U.S. citizens. In 2000 INS commenced removal. Petitioner sought cancellation of removal under 8 U.S.C. 1229b(b)1. An immigration judge found that petitioner had established requisite continuous physical presence and good moral character, but failed to show that removal would result in exceptional and extremely unusual hardship to his children. The BIA affirmed. The Seventh Circuit denied an appeal. The ALJ’s manner of questioning and exclusion of testimony from one of petitioner’s daughters did not deprive petitioner of a full and fair hearing.

Plaintiff suffered an on-the-job injury. The following day, managers decided to terminate her position as part of a national reduction in force. Informed of this decision upon her return from medical leave, plaintiff filed a workers’ compensation claim and, later, sued the company for terminating her in retaliation for exercising workers’ compensation rights. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the employer. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, noting that the company established nondiscriminatory reasons for its decision. Plaintiff did not show a causal link between her decision to seek medical attention and the termination.

Plaintiff first sought treatment in 1988, at age 27, experiencing double vision, eye strain, and facial numbness, and was diagnosed with abducens nerve palsy of the left eye. He continued to work as a welder until 2004, when symptoms forced him to sell his business. In 2007, he applied for disability insurance benefits, alleging onset in 2004. In 2010 an ALJ rejected the claim, concluding that plaintiff; she noted plaintiff’s complaints of headaches, but concluded that they must be non-severe. The district court upheld the denial. The Seventh Circuit remanded to the Social Security Administration, holding that the ALJ’s credibility determination was not supported by substantial evidence.

Three individuals (once known as the "Bad Boys' of Chicago Arbitrage") established "Loop" as a closely-held corporation for their real estate holdings in 1997. A family trust for Loop's corporate secretary (50% owner) owns Banco, which gave Loop a $9.9 million line of credit in 2000. On the same day, Loop subsidiaries entered into a participation agreement on the line of credit through which they advanced $3 million to Loop, giving the subsidiaries senior secured creditor status over Loop's assets. The now-creditor subsidiaries were also collateral for funds loaned Loop. In 2001 Loop received a margin call from Wachovia. The Banco-Loop line of credit matured and Loop defaulted. Banco extended and expanded the credit. Loop’s debt to Wachovia went unpaid. Loop invested $518,338 in an Internet golf reservation company; moved real estate assets to Loop Properties (essentially the same owners); and paid two owners $210,500 “compensation” but never issued W-2s. Wachovia obtained a $2,478,418 judgment. The district court pierced Loop’s corporate veil, found the owners personally liable, and voided as fraudulent Banco’s lien, the “compensation” payments, and payments to the golf company. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, except with respect to the golf company.

Defendants were convicted of conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute and attempt to distribute five kilograms or more of cocaine. 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1) & 846. Baker was also convicted of use of a telephone in commission of the conspiracy, 21 U.S.C. 843(b). The Seventh Circuit affirmed, upholding the district court's denial of a motion for disclosure of the identities of all confidential informers. The court also upheld a three-level sentence increase (U.S.S.G. 3B1.1(b)), rejecting an argument that it was based on unreliable testimony.

Romasanta worked in Chicago as an expediter, helping developers obtain construction permits. In testifying against Curescu, a developer, she admitted bribing 25 to 30 city employees between 2004 and 2007. She paid an $8,000 bribe to a zoning inspector on behalf of Curescu. Convicted of bribery of an agency that receives federal assistance, 18 U.S.C. 666 and conspiracy, 18 U.S.C. 371, Curescu was sentenced to six months and the zoning inspector to 41 months in prison. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting various challenges to testimony and to the court's refusal to severe the cases.

Plaintiff, a part-time mail handler for the USPS since 1987, injured his back on the job in 1998. He returned to "light-duty" work until 2003, when he reinjured himself at work. Except for one week, he did not return to work nor did he provide documentation concerning his injury. In 2005, a supervisor notified him that he would be terminated. Plaintiff's union filed a grievance and the settlement required plaintiff to see a doctor and either return to "full duty" or apply for disability retirement by a certain date. Physicians cleared him to work with several permanent restrictions. A USPS physician determined that plaintiff was unfit for "full duty." He was terminated for violation of the agreement. The EEOC found no discrimination. He filed a claim that, although he was not legally disabled, he was "regarded as" disabled. The district court granted the defendants summary judgment. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. After determining that the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. 12112(a), prior to 2009 amendments, applied, the court found that plaintiff did not establish that USPS regarded him as disabled. Plaintiff lacked standing to challenge the "100% healed" requirement of the settlement agreement under the ADA or the Rehabilitation Act.

The village, on the Mississippi River, experienced a 500-year rain in 2007. Debris carried by the water clogged the trestle beneath the railroad bridge, causing runoff to back up and inundate the village. Residents sued the railroad, alleging faulty design and maintenance of the trestle. The district court dismissed for failure to state a claim, holding that Wis. Stat. 88.87 provided the exclusive remedy and that relief was foreclosed under that statute because plaintiffs had not filed a timely notice of claim. The statute imposes a duty on railroad companies that construct and maintain railroad grades in or across drainage courses not to impede the flow of surface water in an unreasonable manner and grants injured landowners the right to sue for equitable relief and inverse condemnation but not damages. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Plaintiff forfeited claims that section 88.87 did not apply, so the court declined to address preemption by the Federal Railway Safety Act.

Plaintiff, hired by IDOT in 1989, was suspended in 2003, pursuant to a "last chance" agreement, for fighting in the workplace. There had been prior disciplinary measures. In 2005, plaintiff was involved in a worksite altercation with a co-worker and a supervisor. IDOT initiated discharge proceedings. Plaintiff disputed that he had physical contract with his supervisor, but did not alleged that the attempt to discharge him was retaliation for his filing a race discrimination charge in 2001. An ALJ conducted a hearing at which plaintiff was represented by counsel and concluded that plaintiff had engaged in an altercation but that discharge was not warranted. A state trial court overturned the decision and sustained the discharge. Three years later, after obtaining a right to sue letter from the EEOC, plaintiff filed a complaint under 42 U.S.C. 2000e-3(a). The district court dismissed, citing res judicata. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting his argument that the retaliation claim does not arise from the same set of operative facts as the claim made in the state court. The claim could have been raised in that forum.

Rice, charged with attempted bank robbery, was known to have schizophrenia, and shortly before his death, was found incompetent to stand trial. Although seen by mental health professionals while detained, Rice often refused to take medications, eat, or bathe. He was hospitalized at psychiatric and other medical facilities several times and was awaiting placement at a state psychiatric facility. Rice died, about 15 months after arriving at the jail, of psychogenic polydipsia (excessive water drinking), a disorder known to manifest with schizophrenia. His estate filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging deliberate indifference. The district court entered summary judgment against the estate, which filed a second suit, reasserting state wrongful death claims previously dismissed. The judge dismissed, citing collateral estoppel, reasoning that a previous finding as to foreseeability of the cause of death precluded recovery on state claims. The Seventh Circuit reversed in part, holding that a material dispute of fact precluded summary judgment on one of the 1983 claims: that conditions of confinement were inhumane. The district court erred in dismissing state claims; the prior finding concerning foreseeability was not preclusive with respect to those claims.