Justia U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

In 2006, B.T., 14 years old, was failing in high school. Her friends accused her of making a bomb threat. She attempted suicide. In July 2006, B.T. told police that Dietrich, a family friend, had sexually assaulted her between June and August 2004 when she was 12 years old. Dietrich was charged repeated first-degree sexual assault of a child and intimidation of a child victim. Dietrich sought in camera review of B.T.’s counseling records. Dietrich believed the records would show that though the alleged sexual assaults occurred in 2004, B.T. did not tell her therapist about the assaults until after her April 2006 suicide attempt. The state trial court declined. Dietrich was convicted and sentenced to 13 years in prison. After exhausting post-conviction remedies in Wisconsin courts, Dietrich sought habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. 2254. The district court denied relief, but granted a certificate of appealability on the question of whether Dietrich’s due process rights were violated when the state trial court did not conduct the requested in camera review. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The state court reasonably applied precedent, as Dietrich failed to make a plausible showing that the victim’s counseling records contained evidence material to his defense. View "Dietrich v. Smith" on Justia Law

The district court certified a class consisting of more than 4000 participants in the Meriter pension plan who allegedly were not credited with all benefits to which the plan entitled them. Some members received benefits 23 years ago. Some are current, the rest former, participants. The plan has been amended several times, so claims were divided into 10 groups, each of which was certified as a separate subclass having a different representative under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(2), which authorizes class action treatment if the defendant “has acted or refused to act on grounds that apply generally to the class, so that final injunctive relief or corresponding declaratory relief is appropriate respecting the class as a whole.” Each subclass in the ERISA action seeks a declaration of the rights of its members under the plan and an injunction directing that the plan’s records be reformed to reflect those rights. Admonishing the attorneys for failing to adequately describe the plan, the Seventh Circuit affirmed. The court rejected arguments concerning conflicts of interest among class members and that class members who are no longer participants in the plan are not entitled to declaratory or injunctive relief because such relief is forward looking. View "Boyd v. Meriter Health Servs. Emp. Ret. Plan" on Justia Law

As part of a major interagency effort to combat gang violence and drug trafficking in Racine, Wisconsin, state and federal officers identified Matthews as an “impact player” and used a confidential informant to target him in a series of controlled buys. Matthews sold crack cocaine to the informant on five occasions in 2010. He was indicted on five counts of distributing crack, pleaded guilty to two, and was sentenced to 78 months in prison, the midpoint of the sentencing guidelines range. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, noting that the district court deferred to the 18:1 crack-to-powder sentencing ratio adopted in the Fair Sentencing Act of 2010 and rejected an argument for a 1:1 ratio. The judge’s decision to adhere to the ratio endorsed by Congress and the Commission does not make the resulting within-guidelines sentence unreasonable merely because other judges in the district exercised their discretion to use a different ratio. A sentence disparity that results from another judge’s policy disagreement with the guidelines is not “unwarranted” under 18 U.S.C. 3553(a)(6). View "United States v. Matthews" on Justia Law

Nine defendants were charged with conspiracy to distribute large quantities of methamphetamine and marijuana; two were also charged as felons in possession of firearms. All were convicted. The sentences were: Moreland 110 months, Smith 151, Bailey 216, Pitts 420, and the others life. Only one defendant, Shelton, was charged with a substantive drug offense. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, noting the risks inherent in charging conspiracy. The court also rejected an argument that excusing persons who have vacation plans, business commitments, or employment demands tilts the jury’s composition away from the more affluent members of the community and makes jury selection unrepresentative. The court upheld the district court allowing a law enforcement officer to testify as both a lay witness and an expert witness View "United States v. Moreland" on Justia Law

Purnell sold crack cocaine to an undercover agent (27 to 61 grams) on three occasions. During one transaction, Purnell revealed a pistol. In 2007, he pled guilty to distributing crack cocaine in excess of five grams, 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1), and knowingly carrying a firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking crime, 18 U.S.C. 924(c)(1)(A). With a prior drug distribution felony, he was facing a mandatory minimum sentence of 20 years, but was sentenced to only 78 months. Under the agreement, the government dismissed two charges for distributing more than 50 grams, which carried ten-year mandatory minimum sentences; agreed not to seek the prior offender sentence enhancement (21 U.S.C. 851(a)(1)(A)), and agreed to move for a reduction in Purnell’s guideline offense level for acceptance of responsibility. Purnell waived his right to appeal or collaterally attack his sentence, except on grounds that the waiver was involuntary or defective for ineffective assistance. Purnell later sought a reduction in his sentence for crack cocaine distribution in light of the retroactive 2011 reductions to the sentencing guideline ranges, 18 U.S.C. 3582(c)(2). The district court denied relief. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, upholding the court’s consideration of specific instances of false statements Purnell made to the court. View "United States v. Purnell" on Justia Law

Ruppel sued CBS in Illinois alleging CBS’s predecessor, Westinghouse, caused the mesothelioma from which he suffers. Westinghouse had included asbestos in the turbines it supplied to the U.S. Navy, and Ruppel was allegedly exposed to it during his Naval service and later when he worked on an aircraft carrier as a civilian. CBS removed the case under the federal officer removal statute, which permits removal of certain suits where a defendant that acted under a federal officer has a colorable federal defense, 28 U.S.C. 1442(a)(1). Ruppel moved to remand and, without allowing response, the district court granted the motion. The district court concluded Ruppel only sued CBS for failing to warn about the dangers of asbestos for which there is no federal defense. The Seventh Circuit reversed. CBS’s relationship with Ruppel arises solely out of CBS’s duties to the Navy. It also has a colorable argument for the government contractor defense, which immunizes government contractors when they supply products with specifications approved by the government. View "Ruppel v. CBS Corp." on Justia Law

Kasten sued his employer, alleging unlawful retaliation for lodging oral complaints regarding the location of time clocks under the Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. 215(a)(3). Kasten complained that the time clocks were placed in locations which caused him to frequently forget to punch in, notifying his supervisors on at least five occasions that the location away from the donning and doffing area was “illegal.” Kasten failed to punch in on several occasions, violating company policy. He was suspended and ultimately terminated. The district court granted summary judgment for the employer on the ground that oral complaints do not constitute protected activity under the FLSA; the Seventh Circuit affirmed. On certiorari, the Supreme Court vacated, holding that oral complaints may qualify as protected activity where they provide “fair notice” that an employee is asserting rights under the FLSA. On remand, the district court concluded that Kasten’s oral complaints did in fact provide “fair notice,” but concluded that Kasten had failed to create a dispute of material fact regarding causation and granted the employer summary judgment. The Seventh Circuit reversed and remanded, finding that Kasten has provided evidence which would support a jury inference of retaliation. View "Kasten v. Saint-Gobain Performance Plastics Corp." on Justia Law

Over the course of two days in late 2009, Taylor went on a shooting spree in Aurora, Illinois. He fired his black 9 millimeter Beretta semiautomatic pistol on residential streets, at family homes, and at a moving vehicle, all in an apparent attempt to retaliate against rival gang members. Taylor was arrested and charged with possessing a firearm after having previously been convicted of a felony. Before his jury trial, Taylor unsuccessfully moved to exclude evidence of two other guns that officers had recovered at the scene of his arrest. The jury found Taylor guilty of violating the felon-in-possession statute. Based in part on the violent circumstances of Taylor’s crime and his extensive criminal history, the district court imposed a sentence of 480 months’ imprisonment, nearly 13 years above his advisory guideline range. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, upholding the denial of the motion and the sentence and rejecting a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence. View "United States v. Taylor" on Justia Law

Plaintiff sued Home Depot and a personnel manager, claiming that the company had refused to hire him because of his national origin, Albanian, in violation of Title VII. Defendants claim that a manager called plaintiff on August 27, 2007, and told him he wouldn’t be hired. The plaintiff filed discrimination complaints with the EEOC and its Wisconsin counterpart on June 26, 2008, 304 days later. Title VII provides that the 300-day period to file an administrative complaint begins to run when the complainant is informed of the allegedly unlawful employment practice, 42 U.S.C. 2000e-5(e)(1). Plaintiff denied that he had received such a call that day. The district judge conducted an evidentiary hearing and dismissed. The Seventh Circuit reversed, distinguishing between the limitations period and the requirement of exhaustion of administrative remedies. Title VII does not require exhaustion of administrative remedies. It states that “a charge . . . shall be filed . . . within three hundred days after the alleged unlawful employment practice occurred,” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(1), but not that an administrative proceeding shall have been conducted before the employee can file suit. View "Begolli v. Home Depot, U.S.A., Inc." on Justia Law

Huber operated a Ponzi scheme in which 118 investors lost a total of $22.6 million. He told investors, mainly friends and acquaintances, who trusted him, that he administered investment funds, using a computer trading model. He pleaded guilty to mail fraud and related crimes, and was sentenced to 20 years in prison. A receiver appointed to marshal and distribute remaining assets found $7 million, roughly 24 percent of the total amount and has distributed all but about $1 million to the 118 investors. Instead of distributing recovered assets pro rata among the investors, the receiver made a distinction, counting withdrawals made before discovery of the scheme as partial compensation (“rising tide” method). Those investors argue that he should have used the “net loss” method, under which each investor would receive a sixth of his loss. The district court approved the method of distribution. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, reasoning that the investors did not withdraw “their money,” but withdrew portions of the commingled assets in the Ponzi schemer’s funds. View "Merel v. Duff" on Justia Law