Justia U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

The International Child Abduction Remedies Act, 42 U.S.C. 11601, entitles a person whose child has been removed from his custody to the U.S. to petition for return of the child. Father and mother lived with their daughter, three years old, in Canada. The parties are of Indian ethnicity; theirs was an arranged marriage. During a vacation in India, mother alleged domestic abuse, so that father was detained, while mother flew to the U.S. with daughter. Mother gave birth to a second child in the U.S.; that child is not at issue. The district court ordered the child returned to Canada. The child was taken from her mother by U.S. Marshals, based on the father’s assertion that the mother is a flight risk because India is not a signatory of the Hague Convention. The child lived with her father in a hotel in Chicago until she was returned to her mother pending appeal. The Seventh Circuit vacated and remanded for a hearing on whether being with the father will inflict psychological harm on the child. The court noted the conflicting assertions of the parents and that the district court did not explore the issue, apparently seeing it as a foreign problem.

Plaintiff had worked for defendant for 19 years when she had a heart attack requiring bypass surgery and went on medical leave. While on leave, she also received treatment for carpal tunnel syndrome. After six months of leave, defendant terminated her employment pursuant to its established leave policy. Defendant told plaintiff that she was eligible for re-hire to her position once she was medically cleared to work again. Hunt then filed suit, alleging that she was fired in retaliation for her intention to file a workers’ compensation claim related to her carpal tunnel syndrome. The district court granted defendant summary judgment on the retaliation claims. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Plaintiff offered no evidence that the relevant decision-maker even knew of her potential workers’ compensation claim or was influenced by anyone who did know.

After two days of trial, defendant, charged with conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute five kilograms or more of cocaine, 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1); 50 grams or more of cocaine base, 21 U.S.C. 841(b)(1)(A); and one kilogram or more of heroin, 21 U.S.C. 846, pled guilty to unlawful use of a communication facility to further a drug trafficking offense, 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1), 843(b). He signed waivers of indictment and of appeal. During the plea colloquy, defendant stated that he had eight years of education, that he had never been declared mentally incompetent, and that he was not undergoing psychological or psychiatric care or using medications or any drug that would affect his comprehension. He stated that voluntarily accepted the plea and waivers. He later filed a letter with the court, ostensibly pro se, requesting to withdraw his guilty plea. His attorney moved to withdraw. The district court appointed new counsel, denied his motion to withdraw the plea and imposed a 34-month sentence, which amounted to time served, plus one year of supervised release. The Seventh Circuit dismissed an appeal, finding that the waiver was valid and encompassed his right to appeal denial of his motion to withdraw his plea.

Dr. Jajeh, a Syrian-born Muslim, became an attending physician at the county hospital in 1991. Starting in about 2002 he had conflicts with another doctor and regularly complained about that doctor. In 2006 he complained that the conflict involved religious and ethnic discrimination. There was no evidence that problems continued after that time. In 2007 extensive budget cuts forced the county to lay off more than 200 physicians, including Dr. Jajeh. Dr. Jajeh brought suit under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. 2000e, claiming that he was subjected to discrimination on the basis of religion and national origin, and terminated in retaliation for his complaints about the discrimination he suffered. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the county, finding no evidence of discrimination or that he was laid off in retaliation for his complaints. The Seventh Circuit affirmed.

The owner and a prospective tenant signed a residential lease at a home for which the owner had not yet obtained a certificate of occupancy. As the tenant began moving his belongings into the house, a building inspector reminded him that all rental property must have a certificate of occupancy before a tenant can live in the house. Visibly upset, the owner berated the inspector in the presence of a police officer, who arrested the owner for disorderly conduct. Following his conviction, the owner filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, claiming he was unlawfully arrested without probable cause. The district court dismissed the officer and later granted summary judgment to the inspector. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, stating that the evidence supported that the owner was arrested for disorderly conduct and only later cited for failure to obtain a certificate of occupancy.

A corporation that wants its shares to be traded on an exchange or through broker-dealers that make national markets must register the securities under the Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. 77j. Section 13(a) of the 1934 Act, 15 U.S.C. 8m(a), requires the issuer to file periodic reports. Plaintiff registered securities and persuaded broker-dealers to make markets in them, but fell behind with its filings. After eight years, during which plaintiff fell farther behind, the SEC opened a formal proceeding. After a hearing and disclosure that plaintiff could not pay an auditor to certify recent financial statements, the SEC revoked plaintiff's registration; trading in its shares came to a halt. While judicial review was pending, plaintiff filed a new registration, which has not been revoked despite plaintiff's failure to catch up on reports. The Seventh Circuit dismissed the case as moot. To commence trading in any newly registered stock, a broker-dealer needs approval from the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority. When a potential market-maker sought approval, it noted SEC comments on plaintiff's new registration. Setting aside the SEC revocation decision would not oblige FINRA to allow trading to resume.

The Thorogood lawsuit against Sears, characterized as "near frivolous," concerned marketing of a clothes dryer. It was certified and later decertified as a class action on the ground that no issues could be resolved in a single, class-wide evidentiary hearing, and was ultimately dismissed. Murray, a member of the proposed class, who did not become a party, filed a "copycat" class action, using the same attorney. Following a third visit to the Seventh Circuit, the district court enjoined the Murray suit as defiant of the decertification. The Supreme Court remanded. The Seventh Circuit consolidated the Thorogood and Murray cases for its fourth opinion. On the merits, the court stated that "One would have to have a neurotic obsession with rust stains (or be a highly imaginative class action lawyer) to worry about Sears' drum," and that it would "unsay nothing," in its previous opinions, but vacated the injunction. "We were wrong. The Supreme Court’s decision—rendered after we ordered the injunction … although it does not refer to the All Writs Act, inclines us to doubt that Murray, not having been a party to the Thorogood suit, can nevertheless be bound by a ruling in it, including the ruling decertifying the class."

The SEC filed a complaint. The court appointed a receiver to handle defendants' assets for distribution among victims of the $31 million fraud. Assets included oil and gas leases. SonCo filed a claim. The parties came to terms; the court entered an agreed order that required SonCo to pay $580,000 for assignment of the leases. The wells were unproductive, because of freeze orders entered to prevent dissipation of assets; the lease operator, ALCO, had posted a $250,000 bond with the Texas Railroad Commission. The bond was, in part, from defrauded investors. SonCo was ordered to replace ALCO as operator and to obtain a bond. More than a year later, SonCo had not posted the bond or obtained Commission authorization to operate the wells, but had paid for the assignment. The judge held SonCo in contempt and ordered it to return the leases, allowing the receiver to keep $600,000 that SonCo had paid. SonCo returned the leases. The Seventh Circuit affirmed that SonCo willfully violated the order, but vacated the sanction. The judge on remand may: reimpose the sanction, upon demonstrating that it is a compensatory remedy for civil contempt; impose a different, or no sanction; or proceed under rules governing criminal contempt.

Defendants, charged with violating the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) by conspiring to conduct an enterprise's affairs through a pattern of racketeering activity, 18 U.S.C. 1962(d), appealed denial of motions to dismiss indictments, charging them, with other members of the "Chicago Outfit" with a pattern of racketeering activity, from the 1960s to 2005, including murders, extortion, obstruction of justice, and other crimes. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, holding that they failed to show sufficient overlap between the indictment and previous indictments to establish double jeopardy. All defendants were convicted. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting a renewed claim of double jeopardy, claims based on the statute of limitations, challenges to sufficiency of the evidence, and challenges to handling of the jury. The court reversed the part of the sentencing assessing shares of restitution under the Mandatory Victims Restitution Act, 18 U.S.C. 3663A.

Police, believing the car to be stolen and the driver intoxicated, stopped plaintiff's car and implemented high-risk procedures. Officers, equipped with body shields, identified themselves and loudly commanded the driver to show her hands and get out of the car. The driver did not comply, but reached for a compartment in the vehicle and lit a cigarette. She put her feet out of the driver-side window onto the door, while she leaned back toward the console. She picked up a water bottle and set it on the ground beside the car. Officers repeated the order for about 10 minutes before using an SL6 baton launcher to fire a warning shot that hit the vehicle. They continued to issue commands for five minutes, then fired four shots, hitting her legs. Plaintiff, who was highly intoxicated, required stitches and was unable to walk for a week. Her suit claiming excessive force resulted in a verdict in the officers' favor. The Seventh Circuit reversed. The officers had reason to know that they should mitigate the force being used in light of plaintiff’s lack of resistance and were not entitled to qualified immunity.