Justia U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

In 2005, Banks, a construction worker, wanted to flip houses, but did not have capital. John, a mortgage broker, suggested that they purchase homes from distressed owners at inflated prices, with the sellers promising to return money above what they owed their own lenders. Owners cooperated rather than face foreclosure. Banks renovated the houses using funds received from sellers and resold them. Johns collected a broker’s fee. When they purchased a house from owners in bankruptcy, they wanted a mortgage to secure payment from the sellers and informed the trustee of the bankruptcy estate. Despite protestations by the trustee, the sale went through, and Banks used the rinsed equity to pay off sellers’ creditors through the trustee. The sellers’ lawyer discovered the scheme, which led to indictments. Johns was convicted of making false representations to the trustee regarding the second mortgage and for receiving property from a debtor with intent to defeat provisions of the Bankruptcy Code. With enhancements for financial loss and for targeting vulnerable victims, Johns was sentenced to 30 months. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the conviction, rejecting challenges to sufficiency of the evidence and jury instructions, but remanded for clarification of sentencing enhancements. View "United States v. Johns" on Justia Law

McKinney and his brother own a construction business. In 2003, the IRS filed notice of tax liens and pursued collection. McKinney avoided payment by transferring money from the business into accounts used for personal expenses. He made false statements about his ability to pay. He failed to pay taxes during 1999, 2000, 2002, 2003, 2004, 2005, and 2006. Because of the tax liens, McKinney was unable to obtain a residential mortgage. His wife obtained a loan to purchase a home, falsely stating that she was a full-time manager of the construction business with a gross monthly income of $15,374.23. Her husband signed a false employment verification; he earned the income used to pay the mortgage. His brother and his brother’s wife acted similarly. McKinney entered a plea to charges of conspiracy to defraud, impede, impair, obstruct, and defeat functions of the IRS in collection of income taxes, 18 U.S.C. 371; tax evasion, 26 U.S.C. 7201; and false statements to revenue agents, 26 U.S.C. 1001. He received a two-level enhancement to his base offense level for failing to report income exceeding $10,000 from criminal activity, U.S.S.G. 2T1.1(b)(1), and a two-level enhancement for obstruction of justice, U.S.S.G. 3C1.1. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. View "United States v. McKinney" on Justia Law

Mund, an American, married Liu, a Chinese woman in China. They moved to the U.S. For Liu to be admitted as a permanent resident, her husband had to sign an I-864 affidavit, agreeing to support his wife at 125 percent of the poverty level ($13,500 a year), if they divorced, 8 U.S.C. 1183a. They divorced two years later. Without relying on the affidavit, the divorce court ordered Mund to support Liu for one year at $500 a month, contingent on her proving that despite making at least four job applications a month, she had not found work. Mund refused to provide support specified in the federal affidavit because Liu was not seeking work. The district judge held that Liu was not entitled to support while not seeking work. The Seventh Circuit reversed, holding there is no duty of mitigation with respect to obligations under the affidavit. The court noted form language that the obligation continues “until my death or the sponsored immigrant(s) have become U.S. citizens, can be credited with 40 quarters of work, depart the U.S. permanently, or die.” The level of support is meager, so the sponsored immigrant has a strong incentive to seek employment, apart from any legal duty. View "Liu v. Mund" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs are current and former drivers for FedEx delivery service who allege that they were employees rather than independent contractors under the laws of the states in which they worked and under federal law. The district court used the Craig. case, which was based on ERISA and Kansas law, as its “lead” case; certified a nationwide class seeking relief under ERISA and certified statewide classes under FRCP 23(b)(3). The Kansas class has 479 members. They allege that they were improperly classified as independent contractors rather than employees under the Kansas Wage Payment Act, Kan. Stat. 44-313, and that as employees, they are entitled to repayment of costs and expenses they paid during their time as FedEx employees. They also seek payment of overtime wages. The district court granted FedEx summary judgment in Craig and other cases; 21 cases are on appeal. The Seventh Circuit stayed proceedings and certified questions to the Kansas Supreme Court: Given the undisputed facts, are the plaintiff drivers employees of FedEx as a matter of law under the KWPA? Drivers can acquire more than one service area from FedEx. Is the answer different for plaintiff drivers who have more than one service area? View "Craig v. FedEx Ground Package Sys., Inc." on Justia Law

Convicted of kidnapping, rape, and murder, Overstreet was sentenced to death. The Supreme Court of Indiana affirmed and denied a petition for post-conviction relief. The district court denied his habeas corpus petition. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting challenges based on alleged ineffective assistance of counsel during the penalty proceedings. Counsel did not ask the judge to require spectators who wore buttons or ribbons with the victim’s picture to remove the displays of sympathy. He claimed that his lawyers failed to convey “effectively” or “meaningfully” the prosecutor’s offer of a plea bargain. A third argument was based on Overstreet’s mental problems. Psychiatric evidence indicated that on some occasions Overstreet would have lacked the ability to evaluate his legal situation rationally, but the district judge concluded that he understood the offer and discussed it intelligently with his sister. View "Overstreet v. Wilson" on Justia Law

In 2008, Sojka was working on the upper floors of the Chicago Trump Tower construction project, trying to repair a steel cable that held safety netting around the upper floors of the project when the wind knocked him back and a piece of metal struck his eye, causing severe injuries. Although Sojka was wearing safety glasses at the time, they apparently did not fit his face properly. He sued the construction manager, which moved for summary judgment on the ground that it did not owe Sojka any duty of care to provide a safe workplace, and that even if it did it had not breached such a duty because it had no knowledge that the safety glasses were inadequate to prevent the injury. Sojka failed to address this argument in his response and the court granted the motion. The Seventh Circuit reversed. Although the court was correct that Sojka conceded the eyewear point by failing to respond, it took too narrow a view of Sojka’s case. His response addressed several other ways in which defendant’s negligence allegedly caused his injuries. A dispute of material fact remains on those theories. View "Sojka v. Bovis Lend Lease, Inc." on Justia Law

Samuel Milligan, then a freshman at Southern Illinois University, had uncomfortable encounters with a professor emeritus at, and substantial donor to, SIU, during which Meyers touched Milligan inappropriately and complimented him on what Meyers believed to be his feminine features. SIU banned Meyers from campus pending completion of an investigation and warned that he would be subject to arrest for trespass. Milligan saw Meyers on campus more than times after the ban was imposed. SIU public safety personnel escorted Meyers off campus each time they became aware of his presence but, on instructions from the Director of Public Safety, he was not arrested. Although Milligan lost his campus job, he was able to get another and to gain admission to graduate school. Milligan sued SIU under Title VII 42 U.S.C. 2000e-2(a)(1) and Title IX for creating a hostile work and educational environment and also for retaliating against him for complaining about Meyers’ harassment. The district court granted summary judgment to SIU. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, finding that the statutes do not set a higher standard for “more vulnerable” student workers and that SIU responded appropriately to the situation. View "Milligan v. Bd. of Trs. of S. IL Univ." on Justia Law

Marantz practiced pulmonary and critical care medicine. In 1997 she underwent surgery for a herniated disc and degenerative disc disease. The surgery did not eliminate her pain. In 1999, she stopped working full time. Through her employment with she received disability coverage from LINA. LINA approved her claim. Additional surgery did not resolve the problem. MRIs revealed degenerative disc disease and spinal stenosis. In 2000 LINA provided funding for Marantz to enroll in an online Masters of Public Health program, for retraining for less-demanding work. In 2001, Marantz began working approximately 20 hours per week for the Illinois Department of Public Health. LINA offset disability benefits and reduced its monthly payment from $7,616 to $5,000 per month. LINA paid benefits for 60 months. In 2004, LINA investigated whether Marantz satisfied the policy’s more stringent definition of disability relevant after the first 60 months: “unable to perform all the material duties of any occupation for which [that worker] may reasonably become qualified based on education, training or experience.” In 2005 LINA terminated benefits, based on a functional capacity evaluation, doctors’ assessments, and surveillance. Marantz sued under the ERISA, 29 U.S.C. 113. The district court entered judgment in the defendants’ favor. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. View "Marantz v. Permanente Med. Grp., Inc." on Justia Law

Jawad, a Jordanian citizen, entered with his wife and son on a non-immigrant visa that expired in 1987. Before 1989, they had five more children in the United States. In 1998, they divorced. Six months later, Blankenship, a U.S. citizen, filed a visa petition, representing that she and Jawad had married. Blankenship later admitted that the marriage was fraudulent: Jawad had agreed to pay Blankenship $10,000. After ending his relationship with Blankenship, Jawad bought a home and invited his ex-wife and their children to move in with him. He did not divorce Blankenship. He was eventually charged as removable under INA 212(a)(6)(C)(i) for remaining in the country on an expired visa and fraudulently entering into a marriage to secure an immigration benefit. Four years later, USCIS approved a new immediate-family visa petition for Jawad, on his behalf by his daughter, a citizen who had reached her 21st birthday. Following a hearing, the IJ found Blankenship the more credible witness, primarily because she was not promised protection from criminal liability for her testimony and decided that Jawad failed to show he merited a favorable exercise of discretion. The BIA dismissed an appeal. The Seventh Circuit dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. View "Jawad v. Holder" on Justia Law

A former bailiff-nightclub owner, then 70 years old, pleaded guilty to possession of a firearm by an unlawful user of a controlled substance, 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(3), and possession of an unregistered firearm. 26 U.S.C. 5861(d) and was sentenced to 78 months, the bottom of the guidelines range. Defendant’s lawyer sought to withdraw on the ground that he could not find colorable ground for appeal. The Seventh Circuit dismissed, stating that the sentence was reasonable and not a de facto life sentence. The Census Bureau indicates that life expectancy of a black male aged 70 is 12.4 years. Even without time off for good behavior, which could reduce the sentence to 5 years and 8 months, the sentence does not exceed life expectancy. Propensity to engage in criminal activity declines with age and “age may be a reason to depart downward in a case in which the defendant is elderly and infirm and where a form of punishment such as home confinement might be equally efficient as and less costly than incarceration,” U.S.S.G. 5H1.1, but this defendant is devoted to guns and drugs. He is 6'7," weighs 230 pounds, is in good health, and physically capable of continuing indefinitely to engage in the illegal activities. View "United States v. Johnson" on Justia Law