Justia U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

The Union established two funds for its members—a Pension Fund and a Health & Welfare Fund. DLF entered into a Memorandum of Agreement with the Union, under which DLF agreed to be bound to all Collective Bargaining Agreements between the Union and various employer associations in the geographical jurisdiction of the Union. Under the CBA, DLF is required to make fringe benefit contributions to the Funds on behalf of members of the Union. An audit of DLF’s payroll records showed that DLF had failed to make contributions on behalf of Mata, a cement mason who also performed other work (such as painting), for 1,119.5 hours in 2007 and for 234.5 hours in 2008, a total $11,955.05 in fringe benefit contributions. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the Funds, The Seventh Circuit affirmed rejecting DLF’s argument that, under the MOA, it is not contractually bound to make contributions for non-bargaining unit work. The MOA binds DLF to the CBAs and establishes the type of employee covered under the CBA. It was not intended to, and does not, define bargaining unit work for purposes of fringe benefit contributions. View "McCleskey v. DLF Constr., Inc." on Justia Law

Shideler suffers osteogenesis imperfecta, “brittle bone disease.” In 2006, at age 48, he applied for Social Security Disability Insurance benefits, 42 U.S.C. 423(d), alleging an onset date of 1995. His date last insured was 2000. The ALJ found that despite Shideler’s limitations, there were a sufficient number of jobs in the regional economy available to a person with his restrictions, and denied his application. The Appeals Council denied review. The district court and Seventh Circuit affirmed. The record supported the vocational expert’s testimony concerning available jobs as a clerk, assuming certain restrictions: never climb ladders, ropes, or scaffolds and only occasionally climb ramps or stairs; never crouch, kneel or crawl; never perform overhead reaching; avoid exposure to extreme heat and cold; and perform work that includes occasional, but not frequent, use of fingers. Despite his testimony that he had broken at least 55 bones over the course of his life, the record showed that Shideler had only four surgeries and made a full recovery. The record contained no evidence that Shideler visited any doctors between May 2000 and December 2006. View "Shideler v. Astrue" on Justia Law

The sheriff’s department ran a supervision program for non-violent pretrial defendants to reduce jail overcrowding and provide supervised employment, job training, and substance abuse treatment. Passananti was deputy director from 2002 until 2007, when county-wide budget cuts eliminated the position. Passananti sued, claiming sexual harassment by her supervisor and that she was fired based on her sex. A jury awarded her $4 million in compensatory damages against Cook County, and $70,000 in compensatory damages and $30,000 in punitive damages against the supervisor. The district court granted defendants judgment as a matter of law. The Seventh Circuit remanded for entry of a judgment of $70,000, assuming: that the supervisor repeatedly called Passananti a “bitch” in front of co-workers; that he fabricated an accusation that she had had sexual relations with a supervisee; that, as a result, Passananti was temporarily transferred and ultimately sustained a five-day unpaid suspension. The court reversed on the sexual harassment claim and reinstated the verdict as to liability, but affirmed on the discriminatory termination claim, which lacked evidentiary support. The county is the proper defendant on that claim under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act. Punitive damages are not available against the county itself. View "Passananti v. Cook County" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, hired in 2003 by Northwestern University, was denied tenure in 2007 and fired in 2008. The district court dismissed her sex discrimination suit under Title VII, 42 U.S.C. 2000e, finding that only the denial of tenure occurred within the 300-day window for filing a charge of discrimination, and finding that no reasonable jury could infer that plaintiff was denied tenure because she is a woman. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, noting plaintiff’s history with respect to publication and obtaining grants. View "Blasdel v. Northwestern Univ." on Justia Law

Budrik sued Wegman for injuries sustained in an accident on a construction site managed by Wegman and was demanding almost presented a realistic possibility of a potential loss above the policy limit, $1 million), but failed to warn Wegman of this possibility. Wegman sued Admiral for failure to act in good faith, alleging that it would promptly have sought indemnity from its excess insurer, AIG (policy limit $10 million). Budrik filed suit four years before Wegman notified AIG, which denied coverage for failure to timely notify. Budrik obtained a judgment of slightly more than $2 million. The district court dismissed Wegman’s suit against Admiral, and, on remand, granted a stay, pending state court resolution of Wegman’s suit against AIG. The Seventh Circuit dismissed appeal of the stay. Although Wegman’s suit against Admiral in federal court and against AIG in state court, are related, they do not satisfy the conditions for abstention.; the district court is not finished with the case. The stay really is a stay, and not a dismissal. View "R.C. Wegman Constr. Co. v. Admiral Ins. Co." on Justia Law

In a class action under ERISA, the district court partially decertified the class, 3000 to 3500 members (57 to 71 percent). Plaintiffs appealed under Rule 23(f), which authorizes a court of appeals to “permit an appeal from an order granting or denying class-action certification.” After holding that an order materially altering a previous order granting or denying class certification is within the scope of Rule 23(f), the Seventh Circuit denied the appeal for failure to satisfy the criteria for a Rule 23(f) appeal. View "Matz v. Household Int'l Tax Reduction Inv. Plan" on Justia Law

While working as a flight attendant, LeGrande was injured when the aircraft encountered severe turbulence. She sued the United States under the Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. 2674, alleging that air traffic controllers employed by the FAA negligently had failed to warn the flight’s captain that turbulence had been forecast along the flight path. The district court concluded that FAA employees did not breach any duty owed LeGrande and granted summary judgment for the government. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. LeGrande argued, for the first time, that her injuries resulted from the negligence of a National Weather Service meteorologist. The court concluded that the FAA breached no duty owed to LeGrande and that LeGrande failed to give the NWS the notice that the FTCA requires. View "LeGrande v. United States" on Justia Law

The Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) sought an order to prohibit brothers George and Robert Michael, former owners, directors, (Robert), officer of Citizens Bank, from participation in the affairs of any insured depository, 12 U.S.C. 1818(e)(7), and civil penalties, 12 U.S.C. 1818(i), for violations of Federal Reserve regulations, breaches of fiduciary duty, and unsafe and unsound practices. The ALJ issued a 142-page decision with detailed findings showing that the Michaels engaged in insider transactions and improper lending practices and recommending that the FDIC Board issue a prohibition order and civil penalties. The FDIC Board affirmed the decision. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The Michaels urged overturn of numerous adverse credibility determinations and proposed inferences from the record in a way that paints a picture of legitimacy despite the Board’s contrary determinations. The court noted the deference owed the agency determination and found substantial evidence to support the Board’s decision.. View "Michael v. Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp." on Justia Law

Tello and Hill, members of the Latin Kings street gang, pleaded guilty to a charge that they conspired to conduct the affairs of the Latin Kings through a pattern of racketeering activity, 18 U.S.C. 1962(d). Tello appealed, contending that the acts of racketeering referenced in his plea agreement varied materially from those alleged in the indictment. Hill challenged his sentence following a prior, successful appeal challenging his treatment as a career offender, claiming that the district court on remand substantially enhanced his offense level based on a ground that the government had waived by not raising it sooner. The Seventh Circuit affirmed Tello’s conviction, but vacated Hill’s sentence. Both the indictment and plea agreement contained sufficient information for Tello to knowingly and voluntarily plead guilty, and the two documents were wholly consistent with respect to essential elements of racketeering conspiracy. Tello admitted to the elements of RICO conspiracy; any disparity between the predicate acts of racketeering attributed to him in the indictment and the acts in furtherance of the conspiracy that he acknowledged in the plea agreement did not impact the validity of the guilty plea and conviction. The district court erred in applying the accessory guideline on remand. View "United States v. Tello" on Justia Law

In 2001, Dixon pled guilty to conspiracy to distribute crack cocaine, with an agreement that the sentence would be 15 to 20 years. The district court imposed a sentence of 15 years, 10 months. In 2011, the Sentencing Commission issued a policy statement that made retroactive the terms of Amendment 748, which had lowered the offense levels for most crack cocaine offenses. U.S.S.G. 1B1.10(c); U.S.S.G. Appx. C., Amend. 750 (Part A). Dixon then filed a motion to reduce his sentence pursuant to 18 U.S.C. 3582(c)(2). The district court denied his motion, concluding that Dixon’s sentence was based on his binding plea agreement rather than on a Guideline sentencing range that had been lowered. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The precise phrasing of the statutory exception to the general rule that sentencing courts are not authorized to modify sentences after they are imposed indicates that a district court may exercise this authority “in the case of a defendant who has been sentenced to a term of imprisonment based on a sentencing range that has subsequently been lowered by the Sentencing Commission.” Dixon’s sentence was not based on one of the guidelines that has been lowered. View "United States v. Dixon" on Justia Law