Justia U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

McDowell, a confidential informant, continued to sell cocaine, unbeknownst to his handler” In an independent investigation, the DEA developed a cooperating source: “Jose,” a member of a Mexican cartel who supplied cocaine to dealers, including McDowell. Federal agents arranged stings using Jose. McDowell was arrested during a staged sale. He announced that he was an Chicago police informant. Because it was after hours, agents asked him whether he would waive prompt presentment before a magistrate judge (FED. R. CRIM. P. 5(a)). McDowell signed a waiver and spent the night in jail. The next morning he signed a Miranda waiver and confessed involvement in cocaine trafficking. He was convicted of conspiracy and attempted possession of cocaine with intent to distribute and appealed denial of a motion to suppress his confession under 18 U.S.C. 3501(c) and the McNabb-Mallory rule because of delay in presentment. He argued that the court should have ordered the government to produce Jose and that he was entitled to a jury instruction regarding the requirement of evidence corroborating his confession. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. McDowell knowingly waived his right to prompt presentment; the district court was within its discretion maintaining the confidentiality of the cooperating source and denying the requested instruction. View "United States v. McDowell" on Justia Law

Three named plaintiffs in a class action suit to enforce the Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. 216(b) and parallel state laws appealed the district court’s decertification of the classes. Proceeding as individual lawsuits by the three plaintiffs, the case settled, reserving plaintiffs’ right to appeal the decertification. The Seventh Circuit denied a motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction. If appeals such as this were held to be precluded on standing grounds, there would be no judicial economies, since if the named plaintiffs settle after denial of class certification and then exit the scene another member of the class can step forward and take the quitters’ place. View "Espenscheid v. DirectSat USA, LLC" on Justia Law

Mosley was convicted of first-degree murder and aggravated arson and was sentenced to consecutive prison terms of 60 years on the murder charge and 15 years on the arson charge. After exhausting post-conviction remedies in Illinois state courts, Mosley filed a habeas corpus petition alleging ineffective assistance of counsel at trial. The district court granted his petition and directed the State to release Mosley unless within 30 days it either filed an appeal or announced its intention to retry him. The Seventh Circuit vacated, first rejecting a challenge to its jurisdiction. The court agreed that, assuming the accuracy of the original trial record and the affidavits of two potential alibi witnesses whom Mosley’s defense lawyer did not call to testify, Mosley’s lawyer provided ineffective assistance. The state appellate court’s decision that Mosley was not denied effective assistance of counsel was contrary to and an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law. The district court, however, heard additional evidence that contradicted the affidavits, but did not make findings on that evidence. The court remanded for determination of whether, based on new evidence not available to the state appellate court, Mosley’s trial counsel was in fact constitutionally ineffective. View "Mosley v. Atchison" on Justia Law

Plaintiff found a $20 parking citation on his windshield and initiated a class action, claiming that the inclusion of personal information, such as his driver's license number, address, and weight, violated the Driver's Privacy Protection Act, 18 U.S.C. 2721, which generally makes it unlawful to disclose personal information contained in a motor vehicle record. The district court dismissed and the Seventh Circuit initially affirmed. On rehearing, en banc, the court reversed, holding that the DPPA’s general rule of non-disclosure of personal information held in motor vehicle records and its overarching purpose of privacy protection must inform a proper understanding of the other provisions of the statute. Any disclosure must comply with those legitimate uses of information identified in the statutory exceptions. The Village’s placement of protected personal information in view of the public constituted a disclosure regulated by the statute, regardless of whether plaintiff can establish that anyone actually viewed it. View "Senne v. Vill. of Palatine" on Justia Law

Toliver is serving a life sentence for the 1992 murder of Tina Rogers. His habeas corpus petition, 28 U.S.C. 2254, asserted that his trial counsel was constitutionally ineffective because counsel did not call two exculpatory witnesses, and that the prosecution failed to disclose an exculpatory document. On remand, the district court granted the petition on the ground that trial counsel was ineffective, but denied relief on the exculpatory-evidence claim. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Trial counsel is deceased and Toliver’s testimony, which the district court accepted as true, confirmed that counsel did not call witnesses that Toliver desired because counsel thought the jury would disbelieve them based onr family relationship. The transcript from the 1992 pre-trial conference confirmed the difference of opinion between Toliver and his attorney about securing additional witnesses. Toliver’s counsel was busy preparing for another homicide trial. View "Toliver v. McCaughtry" on Justia Law

Reibel sexually molested his girlfriend’s three-year-old daughter and took pornographic photos of her. He pleaded guilty to two counts of producing child pornography in violation of 18 U.S.C. 2251(a) and received concurrent prison sentences of 360 months, the bottom of the Guidelines range but also the statutory maximum. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting an argument that the sentence unreasonably punished him as severely as the worst child pornographers and was based on mere speculation about sex offenders and their victims rather than on evidence. View "United States v. Reibel" on Justia Law

Saucedo’s tractor-trailer was stopped because its paper registration plate appeared to be expired. Trooper Miller confirmed that the plate had expired, advised Saucedo that he would conduct a safety inspection, and requested Saucedo’s driver’s license, logbook, and paperwork for the truck, trailer, and load. Saucedo produced his license and other paperwork; his trailer was empty. Miller ran Saucedo’s license and learned that it was invalid and that he had prior convictions for drug distribution and aggravated assault with a deadly weapon. Miller asked Saucedo whether he had any weapons or drugs. Saucedo volunteered that the trooper could “open it.” Miller asked Saucedo if he could search his truck and trailer; and Saucedo said, “yes.” Because Miller saw things that raised his suspicions, he contacted a canine unit for assistance. He escorted the passenger to an officer’s vehicle. In the cab he found what he thought was an alteration to a small alcove in the sleeper/bunk area behind the driver’s seat. He disassembled one screw, pulled back molding around the alcove, peered in, and found a hidden compartment in which he found 10 kilograms of cocaine. Sentenced to 240 months in prison, Saucedo appealed denial of his motion to suppress. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. View "United States v. Saucedo" on Justia Law

Hare pled guilty, during trial, to being part of a methamphetamine distribution conspiracy and was sentenced to 292 months in prison. He claims that his counsel had failed to tell him of a pre-trial plea offer involving significantly less prison time than he received in the end. Hare’s previous attempt to win relief from his conviction and sentence under 28 U.S.C. 2255 on other grounds was rejected. He sought permission to file a successive collateral attack on his sentence under 28 U.S.C. 2255(h), claiming ineffective assistance of counsel. The Seventh Circuit dismissed the application. Hare did not have new evidence of his innocence, and could not establish “a new rule of constitutional law, made retroactive to cases on collateral review by the Supreme Court, that was previously unavailable.” His petition was not supported by Missouri v. Frye, 132 S. Ct. 1399 (2012), which involved a failure to communicate a plea offer for a lower sentence than the defendant actually received when he later pled guilty. The Frye Court merely applied the Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel according to the test previously articulated in 1984. View "Hare v. United States" on Justia Law

Quality owns dozens of restaurants in several states. To refinance its debt, Quality created subsidiaries (plaintiffs-borrowers) and made a deal with Captec Financial and GE Capital for 34 separate loans totaling $49 million, with each loan secured by a restaurant. The parties disagree about the prepayment requirements for 12 of those loans. The borrowers prepaid according to their own interpretation of the prepayment provision and the lender rejected the effort. The district court granted the lender summary judgment. The Seventh Circuit remanded for the district court to consider extrinsic evidence. The court concluded that extrinsic evidence supported the borrowers’ interpretation and awarded prejudgment interest. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. View "BKCAP, LLC v. CAPTEC Franchise Trust 2000-1" on Justia Law

Scruggs worked for Carrier since 1986. In 2004, Scruggs’s mother was moved to a nursing home. He sought intermittent leave to assist in her care and submitted Family and Medical Leave Act, 29 U.S.C. 2601, certification paperwork five times. Four certifications permitted leave for nursing home visits and transportation to doctor’s appointments. The fifth certification, in effect at his termination, permitted Scruggs to take his mother to doctor’s appointments once every six months and did not mention nursing home visits. In 2006, Carrier implemented a new plan to combat suspected FMLA abuse. Carrier hired McGough to watch about 35 employees who were suspected of misusing leave or had unexcused absences. McGough followed Scruggs, but found no evidence of misusing FMLA leave on the first two occasions. After Scruggs reported that he was taking FMLA leave for an entire day, an investigator recorded that Scruggs did not leave home. Following his suspension, Scruggs provided documentation from his mother’s doctor and the nursing home that he was assisting his mother on the date at issue. After further investigation, Carrier concluded that Scruggs had misused FMLA leave and terminated his employment. The district court rejected his FMLA suit. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, stating that Carrier had an “honest suspicion.” View "Scruggs v. Carrier Corp." on Justia Law