Justia U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

WR sought to develop a medical office building by executing a long-term ground lease to a developer, who would design, finance, construct, and own the facility, leasing space to WR. WR requested proposals, describing a 30-year ground lease for a 30,000 square foot medical facility. Citadel submitted a proposal. Negotiations followed. WR signed an “Authorization to Proceed” stating that WR “will only be responsible for architectural and engineering fees in the event [W R] does not execute its space leases and ground lease.” Citadel hired attorneys, architects, engineers; refined plans: conducted zoning review, and began securing financing. Negotiations failed. WR terminated the relationship, just as Citadel was preparing to commence construction. WR refused to pay expenses unless it received the plans; entered into contracts with Citadel’s architect and engineer; used their plans and built the facility. The district court rejected Citadel’s claims. The parties settled with respect to pre-construction costs and fees. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Citadel failed to show that WR agreed to complete the arrangement. When the relationship ended, they had not agreed on essential lease terms. No language in the agreement required the parties to negotiate in good faith, nor did it establish a framework for the negotiation process. View "Citidal Grp. Ltd. v. Washington Reg'l Med. Ctr." on Justia Law

ITT is a for-profit corporation that runs “ITT Technical Institutes” throughout the country, including Lathrop, California. Halasa was the Lathrop Campus’s College Director for six months in 2009. ITT says that Halasa was fired for poor management skills and delivering inadequate results; Halasa alleges that he was fired in violation of the False Claims Act, 31 U.S.C. 3730(h), after identifying and reporting several irregularities in the way ITT was handling its federally subsidized loans and grants for students. The district court granted ITT summary judgment and costs. Even if Halasa did engage in protected conduct under the Act, he did not establish that he was fired because of this conduct. There was no evidence that decision-makers were made aware of his reporting. View "Halasa v. ITT Educational Servs., Inc" on Justia Law

Thompson was murdered in 2001. Carter was 16 years old and Thompson was 19. No fingerprint, DNA, or physical evidence connected the murder to Carter, or to anyone else. Detectives picked up Carter and took her to the police station. She was not given Miranda warnings; no one told her that she was free to leave. Carter was effectively without any legal guardian. She was allowed to speak to her father for a few minutes and was given food and drink and eventually released. A few hours after Carter’s release, her apartment building caught fire. The cause was arson, and the fire started in the apartment where Carter and Thompson lived. Police again took Carter to the station, with no adult, and without stating her rights. A third trip to the station resulted in a stay of 55 hours. Carter was allowed to move around freely and was provided with necessities; she changed her story several times. She eventually received Miranda warnings, spoke to her parents, and confessed to the murder. She was convicted and sentenced to 30 years. The district court denied her petition for habeas corpus. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. There was adequate evidence to conclude that the confession was voluntary. View "Carter v. Thompson" on Justia Law

Castillon was indicted for fraudulently using credit and gift card accounts for purchases totaling $139,063.23: conspiring to violate 18 U.S.C.1029(a)(2) and (3), (intentionally using an unauthorized access device, and knowingly possessing 15 or more such devices with intent to defraud); fraudulent use and possession of unauthorized access devices, 18 U.S.C. 1029(a)(2); and aggravated identity theft, 18 U.S.C. 1028A(a)(1). Castillon pled guilty to conspiracy and aggravated identity theft. His presentence report revealed that he was born in Cuba and fled to the U.S. at age 17 and calculated his offense level at 16 and his criminal history category at four. His recommended guideline range was 33 to 41 months for conspiracy plus a consecutive, mandatory 24-month term for aggravated identity theft. Based on Castillon’s admission that he viewed fraud differently than violent crimes, the government argued that “Maybe there is a different attitude toward private property in Cuba.” Defense counsel did not object, but responded that there is an “attitude” in Cuba that “you’re pulling a Robin Hood.” He suggested that Cuban immigrants have a hard time adjusting. The court imposed a sentence of 48 months plus 24 months. The Seventh Circuit vacated; there is support for Castillon’s argument that his national origin was considered in sentencing. View "Unted States v. Trujillo-Castillon" on Justia Law

Laguna immigrated to the U.S. with his parents in 1967, and became a lawful permanent resident. In 2001 he was convicted of unlawful possession of a stolen motor vehicle, with other related offenses. Because those felonies qualified as crimes of moral turpitude under 8 U.S.C. 1227(a)(2)(A)(ii), an immigration judge ordered Laguna removed and required Laguna to obtain a Polish passport. In 2004, after he finished serving his state sentences, Immigration and Custom Enforcement released Laguna on an order of supervision, which also required Laguna to obtain a passport. In 2010 Laguna finally completed the requisite application. The Polish consulate confirmed that his passport would be available on April 21, 2010. Laguna refused to pick up the passport and was detained and convicted of willfully interfering with a final deportation order (8 U.S.C. 1253(a)(1)(B) and (C) and sentenced to 18 months’ imprisonment. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, upholding the district court’s exclusion of evidence that ICE’s liberal treatment of Laguna during supervision negated the element of intent.View "United States v. Laguna" on Justia Law

Thi and Danh operated a Wisconsin nail salon, encouraged customers to pay with debit cards, and used a hidden camera to record them typing personal identification numbers into a keypad. They stored the numbers in electronic files, one of which contained more than 800 entries and was found on a flash drive in Thi’s purse. They sent the information to coconspirators in California, and used it for unauthorized withdrawals, for a total loss of more than $77,000. Charged with bank fraud and access-device fraud, Thi pleaded guilty to one count of bank fraud, 18 U.S.C. 1344. This count related to six transactions, captured on ATM surveillance footage, that she completed using cards “recoded” with customers’ information. A probation officer calculated a total offense level of 22 and a criminal-history category of I, for a Guidelines range of 41 to 51 months. The district court directed her to pay more than $77,000 in restitution and sentenced her to 36 months’ imprisonment. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting arguments that the district court failed to adequately consider her arguments in mitigation, addressing her minimal role in the offense, the effect of her sentence on her young daughter, and the possibility of home confinement. View "United States v. Thi" on Justia Law

The Church holds a festival, open to the public, without charge, and obtains a Chicago permit to close portions of streets to vehicles. For the 2008 festival, the parish used a team of paid security guards and volunteer off-duty police officers (parishioners), headed by Kolasinski, a parishioner and Chicago police officer. Members of another church (Garfield) attended the festival to conduct ministry. Its pastor (Teesdale) carried a bullhorn; others carried signs with Scripture verses. The group distributed gospel tracts. Kolasinski, off-duty, wearing a shirt that read “St. Symphorosa Police,” told Teesdale that he could not use a bullhorn or distribute literature without permission. Teesdale attempted to use the bullhorn. Kolasinski handcuffed Teesdale and stated that he was under arrest. Police arrived 30 minutes later. Teesdale was arrested for trespass, a charge eventually dismissed. Teesdale, and others alleged violations of First and Fourth Amendment rights and sought to enjoin the city from preventing attendance at future festivals. A court order permitted Garfield members to enter the festival during specific hours with limitations on the size of signs and a prohibition on sound-enhancement. The 2009 festival passed without incident. The court ruled in favor of the city, but found that First Amendment rights at future festivals were threatened by official policy. The Seventh Circuit remanded that holding for dismissal, based on lack of standing. View "Teesdale v. City of Chicago" on Justia Law

Cotts was injured in 2004 while incarcerated. He complained of intense pain, and was diagnosed with an inguinal hernia, two inches in diameter, pushing into his groin. Cotts visited the health unit 16 times and stated that pain was interfering with walking, sleeping, and using the restroom. Care providers manually shoved it back. Cotts testified that this procedure was painful and that often the hernia popped back out. Cotts claims that a doctor told him that regardless of pain, he would not have surgery because the hernia was reducible. On parole, he was admitted to the emergency room with “unbearable” pain. There was no surgery; Cotts could not pay. Cotts was arrested for parole violation and sent to a different facility, where the doctor told him his hernia necessitated surgery. It was the size of a grapefruit in his groin and a small grapefruit in his right scrotum. He was transferred again and returned repeatedly to the health care unit but was denied surgery. In February 2007, Cotts had surgery. Cotts filed suit, 42 U.S.C. 1983. Despite an agreement by the parties, the district court used jury instructions that suggested that “cruel and unusual punishment” was an independent element of liability beyond showing deliberate indifference to serious medical need and that damages were an element of liability. The Seventh Circuit reversed; the misleading instructions prejudiced Cotts. View "Cotts v. Osafa" on Justia Law

The DEA received information about cocaine trafficking at a muffler shop. The agency identified Vargas as a suspect and used Rojo, a confidential informant, to pose as a drug dealer from Mexico, giving detailed instructions. During his arrest, Vargas claimed that a shoe box containing $45,000 cash was intended for purchase of a truck. He was convicted of attempting to possess, with intent to distribute, more than 500 grams of cocaine (21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1) and 846. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Vargas and Rojo’s conversations contained countless coded references to cocaine. Vargas took a “substantial step” in his attempt to possess cocaine by appearing at a parking lot with $45,000 in cash. Rojo’s testimony that he had been told to get close to Vargas because of “possible cocaine trafficking” should not have been admitted, but the error was harmless in light of the overwhelming evidence of guilt. Exclusion of a portion of the videotaped arrest during which he blurted, “I was here buying a truck,” was appropriate under the hearsay rule. The jury charge adequately required a finding, beyond a reasonable doubt, that Vargas intended to possess cocaine and knowingly took a substantial step; Vargas’s requested “mere presence” instruction was irrelevant.View "United States v. Vargas" on Justia Law

Defendant, a citizen of Colombia, illegally entered the U.S. in 1982. In 1985, he was convicted of drug offenses, 21 U.S.C. 846 and 841(a)(1), was sentenced to five years in prison; in 1987 he was deported to Colombia. About five years after his deportation, he reentered the U.S. and was arrested twice, but managed to avoid deportation. In 2010 he was arrested in Illinois for driving under the influence. Immigration and Customs Enforcement agents were informed of his illegal status. Defendant was indicted on one count of illegal reentry, 8 U.S.C. 1326(a) and 6 U.S.C. 202(4) and pleaded guilty pursuant to a plea agreement. The district court determined his criminal history category to be 3 and, after applying a 16-level enhancement (U.S.S.G. 2L1.2(b)(1)(A)), determined his offense level to be 21, resulting in a calculated Guidelines range of 46 to 57 months’ imprisonment. Neither the government nor defendant objected to this calculation. He was sentenced at the low-end of the Guidelines range to 46 months in prison, claiming that his 1985 conviction was stale and that the calculation overstated the seriousness of his current reentry offense. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. View "United States v. Marin-Castano" on Justia Law