Justia U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Multiemployer pension plans are created by collective bargaining agreements to provide benefits to employees of different firms. When an employer withdraws from an MPP, the plan remains liable to employees who have vested pension rights, but can no longer look to the employer to cover these obligations. The Multiemployer Pension Plan Amendments Act, 29 U.S.C. 1381-1461, assesses the employer with an exit price equal to its pro rata share of the funding shortfall (difference between present value of fund assets and present value of future obligations). Estimating the shortfall depends on estimating the amount by which current assets can be expected to grow with compound interest. To avoid having an employer new to a plan inherit withdrawal liability where existing members failed to fund the plan adequately in prior years, the statute creates default rules for assigning each employer a share of only so much of the shortfall as occurred while the employer was participating, 29 U.S.C. 1391(b)(2)-(4). Disputes about withdrawal liability are resolved by arbitration. The arbitrator in this case ruled that MMP trustees had over-assessed CPC’s withdrawal liability by $1,093,000. The district judge upheld the ruling. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, noting the “Hideous complexities” involved and its own lack of expertise. View "Chicago Truck Drivers, Helpers, & Warehouse Workers Union (Indep.) Pension Fund v. CPC Logistics, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiff, a pretrial detainee in a Wisconsin county jail, was subjected to a pat down and strip search by defendant, a guard. He sued under 42 U.S.C. 1983, claiming that the guard spent five to seven seconds gratuitously fondling plaintiff’s testicles and penis through the plaintiff’s clothing and, while strip searching him, fondled his nude testicles for two or three seconds, contrary to jail policy and without any justification. The guard denies the allegations. The district judge granted summary judgment in favor of the guard. He acknowledged that because the parties’ factual disputes could not be resolved on summary judgment he had to “presume that the defendant grabbed the plaintiff’s genitals in a way that was not related to penological interests,” but concluded that plaintiff had “presented evidence of only de minimis injury,” had “suffered at most an assault and battery,” and had presented no evidence concerning defendant’s “subjective intent.” The Seventh Circuit reversed. Excessive force is not the only means by which a prisoner’s civil rights can be violated. View "Washington v. Hively" on Justia Law

Petitioner, convicted of robbery and forgery in state court, filed a state court motion challenging his sentence. The motion was denied, as was his request for appointed counsel. The federal district court rejected a habeas corpus petition. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The motion to correct petitioner’s sentence was not a motion pursuant to Ind. Code 35-38-1-15 but a collateral attack on his sentence. Therefore, he had no constitutional right to counsel. View "Resendez v. Knight" on Justia Law

Reeves was arrested for his role in a heroine distribution ring. Prior to trial, the government informed the court and Reeves that it would seek an enhancement (21 U.S.C. 851) of any sentence resulting from a guilty because Reeves had, in 2004, pleaded guilty in Illinois state court to possession and sale of cocaine. He was convicted under 21 U.S.C. 841, 846, and 843. Reeves objected to the enhancement, claiming ineffective assistance of counsel on the ground that the attorney representing him during his 2004 guilty plea did not inform him that a guilty plea could be used against him later to trigger a statutory sentencing enhancement in federal court. The court applied the enhancement and sentenced Reeves to 25 years in prison to run concurrently with a separate, lesser sentence of 8 years. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. It was not unreasonable for Reeves’ attorney in the 2004 proceedings to fail to advise his client that a guilty plea could result in a later sentencing enhancement for a future crime.View "United States v. Reeves" on Justia Law

In 2006 Vince P, wrote, recorded, and distributed a song entitled Stronger. The title comes from a line in its refrain that draws from an aphorism coined by Friedrich Nietzsche: “what does not kill me makes me stronger.” Vince P began looking for an executive producer in the hip-hop recording industry and sent a recording to Monopoly, a business manager and friend of Kanye West, a hip-hop superstar. Monopoly agreed to be Vince P’s producer, so long as Vince P was funded by a record label. That funding never materialized and the proposed collaboration foundered. Shortly thereafter, Kanye West released a song entitled Stronger. West’s song also features a hook that repeats the Nietzschean maxim and, according to Vince P, other suspicious similarities to his song. Vince P tried to contact West, but he was turned away by West’s representatives. In response, Vince P registered a copyright for his version of Stronger and sued West. The district court dismissed. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The two songs are not similar enough to support a finding that copyright infringement has occurred under 17 U.S.C. 106(1); the songs share only “cosmetic similarities.” View "Peters v. West" on Justia Law

Levin worked as an Illinois Assistant Attorney General from 2000, until his termination in 2006. Levin was over the age of 60 at the time of his termination and believes he was fired because of his age and gender. He was replaced by a woman in her 30s. He brought claims under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. 621, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. 2000e, and the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment via 42 U.S.C. 1983. The district court denied a motion to dismiss the individual-capacity defendants on grounds of qualified immunity with respect to Levin’s section 1983 age discrimination claim. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. At the time of the alleged wrongdoing, it was clearly established that age discrimination in employment violates the Equal Protection Clause. Although age is not a suspect classification, states may not discriminate on that basis if such discrimination is not “rationally related to a legitimate state interest.” Whether the ADEA is the exclusive remedy for plaintiffs suffering age discrimination in employment is irrelevant; a constitutional right was clearly established. View "Levin v. Madigan" on Justia Law

Swanson hired ISF for steel fabrication work on an Indiana construction project. ISF hired Central to perform steel erection work. ISF and Central signed a subcontract in which Central agreed to procure insurance and to “defend, indemnify and hold harmless.” Central purchased insurance from Scottsdale: a $1 million commercial general liability policy and a $2 million umbrella insurance policy. ISF also carried $1 million in commercial general liability coverage from Amerisure and $7 million in umbrella coverage from National. Colip, a Central employee, was injured at work when he fell 30 feet through a hole in a building roof. Colip settled with ISF for $2.9 million, and the insurers paid according to an agreement that provided that Scottsdale would pay $1 million out of the CGL policy and $950,000 out of the Umbrella policy, while Amerisure would pay the remaining $950,000. Initially, National had no obligation to contribute. The agreement reserved the rights of the parties to seek reimbursement or contribution from each other. Amerisure sued Scottsdale and Central; Scottsdale filed counter- and cross-claims against Amerisure and National. The district court dismissed Central from the litigation and awarded Scottsdale $50,000 from Amerisure and the remaining $900,000 from National. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. View "Scottsdale Ins. Co. v. Nat'l Sur. Corp." on Justia Law

Lemke met a woman while working as a serviceman in her home, pursued her, and eventually left threatening telephone messages for her. He also left threatening messages with the woman’s attorney and with men who shared the same name as a man the woman had dated. He ignored warnings from the FBI and was seen at the woman’s place of employment. He resisted arrest and was found to have a gun and ammunition and maps of the woman’s home. Convicted of violating 18 U.S.C. 875(c), which prohibits transmitting threatening communications in interstate commerce, Lemke was sentenced to 24 months’ imprisonment. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, noting that the sentence was below-guidelines and that Lemke’s actions were “disturbing and frightening.” View "United States v. Lemke" on Justia Law

El-Gazawy a citizen of Jordan, entered the U.S. in 1990 as a non-immigrant, overstayed, and failed to appear for special registration in 2003, required by the National Security Entry-Exit Registration System program. In 2006, the Department of Homeland Security served notice that he was removable under 8 U.S.C. 1227(a)(1)(B); 8 U.S.C. 1227(a)(3)(A) and 1305. At his hearing, El-Gazawy admitted the charges and stated that he would seek cancellation of removal (8 U.S.C. 1229b(b)) or voluntary departure (8 U.S.C. 1229c). The IJ allowed 90 days for the necessary paperwork and advised that failing to timely file fingerprints could result in denial of relief. With an additional schedule change, El-Gazawy had about 14 months to file the necessary paperwork. The IJ concluded that no good cause had been demonstrated for delay, deemed the cancellation claim abandoned, and granted voluntary departure. The BIA dismissed an appeal. El-Gazawy had been represented by attorney Abuzir throughout, but obtained new counsel for filing a motion to reopen, seven months later, arguing ineffective assistance of counsel. El-Gazawy claimed that he had given notice to Abuzir and had filed a claim with the Illinois Attorney Registration and Disciplinary Commission. The BIA denied his motions. The Seventh Circuit denied a petition for review. View "El-Gazawy v. Holder" on Justia Law

In 2005, attorneys White and Beaman, assisted securities broker-turned-real estate investor Seybold with a plan to buy, rehabilitate, and then sell, or refinance and rent, residential and commercial properties in Marion, Indiana. That plan involved the creation of two business entities, one partially owned by a group of private investors who contributed more than $1 million. When the plan failed, the investors sued. The district court entered summary judgment on all of the claims against the attorneys: state and federal RICO violations, conversion, federal and state securities fraud, common-law fraud (both actual and constructive), civil conspiracy, and legal malpractice. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The plaintiffs failed to establish either that an attorney-client relationship existed or that the attorneys owed them some other legal duty for purposes of the malpractice, constructive fraud, and securities-fraud claims. Plaintiffs relied solely on representations that concerned only future conduct, or on representations of existing intent that were not yet executed, so claims of actual fraud failed, Plaintiffs failed to provide evidence that the lawyers acted in concert with Seybold to commit an unlawful act or to accomplish a lawful purpose through unlawful means. View "Rosenbaum v. White" on Justia Law