Justia U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Elizabeth, a citizen of the Philippines, married John, a U.S. citizen, in 2003 in the Philippines. The State Department issued a nonimmigrant K-3 visa pending action on John’s request for her permanent residence as the immediate relative of a U.S. citizen. After arriving in the U.S., Elizabeth obtained a driver’s license. The State of Illinois also sent her a voter registration card, and she voted in the 2006 election. Immigration officials discovered that Elizabeth had voted. She was ordered removed for violating 18 U.S.C. 611, which rendered her inadmissible and ineligible for benefit as John’s spouse, 8 U.S.C. 182(a)(10)(D)(i). The Board of Immigration Appeals affirmed. The Seventh Circuit remanded for determination of whether Elizabeth showed her passport and visa to the state official; whether that official raised the subject of voting knowing that she was an alien; and whether that official checked the box claiming citizenship after Elizabeth signed the forms. View "Keathley v. Holder" on Justia Law

Holocaust survivors and heirs of other Holocaust victims sued, alleging that the Hungarian National Bank and Hungarian National Railway participated in expropriating property from Hungarian Jews during the Holocaust. Railway plaintiffs claimed subject matter jurisdiction under the expropriation exception to the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, 28 U.S.C. 1605(a)(3), and assert: takings in violation of international law, aiding and abetting genocide, complicity in genocide, violations of customary international law, unlawful conversion, unjust enrichment, fraudulent misrepresentation, and accounting. Bank plaintiffs claimed subject matter jurisdiction under the FSIA expropriation and waiver exceptions, 28 U.S.C. 1605(a)(1) and assert: genocide, aiding and abetting genocide, bailment, conversion, constructive trust, and accounting. They sought certifications as class actions, seeking to have the railway held responsible for approximately $1.25 billion, and the bank held jointly and severally responsible with private banks for approximately $75 billion. The district court declined to dismiss. The Seventh Circuit held that it had appellate jurisdiction under the collateral order doctrine and remanded with instructions that plaintiffs either exhaust available Hungarian remedies identified by defendants or present a legally compelling reason for failure to do so. The court should allow jurisdictional discovery with respect to whether the railway is engaged in “commercial activity” in the U.S. View "Abelsz v. Magyar Nemzeti Bank" on Justia Law

Holocaust survivors and heirs of other Holocaust victims sued, alleging that defendant banks participated in expropriating property from Hungarian Jews during the Holocaust. Invoking subject-matter jurisdiction under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, 28 U.S.C. 1330(a), the Alien Tort Statute, 28 U.S.C.1350, and federal question jurisdiction, 28 U.S.C. § 1331, they alleged: genocide, aiding and abetting genocide, bailment, conversion, constructive trust, and accounting. Plaintiffs sought certification as a class action and asked that each bank be held jointly and severally responsible for damages of approximately $75 billion. This case and a parallel case against the Hungarian national railway have produced nine appeals and mandamus petitions. The district court declined to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction. The Seventh Circuit, noting that such a decision would ordinarily not be reviewable, stated that: “This is the rare case, however, in which it is appropriate for this court to exercise its discretion to issue a writ of mandamus to confine the district court to the exercise of its lawful jurisdiction” The court cited the extraordinary scale of the litigation, the inherent involvement with U.S. foreign policy, and the “crystal clarity” of the lack of foundation for exercising general personal jurisdiction over the banks. View "Abelesz v. OTP Bank" on Justia Law

Coleman was fired from the Cook County Juvenile Temporary Detention Center. Coleman was told that his position had been eliminated by budget cuts; he contends that his politics were the real cause for his discharge and a decision not to rehire him. Coleman’s job is not in the category for which politics is a legitimate consideration. Coleman sought damages under 42 U.S.C. 1983 and invoked the Shakman consent decrees, which allow parties aggrieved by certain Cook County patronage to bring civil contempt proceedings. The district judge dismissed the civil rights claim but declined to dismiss the Shakman claim. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Dunlap is not protected by absolute immunity pursuant to the order under which he was appointed. In 2002 the Juvenile Detention Center and inmates settled a case; the court retained jurisdiction and in 2007 appointed Dunlap as administrator in an order, stating that Dunlap would have immunity: “[Dunlap] and his staff shall have the status of officers and agents of this Court and as such shall be vested with the same immunities as vest with this Court.” Dunlap’s decisions were administrative, not judicial. The order did not direct adoption of any particular personnel plan nor direct specific employment decisions. View "Coleman v. Dunlap" on Justia Law

Howard and Brown ended their romantic relationship. Howard alternated between attempts to reconcile and attempts to harm Brown. Howard sent letters begging see their son, but hired someone to throw acid in her face and paid a man to shoot at the train on which she works as an engineer. He was convicted of: interfering with a passenger train engineer, with intent to endanger safety and with reckless disregard for the safety of human life, 18 U.S.C. 1992(a)(6) and (10), 1992(b)(1); committing and attempting to commit use of a firearm, with intent to cause serious bodily injury to a train company employee while such person was inside of a passenger train located on tracks used in operation of a mass transportation vehicle, 18 U.S.C. 1992(a)(7) and (10), 1992(b)(1)’ and knowingly using and carrying a firearm during and in relation to a crime of violence, 18 U.S.C. 924(c)(1)(A). The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting a “prior bad acts” challenge to admission of evidence to prove that Howard took repeated actions that were consistent with motive and intent to harm Brown and upholding denial of a motion to empanel a new jury after jurors sent notes to the judge concerning Howard’s behavior during voir dire. View "United States v. Howard" on Justia Law

In 1999, Hill was convicted of possession with intent to distribute cocaine base, 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1); use of a firearm during and in relation to a drug trafficking crime, 18 U.S.C. 924(c); and possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1). The district court found that each of Hill’s prior convictions (attempted murder; two aggravated battery) qualified as a career-offender “crime of violence,” U.S.S.G. 4B1.2(a)(1), and a “violent felony” under the Armed Career Criminal Act, 18 U.S.C. 924(e)(2)(B)(i) and imposed a sentence of 276 months. He filed two unsuccessful petitions under 28 U.S.C. 2255, alleging ineffective assistance, two unsuccessful petitions to modify his sentence, 18 U.S.C. 3582, then filed a pro se habeas petition under 28 U.S.C. 224, claiming that his classification as a career offender and armed career criminal was erroneous and that he was “innocent” of the sentence enhancements imposed. The district court denied the petition. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. While noting that Hill’s conviction under the Illinois battery statute, 720 ILCS 5/12-3, qualifies as a “crime of violence” under the ACCA, the court held that the petition failed because Hill could not establish that the 2255 remedy is inadequate or ineffective. View "Hill v. Holinka" on Justia Law

Miller, a Fund beneficiary, fell from a ladder and was injured. He hired attorney Darr on a contingent fee basis to sue the person who was supposed to hold the ladder. The Fund advanced $86,709.73 in medical and disability benefits on the condition that Miller repay from any recovery, without deducting attorneys’ fees. Miller and Darr, signed a subrogation agreement. The lawsuit settled for $500,000. Calculating his fee based on $413,290.27, Darr submitted $57,806.48 to the Fund, stating that he was withholding $28,903.25 as a fee. To avoid jeopardizing Miller’s benefits Darr later submitted the $28,903.25. The Fund indicated that if Darr pursued his claim, it would consider Darr and Miller in breach of Plan terms and in repudiation of the subrogation agreement and would consider terminating coverage and seeking relief under ERISA. Darr sued the Fund in Illinois state court under the common fund doctrine, which permits a party who creates a fund in which others have an interest to obtain reimbursement for litigation expenses incurred in creating that fund. The district court enjoined Darr’s lawsuit. The Seventh Circuit vacated. A federal court may not enjoin “proceedings in a State court except as expressly authorized by Act of Congress, or where necessary in aid of its jurisdiction, or to protect or effectuate its judgments,” 28 U.S.C. 2283.View "Trs. of the Carptenters' Health & Welfare Trust v. Darr" on Justia Law

Freeman and Garner were caught in a sting operation that used known drug associates as cooperating informants. Freeman and Garner showed up at the appointed time and place for the staged drug transaction in a minivan matching the description given by an informant. They remained at the scene for only a few minutes. As they drove away, police initiated a traffic stop. A search of the men and the van did not turn up any drugs, but the police arrested them. When Freeman was booked into the jail, he was strip-searched, revealing a bag of crack cocaine concealed between his buttocks. He was convicted of possession of crack cocaine with intent to distribute and sentenced as a career drug offender to 30 years in prison. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The police had credible information about Freeman’s drug-trafficking habits from the cooperating informants, and his activities just prior to his arrest coincided perfectly with details of the undercover operation, supplying probable cause to arrest. Based on his criminal history, the specific grounds for his arrest, and his fidgeting in his seat, there was adequate justification for a strip search. Freeman’s sentence was at the bottom of the properly calculated guidelines range. View "United States v. Freeman" on Justia Law

Jeranek, a beneficiary of the Humana Plan, was hospitalized in 2006. Three days later, she was admitted at Nu-Roc Nursing Home. She was 88 years old and suffered from a variety of maladies that required her to use 14 prescription medications. A physician estimated at the time of her admission that Jeranek had a life expectancy of about one year. Jeranek was a resident at Nu-Roc for 702 days. On several occasions she declined medical treatment and her physician understood that she was to receive comfort care only. From November 15 until November 19, 2006, Jeranek’s stay at Nu-Roc was paid for by Medicare. Humana paid $50,097.67 to Nu-Roc for services provided from November 20, 2006, to September 30, 2007, but later determined that its disbursement had been a mistake, reasoning that “custodial” care was not covered by the Plan. Humana sought reimbursement for its previous payments and denied coverage for October 1, 2007 through October 22, 2008, when costs for Jeranek’s care totaled $64,669.74. The district court determined that Humana’s denial of coverage was not arbitrary and granted summary judgment for the Plan. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. View "Becker v. Chrysler LLC Health Care Benefits Plan" on Justia Law

Brown was convicted in 2000 of being a felon in possession of a gun, 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1), for which the maximum sentence is normally 10 years in prison. Following a remand, the district court applied the Armed Career Criminal Act, 18 U.S.C. 924(e)(1) and sentenced Brown to 264 months. Following an unsuccessful collateral attack on his sentence under 28 U.S.C. 2255, he filed a second challenge in reliance on the Supreme Court’s 2008 decision, Begay v. United States, that driving under the influence is not within the catchall provision of the ACCA because a crime within the catchall “typically involve[s] purposeful, ‘violent’, and ‘aggressive’ conduct.” The district court concluded that Brown had been convicted of three violent felonies or serious drug offenses, and upheld the sentence. The government conceded that Brown could use the habeas corpus statute to challenge the legality of his sentence. The Seventh Circuit reversed, holding that the ACCA did not cover either Brown’s Illinois conviction for compelling a person to become a prostitute or a conviction for possession of a gun while using drugs. View "Brown v. Rio" on Justia Law