Justia U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

After a lengthy federal investigation (Operation Dead Eye) into a drug organization headed by Hicks, 29 defendants were charged with drug-related offenses. Jones pleaded guilty to possession with intent to distribute 50 grams or more of crack cocaine, 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1) and 18 U.S.C. 2 and was sentenced to 180 months’ imprisonment. Germany pleaded guilty to using a communication facility in furtherance of a drug offense, 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1) and 843(b) and was sentenced to 48 months’ imprisonment to be served consecutively to the term of imprisonment imposed in state court. Watson pleaded guilty to conspiracy to distribute crack cocaine, 21 U.S.C. 846 and 18 U.S.C. 2 and knowingly and intentionally distributing crack cocaine, 21 U.S.C. 841(a) and 18 U.S.C. 2 and was sentenced to 180 months’ imprisonment and 5 years of supervised release. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the sentences imposed on Jones and Germany, but remanded for recalculation with respect to Watson. View "United States v. Jones" on Justia Law

Todd attempted to purchase claims against a collection agency (Franklin) from Fletcher. He then sued Franklin. The district court dismissed the complaint, ruling that the assignment was void because Todd was using it merely to attempt to practice law without a license and that Todd failed to state a claim for relief. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The assignment was void as against public policy. Illinois public policy forbids the assignment of legal claims to non-attorneys in order to litigate without a license. Undisputed evidence showed that Todd created a business providing legal advice and repeatedly agreed to purchase claims in order to litigate. Even if the assignment was not void, Todd failed to state a claim. The Fair Debt Collection Practices Act preempts state-law claims, 15 U.S.C. 1681t(b)(1)(F). Todd did not attempt could not bring a claim directly under the FCRA because the section Franklin allegedly violated does not create a private right of action. View "Todd v. Franklin Collection Serv., Inc." on Justia Law

In 2009, George, a vice president of JA, discovered that money withheld from his pay was not being deposited into his retirement account and health savings account. He complained to JA’s accountants and executives, including Burk. He contacted the Department of Labor but declined to file a complaint. He raised the issue with board members, then received checks for $2,600 for the missed deposits plus interest. His employment agreement ran until June 30, 2010, but he had discussed, with Burk and others, retiring in April 2010. On January 4, 2010, Burk told George not to return to work. Burk later discovered that George had drawn down the account containing his deferred compensation. J A concedes that George was entitled to withdraw the funds, but it did not rescind his discharge. George claimed violation of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act, 29 U.S.C. 1104(a) and retaliation for reporting that violation. The district court granted JA summary judgment. The Seventh Circuit vacated. An employee’s grievance is within ERISA’s scope of protection against retaliation whether or not the employer solicited information. George notified JA of the potential breach of its fiduciary duties and asked what would be done. Those conversations involved an “inquiry.” View "George v. Jr. Achievement of Cent. IN, Inc." on Justia Law

Elusta sued tChicago and police officers for excessive force, false arrest, and intentional infliction of emotional distress. He first retained Cerda and De Leon, who conducted discovery and obtained a settlement offer of $100,000. Elusta rejected this offer, apparently because his retainer contained a 40% contingent fee provision. The district court permitted the attorneys to withdraw. Elusta retained Smith and Genson. A jury found in Elusta’s favor on two counts and awarded $40,000. Smith and Genson petitioned for attorney’s fees on behalf of Elusta pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 1988. Before the court could rule, Elusta retained new attorneys, Johnson and Gentleman, to litigate the fee issue. They sought direct payment of some of the fees to Elusta, rather than to Smith and Genson. Smith and Genson’s petition languished for nearly 16 months before Cerda and De Leon filed sought fees, asserting an attorney’s lien or a right to recover under quantum meruit. The court granted Smith and Genson’s request for $82,696.50 under section1988. Cerda and De Leon had not perfected an attorneys’ lien, but the court allowed recovery of $15,000 in quantum meruit. The court rejected Elusta’s motion to have 60% of both amounts paid to him directly. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. View "Elusta v. City of Chicago" on Justia Law

Griffin, a high school freshman, was told to go home for dress code violations. Bell, a police officer, accompanied Griffin and twice removed Griffin’s hat. Bell claims that Griffin struck Bell in the face. A second security officer grabbed Griffin’s arm. Bell told Griffin that he was under arrest and got one handcuff on Griffin before Griffin began to struggle. The struggle continued for approximately 20-30 minutes before Bell attached the second handcuff. Griffin told a different story, claiming to have been beaten. Before trial, Bell moved to exclude a two-minute video of part of the incident, recorded by Brown, a friend of Griffin’s. Brown apparently could not be located at the time of trial. Bell contended that, without Brown as a witness, Griffin could not establish a proper foundation, and that the video was confusing and unfairly prejudicial because it showed only a small part of the incident and included gaps. The court excluded the video, excerpts from the video, and still photos created from the video, and prohibited reference to the video to explain a discrepancy in Griffin’s testimony. A jury rejected Griffin’s 42 U.S.C. claim. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. View "Griffin v. Bell" on Justia Law

Hoppe is a tenured professor of Philosophy at Lewis University. She lost the privilege of teaching aviation ethics after the new chair of the Aviation Department, Brogan, deemed her unqualified because she had no formal training in aviation, had never worked in the industry, and had not obtained any degrees or certifications relevant to the field. During the two years before her removal from the course, Hoppe filed a series of charges with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, requesting an accommodation for her clinically diagnosed “adjustment disorder” and accusing the university of discrimination and retaliation. She sued for discrimination and retaliation under the Americans with Disabilities Act, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, and 42 U.S.C. 1981. The district court awarded the university summary judgment. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. While there was no evidence of Hoppe’s job functions or her inability to perform them, the undisputed evidence shows that the university offered Hoppe three different accommodations, which she rejected, and no rational trier of fact could find that the university’s efforts were unreasonable. Hoppe has no evidence of a causal link between her protected activity and Brogan’s decision and failed to make a prima facie showing of retaliation. View "Hoppe v. Lewis Univ." on Justia Law

Liu, a 50-year-old citizen of China, came to the U.S. in 2000 on a nonimmigrant visa, after protesting the loss of his job at a state-owned factory. He overstayed and, in removal proceedings, requested asylum, withholding of removal, and relief under the United Nations Convention Against Torture. He testified that he was persecuted after protesting layoffs and was beaten in jail. He claimed that officials told his wife that he would face “serious consequences” if he continued to make trouble. He stated that he never belonged to any political organization in China or the United States and acknowledged that he “didn’t do anything to protest or criticize the government of China.” The Board of Immigration Appeals upheld the decision, denying relief and ordering removal. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. View "Liu v. Holder" on Justia Law

Tapia entered the U.S. illegally in 1992. He was removed to Mexico in 1997 following conviction for a hit-and-run accident. Tapia did not seek review, but reentered illegally and was again removed. He reentered again and DHS reinstated the 1997 removal order in 2010. Tapia contended that the 1997 order was invalid because he did not receive proper notice of his right to counsel and because his convictions did not meet the statutory definition of aggravated felonies. The Seventh Circuit rejected the claims as untimely and held that it lacked jurisdiction to review the agency’s decision to execute a removal order. Tapia filed a motion to reopen, which was rejected, and the Seventh Circuit dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. Changing the caption on the document from “motion for stay” to “motion to reopen” does not create a right of judicial review. The only thing that a court of appeals could review would be the original removal order and that review must be sought within 30 days of the order’s reinstatement. Tapia missed the deadline. View "Lemos v. Holder" on Justia Law

Plaintiff taught sixth-grade at a public school and met with a student’s parents about a threat the student had made against another student. He met the parents again after seeing the student beating another student. The father threatened a lawsuit and told plaintiff that an older son, who had assaulted the assistant principal, should have assaulted plaintiff. During a subsequent class, the student used an assignment to write a song with lyrics about stabbing plaintiff. The police liaison encouraged plaintiff to file criminal charges; under Illinois law declaring a knowing threat of violence against a person at a school is disorderly conduct, 720 ILCS 5/26-1(a)(13). School administrators feared a suit and were not supportive. After plaintiff filed charges, his evaluations went from satisfactory to unsatisfactory and administrators advised him that they would recommend that he not be rehired. Plaintiff resigned and filed suit, claiming retaliation for exercise of First Amendment rights. The district court granted summary judgment for defendants on the ground that the complaint was not protected by the First Amendment because it did not involve a matter of public concern. The Seventh Circuit reversed. Principles underlying the suit are well settled, which defeats claims of qualified immunity. View "Gschwind v. Heiden" on Justia Law

During tax years at issue, State Farm filed consolidated returns for life insurance and non-life subgroups. The IRS determined deficiencies. State Farm responded that, using a revised method for calculating alternative minimum tax, rather than owing $75 million in additional taxes, it was entitled to $500 million in additional refunds. State Farm also raised a loss reserve issue. The Tax Court ruled that State Farm should not have included a $202 million award of compensatory and punitive damages for bad faith in its insurance loss reserve for 2001 and 2002 returns. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, regarding punitive damages. Pending clearer guidance from the National Association of Insurance Commissioners (to whom Congress has commanded deference), punitive damages should be treated as regular business losses that are deductible when actually paid rather than deducted earlier as part of insurance loss reserves. With regard to the compensatory damages portion of the award, the court reversed. Extra-contractual obligations like compensatory damages for bad faith have long been included in insurance loss reserves; NAIC guidance supports that result. The court affirmed rejection of State Farm’s recalculation of alternative minimum tax, which would result in “creation from thin air of a virtual tax loss some $4 billion larger than” actual loss. View "State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Comm'r of Internal Revenue" on Justia Law