Justia U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

In 2003, the airline established guidelines that address accommodating employees who, because of disability, can no longer do essential functions of their current jobs, even with reasonable accommodation. The guidelines specify that the transfer process is competitive, so that an employee in need of accommodation will not be automatically placed into a vacant position, but will be given preference over similarly qualified applicants. The EEOC challenged the policy under the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. 12101. The district court ruled in favor of the airline. On rehearing, en banc, the Seventh Circuit reversed and held that the ADA does mandate that an employer appoint employees with disabilities to vacant positions for which they are qualified, provided that such accommodations would be ordinarily reasonable and would not present an undue hardship to that employer. The court concluded that contrary precedent did not survive in light of U.S. Airways, Inc. v. Barnett, 535 U.S. 391 (2002). View "Equal Emp't Opportunity Comm'n v. United Airlines, Inc." on Justia Law

Filus, a 50-year-old former truck driver, has twice applied for disability benefits under the Social Security Act, claiming that back problems have left him incapable of gainful employment. An administrative law judge concluded that Filus could perform some light work and denied his most recent application. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, holding that substantial evidence supports the denial. The ALJ adequately considered Filus’s testimony about the limiting effects of his pain along with his testimony that he regularly completed his daily household activities without any pain medication, not even over-the-counter products.View "Filus v. Astrue" on Justia Law

Robinson pleaded guilty in 2005 to possessing 50 grams or more of crack cocaine, 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1). A recidivism enhancement raised the minimum prison term to 20 years, the term imposed by the district court. Three years later Robinson moved under 18 U.S.C. 3582(c)(2) to reduce his sentence based on amendments 706 and 713 to the guidelines, which retroactively reduced his base offense level from 32 to 28. The district court denied the motion because Robinson’s sentence was based on the statutory minimum, which remained unchanged. Three years later, Robinson moved the court to apply the Fair Sentencing Act of 2010, 124 Stat. 2372. If the Act applied, he would have faced a mandatory minimum penalty of 10 years. The district court denied the motion, reasoning that the Act did not apply to Robinson, whose crime and sentencing both took place before the Act. In 2012 Robinson again moved to reduce his sentence, based on the combined effects of amendments 748 and 750 to the guidelines and the Fair Sentencing Act, which, effective November 1, 2011, retroactively reduced from 28 to 26 the base offense level for Robinson’s conduct, U.S.S.G. 2D1.1(c)(7). The district court again denied the motion. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. View "United States v. Robinson" on Justia Law

Turner was convicted on four counts of wire fraud and two counts of making false statements to the FBI stemming from a scheme to defraud the State of Illinois of salaries paid to but not earned by a team of janitors responsible for cleaning state office buildings. As was typical at the time in federal fraud prosecutions, the wire fraud counts were submitted to the jury on alternative theories that Turner aided and abetted a scheme to defraud the state of its money and also its right to honest services, 18 U.S.C. 1343, 1346. The Seventh Circuit affirmed in 2008. Two years later, the Supreme Court decided Skilling v. United States, 130 S. Ct. 2896 (2010), limiting the honest services fraud statute to schemes involving bribes or kickbacks. Turner moved to vacate the wire-fraud convictions based on Skilling error, and the court agreed. The Seventh Circuit reversed, reinstating the conviction. The Skilling error was harmless; the honest services alternative was unnecessary to Turner’s conviction. The evidence was coextensive on the two fraud theories; the jury could not have convicted Turner of honest-services fraud without also convicting him of pecuniary fraud. View "Turner v. United States" on Justia Law

Home Federal agreed to lend up to $95.5 million to finance construction of a new ethanol production plant. When the developer of the plant ran into serious trouble finishing the project, the bank did not disburse the final $8 million. The developer defaulted on the debt and fired its general contractor, which then filed a mechanic’s lien on the property to recover $6 million allegedly owed it. When the bank sought to foreclose on its mortgage, the general contractor counterclaimed, asserting that its lien had priority over, or at least parity with, the bank’s mortgage. The bank tendered its defense to the title insurer under a policy that required the insurer to defend the bank against a “claim . . . alleging a defect, lien or encumbrance or other matter insured against by this policy.” The policy contained an exclusion from coverage for claims “created, suffered, assumed, or agreed to” by the insured. The district court ruled in favor of the title insurer. The Seventh Circuit reversed. The undisputed facts show that the title insurer breached its duty to defend the bank on the contractor’s claim that its mechanic’s lien had priority over or parity with the mortgage. View "Home Fed. Savings Bank v. Ticor Title Ins. Co." on Justia Law

Beatty injured his back on the job at Olin’s manufacturing plant. At the direction of Olin’s medical department, he was evaluated by his physician, who instructed him to remain off of work for a week. He gave that doctor’s note to the medical department. With the exception of two days of light duty, he did not report for work for the next six weeks. He eventually got a retroactive medical excuse from his doctor, but Olin’s medical department sought an independent examination, anticipating a workers’ compensation claim. In the meantime, a clerk told Olin’s labor-relations manager that Beatty had not been at work for several weeks and had not called in. Olin’s policy requires employees to call in daily if they cannot come to work; failure to call in for three workdays in a row is grounds for termination. Based on Beatty’s noncompliance with the policy, the labor-relations manager terminated his employment. Beatty later filed a workers’ compensation claim, which eventually settled. He then sued for retaliatory discharge. The district court granted summary judgment for Olin. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, noting that the manager who made the termination decision was entirely unaware of Beatty’s status vis-á-vis Olin’s medical department. View "Beatty v. Olin Corp." on Justia Law

Harley-Davidson had a licensing agreement with a subsidiary of DFS and received notice that the companies had merged. Harley-Davidson did not exercise its right to terminate, but later discovered that DFS had sold unauthorized products bearing the trademark to an unapproved German retailer. Harley-Davidon sent an e-mail saying that it believed DFS was in breach of contract and that it was suspending approval of products. DFS responded in kind. Harley-Davidson then attempted to recover unpaid royalties and to secure from DFS information required under the agreement. DFS refused these attempts, but submitted production samples for a new collection. Harley-Davidson reminded DFS of the termination. DFS advised Harley-Davidson that it had “wrongfully repudiated the License Agreement” and that DFS planned to act unilaterally in accordance with its own views of rights and obligations. The district court granted injunctive relief against DFS, which was attempting to litigate the dispute in Greece. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Harley-Davidson made strong showings that DFS was deliberately breaching a licensing agreement and “has tried numerous legal twists and contortions to try to avoid the legal consequences.” The court rejected an argument that the agreement provision consenting to personal jurisdiction in Wisconsin was not binding on DFS. View "H-D MI, LLC v. Hellenic Duty Free Shops, S.A." on Justia Law

Knight was owner and CEO of Knight Industries, which owned other companies. Bank had provided credit ($34 million) to the companies, which, in 2009, filed bankruptcy petitions. Chatz was appointed trustee and was authorized to retain the Freeborn law firm. Chatz and the Bank alleged that Knight had made fraudulent transfers, had breached duties of good faith and fair dealing and duties to creditors, had misappropriated corporate opportunities, had committed conversion, and had violated securities laws, and demanded $27 million for the companies and $34 million for the Bank. In 2010 Knight filed a chapter 7 petition, listing the claims, value “unknown.” Chatz, appointed as trustee, requested representation by the Freeborn law firm, without disclosing intent to pursue the claims against Knight. The bankruptcy court approved. Later, the Bank and Chatz asked to assign the companies’ claims to the Bank. Knight objected, arguing that approval of the law firm conflicted with the companies having viable claims against Knight. The bankruptcy court overruled Knight’s objection. The district court and Seventh Circuit affirmed. Failure to disclose intent to pursue the claims did not harm Knight, and other remedies are available. It would be inequitable to permit Knight to reap huge benefits from harmless omission.View "Knight v. Bank of America, N.A." on Justia Law

Couch was employed as a truck driver by B&B, a private company that has Highway Contract Route contracts with the Postal Service. While Couch was making a delivery to a postal facility in Illinois, a U.S. Postal Service employee ran over his foot with a forklift. Two years later, Couch died, allegedly as a result of complications from the injury. After her husband died, plaintiff sued the United States under the Federal Tort Claims Act, which provides a cause of action for personal injuries negligently caused by federal employees acting within the scope of their employment, 28 U.S.C. 1346(b)(1). The district court granted the United States summary judgment, finding that Couch was a “borrowed employee,” so that workers’ compensation would provide Couch’s only remedy against both the borrowing and lending employers. The Seventh Circuit reversed. The private trucking company does not merely “lend employees” to the Postal Service but provides mail transportation and delivery services. The company trains, equips, pays, and supervises its own employees using its own equipment to provide these services. View "Couch v. United States" on Justia Law

Betker was shot twice during a late-night police raid on his home. The officer who shot him was part of a tactical unit executing a no-knock search warrant secured by Officer Gomez, who obtained the warrant after receiving information from Capol, the estranged sister of Betker’s wife, Sharon, regarding Sharon being a convicted felon allegedly in possession of a firearm. Capol now swears that most of the information that Gomez related in his affidavit to support the warrant’s issuance was not true. In Betker’s suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, the district court denied Gomez’s motion for judgment based on qualified immunity. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, noting that Betker has produced sworn deposition testimony of Capol contradicting the probable cause affidavit. If believed, that testimony would establish that Gomez knowingly or with reckless disregard for the truth made false or misleading statements in the affidavit. Absent those false statements, probable cause for the no-knock warrant would not have existed. View "Betker v. Gomez" on Justia Law