Justia U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

In 2008, plaintiffs were inmates at the Indianapolis jail, which was operated by CCA under contract with the Marion County Sheriff’s Department. They claimed that the jail provided inadequate medical care and exposed inmates to inhumane living conditions so egregious that they amounted to cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment. The district court certified a class, but dismissed claims that the jail failed to provide adequate medical care, that the conditions of confinement inside the jail were inhumane, and that the procedures in the jail violated inmates’ rights under the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act and later entered summary judgment for CCA on the remaining issues. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, noting that CCA had produced an affidavit indicating that complained-of problems had been resolved. View "Kress v. CCA of TN, LLC" on Justia Law

Robers pleaded guilty to conspiracy to commit wire fraud, 18 U.S.C. 371, based on his role in a mortgage fraud scheme; Robers signed mortgage documents seeking loans based on inflated income and assets and on his claim that he would reside in the houses and pay the mortgages. The loans went into default. The district court sentenced Robers to three years’ probation and ordered him to pay $218,952 in restitution to a lender and a mortgage insurance company. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the restitution order. The Mandatory Victims Restitution Act, 18 U.S.C. 3663A, requires restitution in the case of a crime resulting in damage to or loss or destruction of property. The court rejected Robers’s argument that the MVRA requires the court to determine the offset value based on the fair market value the collateral had on the date the lenders obtained title to the houses following foreclosure as the “date the property is returned.” Money was the property stolen and foreclosure is not a return of that property; only when the real estate is resold do the victims receive money. Victims are also entitled to expenses, other than attorney’s fees and unspecified fees, related to foreclosure and sale. View "United States v. Robers" on Justia Law

After agreeing to cooperate with authorities investigating his drug-distribution conspiracy, Schwanke received a death threat from his coconspirator, fled to the Philippines, and stayed for four years. Later he pleaded guilty to conspiracy to possess with the intent to distribute marijuana, 21 U.S.C. 846, 841(a)(1), and was sentenced to 50 months’ imprisonment. Schwanke challenged his sentence, arguing that the district court improperly adjusted his offense level upward under U.S.S.G. 3C1.1 for obstruction of justice. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The district court’s findings sufficiently reflected Schwanke’s willful obstruction of justice: Schwanke fled the jurisdiction before being indicted; knew during his years abroad that an investigation into the conspiracy was ongoing; recognized the possibility of federal charges given his initial cooperation with authorities in exchange for his release without formal charges; and hid in the Philippines for years without contacting authorities. View "United States v. Schwanke" on Justia Law

The tax court found underpayment of $8,553 on Brown’s 2005 income tax and assessed a penalty of $1,171, based on failure to include income realized upon cancellation of a $100,000 whole life insurance policy, issued in 1982. Brown did not receive any cash upon cancellation; he had already used policy dividends and taken loans to pay premiums. The IRS took the policy’s cash value, $37,356.06 and subtracted Brown’s “investment” of $8,271.76 to arrive at $29,093.30 in taxable income. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The cash value of a surrendered (whether or not voluntarily surrendered) life insurance policy is includable in gross income to the extent it exceeds the taxpayer’s investment. The fact that this income was used to pay a debt to the insurance company is irrelevant, because it was a personal rather than a business debt and therefore was not deductible. It is also irrelevant that no money changed hands. By surrendering the policy (albeit involuntarily) Brown gave up the prospect of receiving $100,000 if he died but at the same time freed himself from having to pay $1,837 each year to maintain that prospect. View "Brown v. Comm'r of Internal Revenue" on Justia Law

In 2005 brokers sued Merrill Lynch under 42 U.S.C. 1981 and Title VII raising claims of racial discrimination and seeking to litigate as a class. They alleged that the firm’s “teaming” and account-distribution policies had the effect of steering black brokers away from the most lucrative assignments and prevented them from earning compensation comparable to white brokers. That litigation is ongoing. Three years later, Bank of America acquired Merrill Lynch, and the companies introduced a retention-incentive program that would pay bonuses to Merrill Lynch brokers corresponding to their previous levels of production. Brokers filed a second class-action suit. The district court dismissed. The court held that the retention program qualified as a production-based compensation system within the meaning of the section 703(h) exemption and was protected from challenge unless it was adopted with “intention to discriminate because of race.” 42 U.S.C. 2000e-2(h). The court then held that the complaint’s allegations of discriminatory intent were conclusory. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. It is not enough to allege that the bonuses incorporated the past discriminatory effects of Merrill Lynch’s underlying employment practices. The disparate impact of those employment practices is the subject of the first lawsuit, and if proven, will be remedied there. View "McReynolds v. Merrill Lynch & Co. Inc." on Justia Law

Based on two robberies, two weeks apart, with nearly identical “modus operandi,” Williams and Austin were convicted of armed bank robbery and use of a firearm in a crime of violence, 18 U.S.C. 2113(a), (d), 924(c)(1)(A). On remand they were convicted again and each was sentenced to 684 months in prison. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence and to the adequacy of representation at trial. The court noted that “Austin did not make a wise choice in deciding to testify.” View "United States v. Williams" on Justia Law

Doyle was convicted and sentenced to life in prison for distributing heroin that resulted in the death of Ward. At trial, the government presented two expert witnesses. During direct examination of Dr. Burch, the St. Louis Deputy Chief Medical Examiner, the government began laying a foundation to admit into evidence the Post Mortem Report. Doyle’s counsel, with the intention to “help things along,” stated that he had no objection to any of the government’s medical reports coming in as evidence. The district court then admitted into evidence all of the government’s medical exhibits, including the Medical Examiner’s findings form, created by Dr. Dutra and containing notes concerning Ward’s cause of death. The form lists “Acute heroin and cocaine intoxication” as the cause of death, but the words “and cocaine intoxication” are crossed out. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting Doyle’s argument that admission of the form without the testimony of its author violated his Sixth Amendment right to confrontation. In light of the trial record as a whole, Doyle did not satisfy his burden to establish that the outcome of the trial would probably have been different. View "United States v. Doyle" on Justia Law

In 2008, Bell protested Operation Iraqi Freedom in Chicago. President Bush was at a luncheon at a nearby club. After one protestor was arrested, handcuffed, and placed in a squadrol, Bell and two others, banner in hand, approached the squadrol, walking into the street. The police ordered the men to get back on the sidewalk several times. They refused and began chanting, “Hell no, we won’t go. Set him free.” Police arrested them for disorderly conduct. In particular, police arrested Bell pursuant an ordinance that criminalizes an individual’s behavior when he “knowingly . . . [f]ails to obey a lawful order of dispersal by a person known by him to be a peace officer under circumstances where three or more persons are committing acts of disorderly conduct in the immediate vicinity, which acts are likely to cause substantial harm or serious inconvenience, annoyance or alarm.” A state court acquitted Bell and he sued under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging violation of First, Fourth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights, and malicious prosecution and indemnification. Bell appealed adverse rulings by the district court. The Seventh Circuit reversed, invalidating the ordinance in part, as inhibiting protected speech and not amenable to clear and uniform enforcement. View "Bell v. Keating" on Justia Law

The Center broadcasts advertisements, maintains a website, publishes a weekly e-mail newsletter, produces a bi-weekly radio show, and engages in other forms of mass media communications. Its tax exempt status under section 501(c)(4) is incompatible with partisan political activity, so the Center cannot endorse candidates. During election seasons, the Center runs advertisements that refer to the positions of candidates or to ballot issues and call for actions such as contacting candidates. The Center claims that it feared that Illinois’s new campaign finance laws (10 ILCS 5/9) would require it to register as a “political committee” and to disclose election-related expenditures and significant contributors and that its donors require assurances that their identities will not be disclosed. The Center argued that the law was vague and overbroad. The district court dismissed. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, noting that the Illinois law is modeled on federal law. The Center did not establish that the statute “prohibits a substantial amount of protected speech,” or that its “deterrent effect on legitimate expression is ... real and substantial.”View "Ctr, for Individual Freedom v. Madigan" on Justia Law

A suit on behalf of a 14-year-old, eighth grade boy alleged that the failure of the public school district to prevent sexual abuse by a female teacher violated the student’s rights under Title IX of the federal Education Amendments Act of 1972, 20 U.S.C. 1681, and constituted negligent infliction of emotional distress under Wisconsin law. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the school district; claims against the teacher remain pending. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. In a private suit under Title IX, a school district cannot be held liable on the ground of respondeat superior for an employee’s violation absent proof of actual notice and deliberate indifference. That other teachers suspected improper conduct and administrators investigated and accepted the teacher’s denials does not establish knowledge or deliberate indifference. . View "N. R. Doe v. St. Francis Sch. Dist." on Justia Law