Justia U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Carroll and Kelliher worked at Merrill Lynch. Carroll lodged a complaint that led to the firing of two employees. Restructuring followed and a supervisory position opened. Although Carroll did not apply, she felt “overlooked” when Merrill Lynch hired another. Carroll felt that Kelliher, apparently not involved with the earlier human resources complaint, was performing some of her duties. Around 9:00 PM on Thanksgiving, Carroll called Kelliher at home. As Carroll later admitted, she “fucking snapped;” she acknowledged that, if she received a similar call, she would feel “threatened.” Mrs. Kelliher overheard loud accusations and began listening from another receiver. Increasingly frightened, she pushed the “record” button on her answering machine. The Kellihers did not call the police, but called a Merrill Lynch supervisor. At his supervisors’ request, Kelliher played the recording and reported Carroll’s call to the police. Two months later, Carroll filed a police report, accusing the Kellihers of violating the Illinois eavesdropping statute. Merrill Lynch fired Carroll for her conduct on the call. Carroll sued Kelliher and Merrill Lynch. The district court entered summary judgment on her claim under the Illinois statute, concluding that the recording fell within the statute’s fear of crime exemption. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. View "Carroll v. Merrill Lynch, Jim Kelliher, and Pat Kelliher" on Justia Law

After a long history of arrests for drunken driving and other offenses, Duron-Ortiz, a citizen of Mexico who entered the U.S. illegally in 1989, was served a Notice to Appear by the Department of Homeland Security. He sought cancellation of removal, but the Immigration Judge denied his application on the grounds that, because Duron-Ortiz had served more than 300 days for two recent drunken driving arrests, he could not satisfy the good moral character requirement for cancellation of removal. The Board of Immigration Appeals affirmed. The Seventh Circuit denied review. The statute, 8 U.S.C. 1229b(b)(1), defines “good moral character” in the negative, stating that anyone who has been confined in a penal institution for an aggregate of 180 days or more during the 10-year period cannot satisfy the standard. The court deferred to the Board’s determination that the period terminates when the IJ or Board issues a final administrative decision. The court rejected an argument that the 10-year period to establish continuous physical presence and good moral character cuts off when an alien is served an NTA. View "Duron-Ortiz v. Holder" on Justia Law

Turbo blowers are used in waste water treatment plants to maintain the oxygen dissolved in the water at a level needed by the aerobic bacteria that break down organic waste into carbon dioxide, nitrogen, and water. In 2006 Neuros began offering such blowers to facilities in North America. Two years later, KTurbo began marketing its blowers. In 2008 Neuros won a bid to supply blowers to a Utah plant. Lee, the chief executive officer of KTurbo, was dissatisfied, and slides and related tables that accused Neuros of fraud in its representations to the Utah purchaser. Lee made his presentation to engineering firms that advise treatment plants on which blowers to buy, but apparently failed to win any business away from Neuros. Lee also published his accusations on a website and sent them to the sales representatives. Neuros sued, charging violations of the Lanham Act, the Illinois Uniform Deceptive Trade Practices Act, and defamation. A bench trial resulted in a judgment in favor of Neuros on its defamation claim and an award of $60,000. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the award, but held that the other claims should not have been dismissed. View "Neuros Co., Ltd. v. KTurbo, Inc." on Justia Law

Klene, a citizen of the Philippines, applied for U.S. citizenship. USCIS denied the application after concluding that Klene’s marriage to a U.S. citizen had been fraudulent. Klene asked a district court for relief under 8 U.S.C.1421(c), which allows a judge to make an independent decision about an alien’s entitlement to be naturalized. USCIS opened removal proceedings. The court dismissed Klene’s suit, based 8 U.S.C. 1429, which provides: “[N]o application for naturalization shall be considered by the Attorney General if there is pending against the applicant a removal proceeding pursuant to a warrant of arrest issued under the provisions of this chapter or any other Act.” USCIS acts as the Attorney General’s surrogate. The Seventh Circuit vacated and remanded. While a court cannot order the Attorney General to naturalize an alien, it can enter a declaratory judgment of entitlement to citizenship without violating section. A judgment declaring that Klene’s marriage was bona fide would bring the removal proceeding to a prompt close. This approach preserves the alien’s entitlement under section1421(c) to an independent judicial decision while respecting the limit that section 1429 places on the Attorney General’s powers. View "Klene v. Napolitano" on Justia Law

McInnis, a law-school graduate who has never been licensed to practice, filed a pro se complaint accusing his employer, the Department of Education, of violating federal law (Whistleblower Protection Act, 5 U.S.C. 1211 to 1222; Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. 2000e) by passing him over for promotion and giving him a performance appraisal that he says is both inaccurate and incomplete. He had worked for the Department for more than 20 years and claimed race and gender discrimination and retaliation. After he had failed for a second time to attend a scheduled hearing, the district court dismissed the suit for failure to prosecute. The Seventh Circuit affirmedView "McInnis v. Duncan" on Justia Law

USA Cleaning is a proprietorship with fewer than 10 employees that provides janitorial services to a cement plant owned by Essroc. After an inspection of the plant the Federal Mine Safety and Health Administration ordered three janitors to undergo 24 hours of safety training. The Administration issued a “withdrawal order,” forbidding the janitors from reenterng the plant until they completed training, 30 U.S.C. 814(g)(1). Essroc provided legal assistance to challenge the order; within a week the lawyers billed $22,000. A week after issuing the order, the Administration vacated it, without acknowledging error. The review commission dismissed USA Cleaning’s contest proceeding. USA Cleaning requested $22,000 in legal fees that Essroc had paid (Equal Access to Justice Act, 5 U.S.C. 504). The Administration refused; the review commission upheld the refusal. The Seventh Circuit dismissed, noting that not the Federal Mine Safety and Health Administration, but a separate body, the Federal MineSafety and Health Review Commission, was named as respondent along with the Secretary of Labor. The review commission is the equivalent of a court. It did not issue the order challenged by the petitioner, but merely upheld the refusal of the mine-safety administration to award attorneys’ fees. View "USA Cleaning Serv. & Bldg. Maint. v. Fed. Mine Safety & Health Comm'n" on Justia Law

Owens, a Chicago zoning inspector, was convicted of two counts of federal program bribery, 18 U.S.C. 666(a)(1)(B), for accepting two $600 bribes in exchange for issuing certificates of occupancy for four newly constructed homes. The Seventh Circuit reversed, finding that there was insufficient evidence, to establish beyond a reasonable doubt, that the issuance of the certificates of occupancy had a value of $5,000 or more as required by the statute. View "United States v. Owen" on Justia Law

In his 40s, Kastner had worked as a truck driver and as a delivery manager. Having suffered injuries following a fall and subsequent heavy lifting at work, he suffered from a degenerative disc disorder and pain in various parts of his body, and sought disability insurance benefits under 42 U.S.C. 423(d). An administrative law judge determined that, though Kastner’s impairments are severe, they do not meet listed requirements for a presumptively disabling condition and that Kastner has residual capability to perform certain jobs in the economy. The Appeals Council denied review and the district court affirmed. The Seventh Circuit reversed and remanded, holding that the ALJ did not adequately explain why Kastner had not met the requirements for a presumptive disability. View "Kastner v. Astrue" on Justia Law

From 2004 until 2010 Gaona’s brothers and others sent cocaine and marijuana from El Paso, Texas, to Milwaukee, Wisconsin, where associates would receive the drugs. Family or close friends of participants would then wire the proceeds back to El Paso or transport the proceeds by car under the guise of a family trip. In support of the scheme, Gaona wired $69,631 to Texas; traveled south by car on one occasion with proceeds totaling $45,751; accompanied another codefendant, on approximately eight occasions to wire money; and held drug proceeds for her brother on at least two occasions. When charged in connection with the scheme, Gaona negotiated a plea agreement under which she plead guilty to money laundering (18 U.S.C. 1956). The agreement stated: “The government will not make a specific sentencing recommendation, but is free to present all facts to the court.” After the prosecution declined, at Gaona’s sentencing hearing, to recommend no prison time, and asked the district court to disregard Gaona’s pregnancy when imposing a sentence, the district court sentenced Gaona to 18 months’ imprisonment plus restitution. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Gaona waived her objection to any breach of the plea agreement. View "United States v. Gaona" on Justia Law

While working at an animal shelter, Povey injured her wrist moving a dog. She had surgery and underwent physical therapy. Jeffersonville’s Human Resources Director explained that the shelter did not have light duty positions. Povey’s supervisor nonetheless limited her duties and exempted Povey from working weekends because it would entail heavy lifting. Co-workers complained. Although an investigation concluded that there was no illegal harassment, Povey reported that she felt harassment “behind her back” and filed a complaint. Jeffersonville then received medical notice of Povey’s permanent physical restrictions which prohibited repetitive hand movement or lifting, pushing or pulling more than five pounds with her right arm. Povey’s employment was terminated. Povey sued under 42 U.S.C. 12101, alleging violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act. The district court granted Jeffersonville summary judgment, finding that Povey did not demonstrate that her wrist injury impaired her from completing daily tasks; her perceived impairment foreclosed her from accepting a broad range or class of jobs; she was perceived unable to perform manual tasks; she was a qualified individual as defined under the ADA; or that she was terminated in retaliation for exercising her rights under the ADA. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. View "Povey v. City of Jeffersonville" on Justia Law