Justia U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Illini Concrete formally ceased doing business in October 2009 and sold certain of its assets, including delivery trucks, to Kienstra. The Teamsters Local Union, which represents concrete mixer drivers and others employed by Illini and then by Kienstra, alleged that Kienstra laid off 14employees, declined to make good on Illini’s unfunded liability to its employees’ union pension fund, subcontracted work to competitors to avoid hiring back union employees,and refused to hear grievances regarding the asset sale and its effect on the employees. The Union claimed that the asset sale was a ruse to allow Illini to evade obligations under its collective bargaining agreement and sought a declaration that Kienstra is Illini’s alter ego, bound by the CBA. The district court denied motions to compel arbitration. Kienstra and Illini Concrete filed an interlocutory appeal. The Seventh Circuit dismissed for lack of appellate jurisdiction, citing the Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. 1, which states that “nothing [in the FAA] shall apply to contracts of employment of seamen, railroad employees, or any other class of workers engaged in foreign or interstate commerce.” View "Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, Local Union No. 50 v. Kienstra Precast, LLC" on Justia Law

While installing a natural-gas pipeline in Madison, Wisconsin, KS Energy was cited by the Occupational Safety and Health Administration for violating trench safety regulations that require companies to protect workers from dangerous cave-ins. After inspecting KS Energy’s trench, OSHA issued a citation alleging a repeat violation of 29 C.F.R. 1926.652(a)(1) for failing to provide an adequate protective system. An ALJ upheld the citations, finding that the soil in the trench was “Type B,” so the slope was too steep based on and KS improperly used the technique of “benching” to configure its trench. The OSHA Review Commission made the determination final. The Seventh Circuit denied review. The parties agree that if the soil in the excavation was properly classified as Type B, the trench was impermissibly steep. Substantial evidence supports the determination that the soil was classified as Type B. View "KS Energy Serv., LLC v. Solis" on Justia Law

McIntosh has an extensive history of bank fraud, escape, 18 U.S.C. 751(a), violation of supervised release, and failure to surrender, going back about 20 years. In 2009, the court revoked supervised release and sentenced him to an additional 16 months of imprisonment. He did not surrender, but rented a car and drove to Nashville. He failed to return the car. The district court found McIntosh guilty of failing to surrender, 18 U.S.C. 3146, and sentenced him to 60 months. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. View "Unted States v. McIntosh" on Justia Law

Lara, a citizen of Mexico, was 19 when he first entered the U.S. illegally in 1985. His wife and child joined him; they had three more children, each a citizen of the U.S. by birth. Lara was deported following a 1999 conviction for selling $50 worth of cocaine. In 2001, he unlawfully returned to the U.S., pled guilty to illegal reentry, and was sentenced to 66 months’ imprisonment. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting a challenge to the district court’s application of U.S.S.G. 2L1.2(b)(1)(A)(i), which requires an offense level increase of 16 levels if, prior to deportation, the defendant is convicted of a drug offense that results in a term of imprisonment exceeding 13 months. Lara argued that he did not receive the sentence until his probation on the drug offense was revoked. The court found that he ultimately received a three-year sentence for the drug trafficking offense prior to deportation. The court also upheld the decision not to grant a downward departure under Note 8, U.S.S.G. 2L1.2, which applies to unlawful entry if a defendant has “assimilated” to the local culture, noting that Lara did not move to the U.S. until he was an adult and has a lengthy criminal history. View "United States v. Gonzalez-Lara" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs challenged an Illinois law that forbid carrying a gun ready to use (loaded, immediately accessible, uncased), with exceptions for police, security personnel, hunters, members of target shooting clubs, a person on his own property, in his home, in his fixed place of business, or on the property of someone who has permitted him to be there with a ready-to-use gun,720 ILCS 5/24-2. Carrying an unloaded gun in public, uncased and immediately accessible, is prohibited, other than excepted persons, unless carried openly outside a vehicle in an unincorporated area and ammunition is not immediately accessible. The district court dismissed, holding that the Second Amendment does not create a right of self-defense outside the home. The Seventh Circuit reversed, but stayed its mandate for 180 days to allow the legislature to draft new restrictions. The Supreme Court has decided that the amendment confers a right to bear arms for self-defense, which is as important outside the home as inside. Evidence, although inconclusive, is consistent with concluding that a right to carry firearms in public may promote self-defense. Illinois failed to provide more than merely a rational basis for believing that its sweeping ban was justified by increased public safety. View "Moore v. Madigan" on Justia Law

Harney and Muldoon occupy one unit of a three-unit Chicago building; DeVarela occupies another. In 2004, DeVarela contacted police to complain about damage to her vehicle. Midona’s police report noted an “unknown offender.” Months later, DeVarela’s dog bit Harney. Harney reported the incident. Days later, DeVarela telephoned Midona, claiming that Harney and Muldoon chased her up the stairs and pushed her. Months later DeVarela again called Midona and showed officers a videotape that may have shown Harney and Muldoon damaging the car. The next day Midona went to the building with detectives, and, outside the unit, told Harney that he was under arrest. While outside of his unit, Harney told the officers that he would get Muldoon. The officers followed Harney into the unit. Harney did not invite them in, but did not instruct them to remain outside. While Harney was speaking with Muldoon, the officers instructed them that they needed to come out of the bedroom. Harney did not know that they were in the unit until then. Harney and Muldoon were found not guilty of damaging the vehicle and sued (42 U.S.C. 1983) Midona and the city. The district court granted the defendants summary judgment. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. View "Harney v. Devarela" on Justia Law

Plaintiff owns three tracts, zoned agricultural, and challenged a 2009 amendment to the Winnebago County zoning ordinance that makes it easier to obtain permission to build a wind farm. She claimed that a wind farm on adjacent land would deprive the property “of the full extent of the kinetic energy of the wind and air as it enters the property, subjecting it to shadow flicker and reduction of light, severe noise, possible ice throw and blade throws, interference with radar, cell phone, GPS, television, and other wireless communications, increased likelihood of lightening damage and stray voltage. increased electromagnetic radiation, prevention of crop dusting, drying out her land, and killing raptors. The district court dismissed. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, characterizing the claim as simply that a wind farm adjacent to plaintiff’s property would be a nuisance. There is no merit to the claim that the amendment violates plaintiff’s constitutional rights. It is a “modest legislative encouragement of wind farming,” within the constitutional authority, state as well as federal, of a local government.View "Muscarello v. Winnebago Cnty. Bd." on Justia Law

Preacely pleaded guilty in 2009 to tax fraud, 26 U.S.C. 7206(2). The district court sentenced him to 18 months’ imprisonment to be followed by three years of supervised release, with a special condition, prohibiting him from participating in his former occupation of tax preparer. When the district court imposed the special condition, counsel asked: “may he own the business if he himself does not prepare any taxes himself?” The court responded, “No … you should not engage in the business of tax preparation directly or indirectly.” After his release from prison, Preacely transferred ownership of his business to his wife, but when an undercover IRS agent asked to speak to the vice-president, he was directed to Preacely. The IRS also executed a search warrant at the business and interviewed a number of employees. The district court revoked Preacely’s supervised release. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting arguments that the condition was unconstitutionally vague and that Preacely was involved only administratively with the business by doing things such as dropping off food, office supplies, and signing paychecks. View "United States v. Preacely" on Justia Law

Henry pleaded guilty to drug offenses in Iowa state court. He was sentenced to 10 years’ imprisonment, suspended, and 5 years’ probation. The same day, Henry and Parazine drove to the Chicago area. On the way, Henry used his cellular telephone to contact his Chicago-area drug supplier. Henry purchased heroin and cocaine from his supplier, intending to distribute the drugs in Iowa. They were stopped by law enforcement in Illinois. The Iowa court revoked Henry’s probation and sentenced him to 10 years’ imprisonment. Henry was subsequently charged in federal court and pleaded guilty to two counts of using a communication facility to further commission of a drug felony. As part of his plea agreement, he waived the right to appeal any part of his sentence. The district court sentenced him to 96 months’ imprisonment to run consecutive to his undischarged state sentence. The Seventh Circuit dismissed an appeal, rejecting Henry’s argument that his plea was not knowingly given because the district court did not explain that his federal sentence could be consecutive to his undischarged state sentence. The court also rejected a claim that his waiver of appellate rights is ineffective because it stands or falls with the plea. View "United States v. Henry" on Justia Law

Wolfe was convicted on one count of bank theft and one count of interstate transportation of stolen goods under 18 U.S.C. 2113(b) and 2314 for his role in a copper theft scheme. The district court sentenced Wolfe to 88 months’ imprisonment on each count, to be served concurrently, followed by concurrent three-year terms of supervised release and ordered restitution in the amount of $3,028,011.29. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting an argument that Wolfe was deprived of a fair trial because of statements the prosecutor made during closing argument that Wolfe was a knowing participant of the scheme from the beginning and his testimony was not to be trusted. The prosecutor supported this contention by highlighting the fact that Wolfe would not even identify himself on the video. The court also upheld the sentence and restitution order. View "United States v. Wolfe" on Justia Law