Justia U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Ray was convicted of reckless homicide and reckless endangerment, arising from a retaliatory shooting that left an 11-year-old girl dead and two others injured. At trial, the state called Detective Phillips to describe a signed statement that Ray gave during his police interview. Phillips read from Ray’s statement and recounted his own out-of-court statements informing Ray that co-actors had implicated Ray. Neither co-actor testified, but defense counsel did not object to Phillips’s testimony. Wisconsin courts rejected direct appeal and denied post-conviction relief. In his first federal habeas petition, the Seventh Circuit found that Ray’s constitutional rights were violated when the state introduced out-of-court statements made by individuals who did not testify, but remanded to allow the state to assert that Ray’s state post-conviction motion was untimely. On remand, the district court placed the burden of proof on Ray, finding that he did not timely give his motion to a prison official for mailing. The Seventh Circuit reversed, holding that the prisoner mailbox rule governs whether a state post-conviction document is “properly filed” because Wisconsin has not clearly rejected it. The state failed to rebut Ray’s testimony and documents showing that he timely gave his state post-conviction motion to a prison official. View "Ray v. Pollard" on Justia Law

Iain and Norene were married in Chicago in 1993. They lived in Seattle until 1998 when they moved to Australia. Their eldest child was born in the U.S. in 1997; two younger children were born in Australia. Although Norene and Iain initially intended to stay in Australia for five years, they stayed 12 years. In 2010, they traveled to the U.S., planning that Norene and the children would remain for six months to one year, but Norene filed for divorce in Illinois. Iain offered Norene primary custody, but wanted to be guaranteed custody of the children for nine weeks of their summer vacation and for two weeks over the Christmas holidays, and asserted that the couple’s residence was Australia. Norene did not accept Iain’s offer of settlement. Iain immediately filed a request for the return of the children with the Australian Central Authority charged with administering the Hague Convention, then filed a petition for return in Illinois (International Child Abduction Remedies Act, 42 U.S.C. 11601), which the district court denied. The Seventh Circuit remanded, stating that further fact-finding was necessary to determine which court should resolve custody. View "Walker v. Walker" on Justia Law

Defendant pleaded guilty to seven counts of violation of child pornography laws, 18 U.S.C. 2251(d)(1), 2252(a)(1), (a)(2), (a)(4), and was sentenced to 30 years’ imprisonment, followed by supervised release for the rest of his life, and payment of restitution to two women, “Amy and Vicky,” in the amount of $3,367,854.00 and $965,827.64; pornographic images of them, as girls, were found in the defendant’s possession. On appeal, the government defended the sentence but not the restitution award, and challenged allowing Amy and Vicky to intervene (rather than merely to be heard under the Criminal Victims’ Rights Act, 18 U.S.C. 3771(a)(4)). The Seventh Circuit affirmed the prison sentence and the calculation of the victims’ losses, but vacated the order of restitution and remanded for determination of how much to subtract from Amy’s losses to reflect restitution that she has received in other cases and determination of whether the defendant uploaded any of Amy’s or Vicky’s images. Defendant will not be permitted to seek contribution from other defendants convicted of crimes involving pornographic images of the two girls and the girls will not be permitted to intervene in the district court. View "United States v. Laraneta" on Justia Law

The underlying suits arise from alleged defects in Kenmore-brand Sears washing machines sold in periods beginning in 2001 and 2004. One asserted a defect that causes mold; the other asserted a defect that stops the machine inopportunely. The district court denied certification of the class complaining of mold and granted certification of the class complaining of sudden stoppage. The Seventh Circuit affirmed certification of the stoppage claims and reversed denial of certification for the mold claims. Rule 23(b)(3) conditions maintenance of a class action on a finding “that the questions of fact or law common to class members predominate over any questions affecting only individual members.” The basic question in the litigation is: were the machines defective in permitting mold to accumulate and generate noxious odors? The question is common to the entire mold class, although the answer may vary with the differences in design. The individual questions are the amount of damages owed particular class members. It is more efficient for the question whether the washing machines were defective to be resolved in a single proceeding than for it to be litigated separately in hundreds of different trials View "Butler v. Sears, Roebuck & Co." on Justia Law

During unrelated civil litigation against Illinois Department of Corrections officials, Eichwedel, an inmate, pro se, filed motions that the district court denied as “frivolous.” The state revoked six months of Eichwedel’s good-conduct credits. Illinois law establishes penalties for prisoners who file frivolous motions against the state, 730 ILCS 5/3-6-3(d). A state trial court denied relief; the appellate court declined review. Rejecting a federal habeas petition, the district court concluded that the Supreme Court never has recognized a First Amendment right to file frivolous motions. The Seventh Circuit certified to the Supreme Court of Illinois the question: was the State required to establish, in order to revoke a prisoner’s good-conduct credit, either that the court making the finding of frivolousness had determined specifically that the filing satisfied one of the definitions of frivolousness in 730 ILCS 5/3-6-3(d) or that the court had otherwise made its intent to invoke 730 ILCS 5/3-6-3(d) known? After Eichwedel was released, the court withdrew the certification as moot. While the underlying situation may occur again and may not be resolved before a prisoner’s release date, the chance of this situation happening to Eichwedel is simply too speculative to constitute a continuing controversy between him and IDOC. View "Eichwedel v. Chandler" on Justia Law

Johnson, an African-American woman, age 67, worked for 16 years as a legal assistant at the U.S. Attorney’s Office until her voluntary retirement in 2007.Weeks before her retirement, Johnson had a verbal altercation with another legal assistant, Mosley. Management eventually decided that the office would best be served by Johnson’s reassignment to another floor, rather than by a formal reprimand. Johnson’s salary and benefits did not change. Her duties and some working conditions were altered. She sued the Department of Justice for discrimination based on her age, sex and race. She asserted that the trier of fact could infer discriminatory intent from a “mosaic of evidence” comprised of the DOJ’s arguably contradictory witness statements and from her assertions that similarly situated employees had received preferential treatment. She also contended that she could make out a prima facie case of discrimination because she belonged to a protected class, had met her employer’s legitimate expectations, suffered an adverse employment action when reassigned to the file room and was treated differently than similarly situated employees. The district court entered summary judgment for the DOJ. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. View "Johnson v. Holder" on Justia Law

Based on a scheme that involved purchasing large quantities of cell phones, defaulting on payment, and shipping them for resale, Natour was convicted of four counts of interstate transportation of stolen property, 18 U.S.C. 2314. At sentencing, the district court attributed to him a loss amount of approximately $292,000 and determined that he was “in the business of receiving and selling stolen property,” U.S.S.G. 2B1.1(b)(4), resulting in a 14-level increase to the base offense level under the Guidelines. The district court sentenced Natour to 28 months’ imprisonment on all counts, to run concurrently, followed by three years of supervised release, and ordered restitution in the amount of $104,742.16. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, first rejecting a claim that the conviction violated the Grand Jury Clause. The terms used in 18 U.S.C. 2314 are not of a wholly independent character, and the offense conduct proved at trial and stated in the jury instructions were within the charges approved by the grand jury. The court properly applied the Sentencing Guidelines to. Natour as a person in the business of receiving and selling stolen property and the court used both an acceptable method and evidence-based mathematical figures in arriving at a loss calculation. View "United States v. Natour" on Justia Law

Porter, a civilian police department employee, worked the “auto desk,” where employees process information about towed, stolen, repossessed, or recovered vehicles, 24 hours per day, seven days a week. In 2005 she was assigned to a group that has Fridays and Saturdays off. She requested reassignment because she was involved in her church. The request was granted. She then requested to work a later shift to attend classes as a student minister. The request was granted. Weeks later, Porter took leave due to a car accident and pregnancy complications. Following three months of FMLA leave, Porter took a medical leave for another six months. She returned and was assigned to the Friday/Saturday days-off group. She was told that her request would be accommodated when an opening became available in the Sunday/Monday group. Between returning to work on July 16, 2006, and November 12, 2006, Porter was absent 34 days, including 16 Sundays. Porter claimed that she was harassed by her supervisors and filed internal grievances. Porter sued, alleging that the city failed to accommodate her religious practice, discriminated against her, and retaliated against her for engaging in protected activity, 42 U.S.C. 2000e. The district court granted the city summary judgment. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. View "Porter v. City of Chicago" on Justia Law

Hible was charged with conspiracy involving distribution of cocaine and crack cocaine; distribution of cocaine; and distribution of crack cocaine (21 U.S.C. 841, 846). The government filed notice under 21 U.S.C. 851 that it would seek an enhanced sentence due to Hible’s prior felony drug conviction. The law in effect at the time had a mandatory minimum penalty of 10 years’ imprisonment and a maximum penalty of life imprisonment for a defendant who distributed 5 grams or more of crack cocaine and had a prior felony drug conviction. In January 2011, Hible pleaded guilty distribution of 5 grams or more of crack cocaine, initially asserting that he should be sentenced under the new Fair Sentencing Act of 2010, under which he faced no mandatory minimum term of imprisonment and a maximum term of not more than 30 years, 21 U.S.C. 841(b)(1)(B)(iii), (C). The district court reviewed the presentence report, which recommended an offense level of 39, criminal history category VI, and an advisory range of 360 months to life and imposed a sentence of 240 months. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Hible waived his right to appeal , having failed to assert any right to be sentenced under the FSA at his sentencing. View "United States v. Hible" on Justia Law

American citizen-civilians, employees of a private Iraqi security services company, alleged that they were detained and tortured by U.S. military personnel while in Iraq in 2006, then released without being charged with a crime. Plaintiffs sought damages and to recover seized personal property. The district court denied motions to dismiss. In 2011, the Seventh Circuit affirmed in part, holding that plaintiffs sufficiently alleged Secretary Rumsfeld's personal responsibility and that he is not entitled to qualified immunity. On rehearing en banc, the Seventh Circuit reversed, stating that a common-law claim for damages should not be created. The Supreme Court has never created or even favorably mentioned a nonstatutory right of action for damages on account of conduct that occurred outside of the U.S. The Military Claims Act and the Foreign Claims Act indicate that Congress has decided that compensation should come from the Treasury rather than from federal employees and that plaintiffs do not need a common-law damages remedy in order to achieve some recompense. Even such a remedy existed, Rumsfeld could not be held liable. He did not arrest plaintiffs, hold them incommunicado, refuse to speak with the FBI, subject them to loud noises, or threaten them while they wore hoods. View "Vance v. Rumsfeld" on Justia Law