Justia U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

In 2007 Calumet City’s Mayor Qualkinbush appointed Embry commissioner, to oversee construction and repair of streets, paving, sidewalks, and other public improvements. Embry supervised day-to-day work, prepared the department’s annual budget, managed payroll and scheduling for 40 employees, and met with the mayor and other department heads to brainstorm improvements. During the 2009 municipal election, Embry campaigned for a team of candidates that included Mayor Qualkinbush and three of the four defendant-aldermen. The three broke party ranks to support Munda. Munda won, creating a rift between the defendant-aldermen and the mayor. Defendants urged Embry to stop supporting the mayor. Embry declined. After the election, the city council merged Embry’s department with the Sewer and Water Department; the Sewer Superintendent planned to retire, and Embry thought that he would be appointed commissioner of the new department. Defendant-aldermen vowed not to ratify Embry’s appointment, so the mayor nominated someone else. The city council approved the new appointment. Embry filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983. . Applying the Elrod-Branti line of political-patronage cases, the district court granted defendants summary judgment, concluding that the commissioner is a policy-making position and that Embry could be removed because of his political affiliation. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. View "Embry v. City of Calumet City" on Justia Law

Raybourne was a quality engineer for 23 years. The employer provided a long-term disability plan that paid benefits for up to 24 months if disability prevented him from performing the duties of his regular job. After 24 months, the plan paid benefits only if he was unable to perform all material duties of any occupation for which he was reasonably qualified. Raybourne suffered degenerative joint disease in his foot, with severe pain. In 2003, he stopped working and underwent the first of the four surgeries. From December 2003 through February 2006, Cigna paid benefits, then determined that he was not disabled under the more stringent standard. Raybourne exhausted administrative remedies, then sued under 29 U.S.C. 1132(a)(1)(B). The district court ruled in favor of Cigna. On remand the court rejected Cigna’s “unconvincing” explanation for how the company determined that Raybourne was not disabled. The court found that Cigna relied on the report of a non-treating physician and on the Social Security Administration’s initial rejections of Raybourne’s claim, failing to consider the SSA’s final determination of disability. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, finding that denial of benefits was based on a conflict of interest rather than on the facts and the terms of the policy. View "Raybourne v. CIGNA Life Ins. Co. of NY" on Justia Law

Brown and Wilson began working as nurses at Advocate-Christ in 2005. Both are African-American. In 2008, the plaintiffs and 10 other nurses delivered a Petition for Change in Labor Practices to their human resources department, claiming that Advocate-Christ treated its Filipino nurses better than its African-American nurses by giving them easier assignments, more training, and more leadership opportunities. Human resources employees investigated and ultimately concluded that the claims could not be corroborated. Both plaintiffs resigned. In October 2008, they began working at Advocate South Suburban and became concerned that other nurses were sleeping on duty, that the culture was unprofessional, and that work assignments were unequal and unfair. When their supervisors failed to make changes that the plaintiffs recommended, they complained of race discrimination and started applying for positions at other Advocate facilities. Neither was hired. They filed charges of discrimination with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission and later filed suit. The district court entered summary judgment in favor of Advocate. The Seventh Circuit affirmed.View "Brown v. Advocate S. Suburban Hosp. " on Justia Law

The insurers provided law enforcement liability coverage to the city of Waukegan and its employees acting within the scope of employment. In 2009, Starks filed a civil rights suit against the city and some current and former police officers, among others, alleging that each played a role in his wrongful conviction for a 1986 crime. The insurers obtained a declaratory judgment that they have no duty to defend or indemnify. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, noting that the policies were not in effect at the time of the crime, that Starks was not exonerated during the period when the policies were in place, and that any outrageous conduct that might be grounds for a claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress also fell outside the policy dates. View "Northfield Ins.Co. v. City of Waukegan" on Justia Law

Pelletier admitted during a job interview with the FBI that he had pornographic pictures of children on his home computer, which he claimed were related to research. The admission occurred in an unlocked polygraph room, in the presence of an unarmed agent. Pelletier signed a form that provided: “I understand that I am not in custody, that my participation in the polygraph examination is voluntary, and that I may leave at any time.” Another agent, wearing his badge and sidearm, told Pelletier that “you don’t have to answer any questions.” Pelletier refused a request for a computer search, but admitted to “inadvertently” creating child pornography by recording himself having sex with a girl. The agent directed another agent to go to Pelletier’s home and freeze the premises, telling Pelletier that he was going to try to get a warrant. Pelletier signed a consent form. The FBI found more than 600 images of children on his computer. Pelletier conditionally pled guilty to possession of child pornography, 18 U.S.C. 2252(a)(5)(B). The Seventh Circuit affirmed denial of a motion to suppress. Pelletier was never in custody; voluntarily consented to the search; and the contents of the computer inevitably would have been discovered with a search warrant. View "United States v. Pelletier" on Justia Law

In 2000, Townsend’s Pontiac was stolen by means of breaking a window. The car was seen at a bank 15 miles away. Two armed men stepped out, wearing gloves, dark clothes, and masks. The attempted robbery failed; they fled without any money. Later that day, police found Townsend’s Pontiac, containing the masks, gloves, jacket, and sweatshirt. Investigators recovered latent prints; for reasons unknown, the fingerprints were not immediately analyzed. Investigators also recovered a hair from the gloves and a DNA sample from a mask. having a “mixed,” partial profile, with incomplete DNA sequences from two people. The profile was uploaded in 2001 and immediately registered multiple “hits” on unknown individuals. In 2008, Indiana upgraded its equipment to allow for more sensitive testing, retested the hair, and extracted a complete DNA profile. The database hit on Hagler. Police picked him up and collected a fresh DNA sample. Hagler’s DNA matched that on the mask as a “major contributor;” his brother was likely the minor contributor. One recovered print matched Hagler. Hagler and his brother were first indicted for attempted robbery, 18 U.S.C.2 & 2113, in 2009. Hagler was ultimately convicted. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting an argument that the prosecution was untimely. View "United States v. Hagler" on Justia Law

Omni, a technology consulting agency, hired Messier to work as a temporary programmer for Thrivent pursuant to an agreement between Omni and Thrivent. After leaving Omni and Thrivent, Messier had a difficult time finding a new job and began to suspect that Thrivent was saying negative things about him to prospective employers who called for reference checks. The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission alleges that during these reference checks, Thrivent was revealing information about Messier’s migraine condition to prospective employers in violation of the medical record confidentiality requirements of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. 12111. The district court found that Thrivent learned of Messier’s migraine condition outside the context of a medical examination or inquiry, so that the confidentiality provisions did not apply, and granted summary judgment to Thrivent. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, finding that Thrivent had no duty to treat its knowledge of Messier’s migraine condition as a confidential medical record because Messier had volunteered the information in responding to an inquiry about his absence from work. View "Equal Emp't Opportunity Comm'n v. Thrivent Fin. for Lutherans" on Justia Law

Vrljicak arrived in the U.S. from Serbia under a work visa, which expired September 30, 2009.He did not leave and was in unauthorized status on July 14, 2010, when he applied for asylum on the ground that his native land would persecute him because of his sexual orientation. The Board of Immigration Appeals agreed with the IJ that Vrljicak took too long to seek asylum, 8 U.S.C. 1158 (a)(2)(B), but held that he is entitled to withholding of removal and remanded. The Seventh Circuit denied review, rejecting a challenge that the Board should have excused his delay under 8 C.F.R. 1208.4(a)(5)(iv), which reads: “The applicant maintained Temporary Protected Status, lawful immigrant or nonimmigrant status, or was given parole, until a reasonable period before the filing of the asylum application.” View "Vrljicak v. Holder" on Justia Law

Holloway was arrested without a warrant and detained. Although Holloway had a probable cause determination the day after his arrest and an initial appearance in front of a judicial officer within three days, he was detained for nine days without having any charges filed against him. During his time in jail, Holloway received care from the medical staff. Before his detention, Holloway had been taking prescribed Oxycontin and other medications to treat chronic pain caused by his Klippel-Trenaunay Syndrome. The jail physician did not believe that Oxycontin was necessary to treat Holloway’s chronic pain and, instead, prescribed non-narcotic pain medications and other medications to prevent narcotic withdrawal symptoms. After the prosecutor did not file charges against Holloway within the time allowed by the court, Holloway was released from jail and was admitted to a hospital, where he resumed his regimen of Oxycontin. Holloway sued (42 U.S.C. 1983), alleging that the sheriff violated his rights by detaining him without charges for nine days and that the jail physician and two attending nurses violated his constitutional rights by acting with deliberate indifference to his serious medical condition. The district court granted summary judgment for defendants. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. View "Holloway v. Delaware Cnty. Sheriff" on Justia Law

Plowman was a local government official in Indianapolis when he accepted a bribe from an undercover FBI agent. He was videotaped discussing payment for “taking care of” a zoning variance. The agent gave Plowman $5,000. Prior to trial, the government filed a motion in limine seeking to preclude Plowman from arguing an entrapment defense. The district court granted the motion. A jury then convicted Plowman of federal-funds bribery, 18 U.S.C. 666(a)(1), and attempted extortion under color of official right, 18 U.S.C. 1951(a). Plowman was sentenced to 40 months in prison. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. To argue entrapment to a jury, Plowman needed to provide sufficient evidence of both inducement and a lack of predisposition, but he failed to establish the first element. View "United States v. Plowman" on Justia Law