Justia U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Adams was sentenced, in Illinois, to 180 days in jail plus three years’ probation for a 1981 armed robbery; he committed a second robbery while on probation. He was convicted of robbery and aggravated battery. Paroled in August, 1984, he promptly violated, but was re-paroled in December. He committed another armed robbery in January 1985 and was sentenced to 25 years. While confined, Adams committed aggravated battery of a guard. He had not been out for long when he was caught with a firearm, convicted as a felon in possession, 18 U.S.C. 922(g), and sentenced to 15 years’ imprisonment as an armed career criminal, 18 U.S.C. 924(e). Adams conceded that two convictions qualify as violent felonies but argued that two do not, given 18 U.S.C.921(a)(20), which provides that restoration of civil rights causes a conviction to be disregarded for federal felon-in-possession statutes. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. In 1984 Illinois repealed statutes that had allowed criminals to possess firearms beginning five years after release from prison; his civil right to possess firearms was not restored and that right would not have been restored even under the pre-1984 version of Illinois law, since he has not spent any five-year period out of prison. View "United States v. Adams" on Justia Law

Racine County Human Services Department caseworker Wagner removed Thor, a 12-year-old, from his parents’ home and placed him into protective custody. Thor suffers from cerebral palsy, global developmental delay, and is confined to a wheelchair. Wagner investigated after receiving a referral from personnel at Thor’s school concerning bruising on his arm and leg. A judge issued a probable cause order for removal, based on evidence of Thor’s injuries and that he had been left unattended. Thor suffered additional injuries as a result of accidents that occurred in foster care and at a rehabilitation facility. Thor’s mother and stepfather and Thor sued Wagner, his supervisor, another caseworker, and her supervisor, alleging violations of their constitutional rights under 42 U.S.C. 1983 and 42 U.S.C. 1985. The district court granted summary judgment to defendants on qualified immunity grounds and because plaintiffs failed to establish sufficient evidence of racial animus. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity for any alleged violation of plaintiffs’ right to familial relations; for any alleged breach of Thor’s right to bodily security and integrity based on the decision to continue his placements; and for any alleged breach of Thor’s right to individualized treatment. View "Xiong v. Wagner" on Justia Law

Defendant, a black Muslim inmate of an Illinois Federal Correctional Institution, was attacked by Mexican inmates. Later, locked in his cell, defendant attacked another Mexican inmate, kicking and stomping him with steel-toe boots and slamming his head into a bunk. The victim had not participated in the earlier attack and made no effort to defend himself. Defendant was convicted of “assault resulting in serious bodily injury,” 18 U.S.C. 113(a)(6), and sentenced to 46 months. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting an argument that he did not inflict “serious” bodily injury,” defined as involving “a substantial risk of death,” “extreme physical pain,” “protracted and obvious disfigurement,” or “protracted loss or impairment of the function of a bodily member, organ, or mental faculty.” The victim was bloody, had difficulty walking, required 16 stitches on his head, and had scratches, abrasions, and contusions. His nose was broken and his eyes swollen shut; he had headaches, pain in his face and shoulders, and several loose teeth. He exhibited signs of post-traumatic stress syndrome, for which Zoloft was prescribed. Judge Posner expressed bafflement that inmates are required to wear steel toed boots and stated that there was no basis for a jury instruction on self-defense. View "United States v. Wilson" on Justia Law

Fleishman began working for Continental in 1984 as a trial attorney defending workers’ compensation claims. Izzo oversaw the attorneys. Beginning in 2003, Fleishman suffered a series of medical problems related to a brain aneurism. He took intermittent medical leaves between July 2003 and June 2005. Izzo mentioned to Fleishman that his numbers “were off” because he was out on leave and inquired whether Fleishman thought about retirement. Fleishman declined and did not request another leave or accommodation after his return, although he had a noticeable dent on the side of his head. He was assigned to a new group that handled high-value cases. And his supervisor began receiving a series of performance-related complaints that ultimately led to his termination in 2007 at the age of 54. Fleishman filed suit under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. 623 (a)(1) and the Americans with Disabilities Act 42 U.S.C. 12112(a). The district court granted Continental summary judgment. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Fleishman offered no evidence of age discrimination and does not meet the definition of disabled under the ADA. View "Fleishman v. Cont'l Cas. Co." on Justia Law

Four-year-old Jaquari died from asphyxiation by an elastic band from a fitted bed sheet. That day, his mother, Harris, disciplined her sons for leaving the apartment while she out doing laundry. The state argued that Jaquari would not stop crying and that Harris strangled him while five-year-old Diante slept in the bunk above. The defense claimed that Jaquari had wrapped the elastic around his own neck and accidentally asphyxiated himself. A videotaped confession, recorded the day after Jaquari’s death following 27 hours of intermittent interrogation, was admitted. Diante, has maintained since the day after Jaquari’s death that his brother wrapped the elastic band around his own neck and that neither parent was present. The trial court determined that Diante (then six) was not a competent witness, improperly reversing a presumption of competency, requiring the defendant to prove competency. The Illinois Appellate Court rejected direct appeal. The district court denied federal habeas relief. The Seventh Circuit reversed. Exclusion of defense evidence violates the Sixth Amendment Compulsory Process Clause where evidence is material to the outcome and the exclusion is arbitrary or disproportionate to the state’s legitimate interests. Harris was denied effective assistance. Counsel did not interview Diante, did not secure a witness to show that Diante’s recollections were consistent, and did not challenge the burden of proof. View "Harris v. Thompson" on Justia Law

Quinn pleaded guilty to possessing child pornography, 18 U.S.C. 2252(a)(4)(B), and was sentenced to 97 months’ imprisonment with supervised release for life, subject to conditions. His plea agreement contains a promise not to appeal the conviction or length of imprisonment. Both the Criminal Code and the Sentencing Guidelines authorize lifetime supervised release for such violations, 18 U.S.C. 3583(k); U.S.S.G. 5D1.2(b)(2) and the Sentencing Commission recommends “the statutory maximum term of supervised release” for every sex offense. While the judge explained the prison sentence, he did not address the length or conditions of supervision or address Quinn’s arguments about recidivism. The Seventh Circuit vacated and remanded with respect to supervised release. One term of supervised release prevented contact with most minors without advance approval. Quinn has a young child, whom he has never been accused of abusing. Putting the parent-child relationship under governmental supervision for long periods requires strong justification. . View "United States v. Quinn" on Justia Law

Blue, a bus driver insured under Hartford group disability plans, stopped working because of chronic headaches in 1998; Hartford approved short-term disability (STD) benefits. Blue was diagnosed with sphenopalatine ganglion neuralgia. Hartford approved long-term (LTD) benefits in 2001. To qualify for STD benefits, Blue needed to show inability to perform his own occupation; for LTD benefits, he needed to show that he could not do “any occupation or work for which he was or could become qualified by training, education or experience.” In 2002, Hartford amended its LTD policy, retroactive to 1993, adopting the more lenient “own occupation” standard. Hartford received annual physician’s reports, and by 2008, his provider indicated that Blue was capable of full-time light or sedentary work. Hartford notified Blue that he was no longer eligible for LTD benefits, quoting the “any occupation” language; it apparently did not send the 2002 retroactive amendment. In 2011, Hartford acknowledged its mistake to the district court, reinstated benefits, and issued a check for retroactive benefits. After granting one, but denying a second, extension of time, the district court ruled without Blue’s response, finding the contract claim was moot and granting Hartford summary judgment on the bad faith claim. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. View "Blue v. Hartford Life & Accident Ins. Co." on Justia Law

Plaintiff owns properties in a mixed rural/suburban area in central Illinois and lives in a house on one parcel. The other parcels, about 190 acres and near the house, were zoned agricultural and very close to a hog farm. The owners of two other properties in proximity to the hog farm obtained rezoning to the “rural residential” classification, but the county declined plaintiff’s applications for rezoning. Plaintiff sued in state court; the court entered an “Agreed Order” that stated that the parcels should be rezoned, but did not order that they be rezoned. One year later, the zoning board held the required hearing and recommended approval. The County Board voted 11 to 10 in favor of the applications, less than a three-fourths majority, which functioned as a denial. In 2008, the Board granted the applications, but the real estate market had collapsed, and the parcels were no longer worth more zoned residential than they had been when zoned agricultural. Plaintiff sought damages under 42 U.S.C. 1983. The district court entered summary judgment for the defendants. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, noting that protection of agriculture was a rational, nonretaliatory motive for voting against the applications. View "Guth v. Tazewell County" on Justia Law

In 1989, Cruz entered the U.S. without inspection. In 2005 a Notice to Appear issued, initiating removal proceedings. Cruz applied for cancellation of removal pursuant to 8 U.S.C. 1229b(b), which gives the Attorney General discretionary power to allow an alien to remain. The IJ concluded that Cruz met the requirement of 10 years’ continuous physical presence, that he was a person of good moral character, and that he had no disqualifying convictions on his record, but Cruz did not satisfy the final requirement: that the alien establish that removal would result in exceptional and extremely unusual hardship to the alien’s spouse, parent, or child, who is a citizen. The Board affirmed. The Seventh Circuit denied several petitions, noting that his petition for asylum was untimely and that dangerous conditions in Mexico did not justify granting his petition in any event. There was no evidence of any improper motive directed personally against Cruz and there was a rational basis for the Board’s decision. View "Cruz-Mayaho v. Holder" on Justia Law

In 2010-2011 several hundred plaintiffs filed 10 lawsuits in Illinois state courts against Abbott, for personal injuries they allege were caused by Depakote, a prescription. Plaintiffs moved the Supreme Court of Illinois to consolidate and transfer their cases to St. Clair County, pursuant to Illinois Supreme Court Rule 384; the Supreme Court has not ruled. Abbott removed each of the cases to federal court, asserting that the motion to consolidate brought the cases under the “mass action” provision of the Class Action Fairness Act, 28 U.S.C. 1332(d)(11)(B)(i), which allows the removal of any case where 100 or more people propose to try their claims jointly. Cases filed in St. Clair and Madison counties were removed to the Southern District of Illinois and cases filed in Cook County were removed to the Northern District; plaintiffs moved to remand in both courts. The Northern District denied plaintiffs’ motion to remand. The Seventh Circuit held that removal was proper, rejecting plaintiffs’ argument that they did not propose a joint trial because their motion to consolidate did not address how the trials of the various claims in the cases would be conducted, other than proposing that they all take place in St. Clair County.View "Abbott Labs., Inc. v. Alexander" on Justia Law