Justia U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

The company, S.C. Johnson & Son, was injured by a bribery and kickback scheme involving a dishonest employee and transportation companies with which it had contracts and filed a tort lawsuit in Wisconsin state court. The company filed a second suit, against different transportation defendants, in federal court, based on diversity jurisdiction. The district court dismissed the suit, which raised state law claims of fraudulent misrepresentation by omission; criminal conspiracy to violate Wisconsin’s bribery statute, Wis. Stat. 134.05; conspiracy to commit fraud; violations of the Wisconsin Organized Crime Control Act, Wis. Stat. 946.80, through racketeering activity and mail and wire fraud; and aiding and abetting a breach of fiduciary duty by providing bribes and kickbacks. The court indicated that federal law preempted state tort claims because they could have “the force and effect of a law related to a price, route, or service of any motor carrier . . . with respect to the transportation of property.” 49 U.S.C. 14501(c)(1). The Seventh Circuit reversed. A claim for fraudulent misrepresentation was properly dismissed, but theories based on bribery and kickbacks fall outside the scope of the preemption provision. View "SC Johnson & Son Inc. v. Transp. Corp. of Am., Inc." on Justia Law

In 2004 the defendant pleaded guilty to conspiracy to distribute crack cocaine. Because of the amount of crack involved, his base offense level was 36. U.S.S.G. 2D1.1(c)(2). The judge reduced the level to 33 because the defendant had accepted responsibility for his crime. His guidelines sentencing range, based on that offense level and a Category VI criminal history, was 235 to 293 months. Based on retroactive amendment to the guidelines, the judge ultimately imposed a sentence of 188 months. The defendant moved for a further reduction, which was refused. In an Anders brief, defense counsel pointed out that here was no possible basis for a further reduction, as “Amendment 706 provides no benefit to career offenders.” The Seventh Circuit dismissed defendant’s appeal and granted his attorney’s motion to withdraw. View "United States v. Williams" on Justia Law

In 2007, an explosion occurred at a metal processing plant in Manchester, Georgia owned by GSMC, which had obtained insurance through Continental, covering damage to the plant. Continental made some payments to GSMC, but GSMC subsequently sued, alleging that the payments were inadequate. GSMC is now in bankruptcy. Plaintiffs, claiming that the failure of Continental to timely pay adequate damages to GSMC caused them damages, brought suit against Continental and Hylant, their former insurance broker. Three of the plaintiffs are businesses affiliated with GSMC, and are additional named insureds under the policy that covered the Manchester plant. The other plaintiffs are owners and operators of GSMC, and allege that they are third-party beneficiaries of the policy. The district court dismissed the claims of: breach of contract; promissory estoppel; bad faith; negligence; tortious interference with contract; negligent infliction of emotional distress; and breach of fiduciary duties. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, applying Indiana law. View "G & S Holdings LLC v. Cont'l Cas. Co." on Justia Law

For several years Chapman, now 46, lured kids as young as 12 to his home with marijuana and alcohol and filmed them, usually through “peepholes,” engaging in sexually explicit conduct. He pleaded guilty to producing child pornography, a crime punishable by no less than 15 years in prison, 18 U.S.C. 2251(a), (e) and faced a guidelines range of life imprisonment. He was sentenced to a total of 40 years. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting an argument that the district court did not fully evaluate his arguments in mitigation, and failed to adequately explain its choice of sentence. Chapman exaggerated the evidenced presented at sentencing about his background; the “mitigating” factors he cited lacked evidentiary foundation or amounted to “stock” arguments that required no response from the judge. View "United States v. Chapman" on Justia Law

Chicago police officers arrested plaintiffs for disorderly conduct at a 2005 antiwar demonstration. The plaintiffs brought claims for First Amendment retaliation, Fourth Amendment false arrest, Fourteenth Amendment class-of-one equal protection violations, and state law malicious prosecution. They also brought facial challenges against Chicago’s disorderly conduct ordinance, as overbroad and unconstitutionally vague. The district court granted summary judgment. The Seventh Circuit affirmed on the basis of qualified immunity. The facial attack on the ordinance was rendered moot by an earlier decision, which partially invalidated the subsection on overbreadth and vagueness grounds. The court acknowledged that the plaintiffs’ arrests under a now-invalid ordinance may have affected their free speech rights, but that they did not bring an as-applied challenge to redress such an injury. View "Thayer v. Chiczewski" on Justia Law

Naficy began working for IDHS in 1996. According to Naficy, her co-worker and eventual supervisor, Bailey, mocked her accent and suggested that Naficy should not have been promoted because she is Iranian. Naficy filed complaints of discrimination, relating to treatment during a layoff and unfavorable performance evaluations. In 2010, in connection with closure of another facility, IDHS followed provisions of a collective bargaining agreement. Naficy and others received a letter alerting them to the possibility of a layoff and outlining potential bump options. Naficy was reassigned to a part-time position; she returned to her former position with the same schedule and salary two months later. Naficy filed a complaint with the EEOC alleging that the reassignment was discriminatory and retaliatory. She received a right-to-sue letter and filed suit under Title VII, 42 U.S.C. 2000e, and 42 U.S.C. 1981. The district court dismissed the claims, reasoning that as a state agency, IDHS is not a “person” amenable to suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, and that Naficy had no direct evidence of discrimination by anyone involved in her reassignment, of retaliation, or of a similarly situated IDHS employee who received better treatment than Naficy. The Seventh Circuit affirmed View "Naficy v. IL Dep't of Human Servs." on Justia Law

Charged with possessing with the intent to distribute 50 grams or more of a substance containing cocaine base, 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1), Dowell plead guilty in return for the government’s agreement to withdraw an information filed under 21 U.S.C. 851, alleging that Dowell had previously been convicted of a felony drug offense. Without that withdrawal, Dowell would have faced a mandatory minimum sentence of 20 years’ imprisonment. The court nonetheless applied the “career offender” guideline, U.S.S.G. 4B1.1, and imposed a sentence of 180 months. Although Dowell claims to have instructed his attorney to file, a notice of appeal was not filed within 10 days, as required for timely filing. Dowell, therefore, filed a 28 U.S.C. 2255 motion asserting that failure to file constituted ineffective assistance of counsel. The government opposed the motion, arguing that Dowell’s agreement in his plea not to challenge his sentence on collateral attack precluded relief. The district court agreed with the government. The Seventh Circuit reversed and remanded for determination as to whether Dowell told his attorney to file the appeal.View "Dowell v. Unted States" on Justia Law

Plaintiff sued her ex-husband for battery and related torts, claiming that he beat and raped her while they were still married. The district judge dismissed the suit, ruling that it was malicious. She was proceeding in forma pauperis, and 28 U.S.C. 1915(e)(2)(B)(i) requires a district court to dismiss such a suit if the court determines that it is frivolous or malicious. Before the two divorced, plaintiff had complained about the beating and rape to the police, but later withdrew charges, resumed living with the defendant, and emailed him a statement recanting the charges, saying that he was a wonderful husband. The court characterized the suit as “the latest battleground for the parties in their long-running personal feud” and stated that “this action may be merely a fishing expedition. The Plaintiff has expressed her desire to subpoena the Defendant’s telephone records, and has requested that the Court enter an order blocking AT&T from disposing of any telephone records relating to the Defendant.” The Seventh Circuit vacated, concluding that the district court's finding was not supported by the record. View "West v. West" on Justia Law

In 2008, plaintiffs were inmates at the Indianapolis jail, which was operated by CCA under contract with the Marion County Sheriff’s Department. They claimed that the jail provided inadequate medical care and exposed inmates to inhumane living conditions so egregious that they amounted to cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment. The district court certified a class, but dismissed claims that the jail failed to provide adequate medical care, that the conditions of confinement inside the jail were inhumane, and that the procedures in the jail violated inmates’ rights under the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act and later entered summary judgment for CCA on the remaining issues. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, noting that CCA had produced an affidavit indicating that complained-of problems had been resolved. View "Kress v. CCA of TN, LLC" on Justia Law

Robers pleaded guilty to conspiracy to commit wire fraud, 18 U.S.C. 371, based on his role in a mortgage fraud scheme; Robers signed mortgage documents seeking loans based on inflated income and assets and on his claim that he would reside in the houses and pay the mortgages. The loans went into default. The district court sentenced Robers to three years’ probation and ordered him to pay $218,952 in restitution to a lender and a mortgage insurance company. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the restitution order. The Mandatory Victims Restitution Act, 18 U.S.C. 3663A, requires restitution in the case of a crime resulting in damage to or loss or destruction of property. The court rejected Robers’s argument that the MVRA requires the court to determine the offset value based on the fair market value the collateral had on the date the lenders obtained title to the houses following foreclosure as the “date the property is returned.” Money was the property stolen and foreclosure is not a return of that property; only when the real estate is resold do the victims receive money. Victims are also entitled to expenses, other than attorney’s fees and unspecified fees, related to foreclosure and sale. View "United States v. Robers" on Justia Law