Justia U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

A class of persons required to register on the state’s online sex and violent offender database sued the Indiana Department of Correction, alleging that failure to provide any procedure to correct errors in the registry violates due process. In response, the DOC created a new policy to give notice to current prisoners about their pending registry listings and an opportunity to challenge the information. The district court granted summary judgment on the ground that the new policy was sufficient to comply with due process. The new procedures still fail to provide any process at all for an entire class of registrants: those who are not incarcerated. The Seventh Circuit reversed. State judicial post-deprivation remedies cited by the DOC are insufficient to meet the requirements of due process. Although registrants can challenge registry errors in the course of criminal prosecutions for failure to comply with registration requirements, due process does not require a person to risk additional criminal conviction as the price of correcting an erroneous listing, especially where a simple procedural fix is available much earlier. View "Schepers v. Comm'r of IN Dep't of Corr." on Justia Law

Schorsch enrolled in a long-term disability plan in 1991, but apparently never received a summary plan description or explanation of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act, 29 U.S.C.1132. In 1992 she was in an automobile accident; in 1993 Schorsch began receiving disability benefits. In 2006, at the plan’s request, Schorsch underwent a medical exam, which resulted in a report finding her capable of performing a medium duty job. The plan notified Schorsch that it would terminate her benefits, but did not mention a surveillance report, which was part of the determination. , Schorsch’s counsel sent a letter, but neither Schorsch nor her attorney submitted a request for review. The plan notified Schorsch that the appeals period had passed. Schorsch’s claimed breach of contract and unreasonable denial of benefits under Illinois law and ERISA violations. The plan had lost the administrative record relating to Schorsch’s claim. The district court granted summary judgment on the ground of failure to exhaust administrative remedies. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. There are exceptions that may excuse a failure to exhaust, but Schorsch offered no evidence of reasonable reliance on information missing from the notice or that alleged deficiencies were material. View "Schorsch v. Reliance Standard Life Ins. Co." on Justia Law

Martin was the Sheriff of Gallatin County from 1990 until his conviction on 15 counts: marijuana distribution, possession of a firearm during a drug trafficking crime, conspiracy to distribute marijuana, witness tampering, conspiracy to tamper with witnesses, and attempted structuring of financial transactions. The government obtained audio and video recordings of three deliveries of marijuana to Potts by Martin, while in uniform, in his patrol vehicle, and in possession of his service revolver. While incarcerated jail, Martin solicited inmates to kill Potts and another witness and took steps to obtain payments for the murders. Because of a bizarre case of mistaken identity, a non-juror was in the jury room for no more than five minutes before jurors lined up to enter the courtroom. Each juror testified that the individual did not speak to anyone in the jury room. The court notified the parties that it intended to proceed with the trial. Defense counsel did not object. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the conviction, finding that the district court did not err in its inquiry into the potential jury tampering and in its determination that no improper communication or influence had occurred, but remanded for recalculation of the sentence. View "United States v. Martin" on Justia Law

Defendant pleaded guilty to possession of child pornography and sexual exploitation of a child, 18 U.S.C. 2252A(a)(5)(B), 2251(a), and was sentenced to 420 months, reserving the right to appeal the legality of the search of his computer. The warrant affidavit said that authorities had discovered that a pornographic video, which a 13- year-girl had made of herself and uploaded to the Internet, had been downloaded to a computer at defendant’s home and that images from that video had been uploaded from that computer to an image-sharing website. A Facebook message with a link to that website had been sent to the girl’s stepmother from the same computer. Authorities identified the computer’s Internet Protocol address as registered to the defendant. Defendant argued that the facts were stale and that there was no reason to believe that seven months after he had uploaded child pornography there would still be evidence of the crime on his computer. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Staleness is highly relevant to the legality of a search for a perishable or consumable object, like cocaine, but rarely relevant to a computer file. Computers and computer equipment are “not the type of evidence that rapidly dissipates or degrades.” View "United States v. Seiver" on Justia Law

Defendant gave an informer for the federal Drug Enforcement Administration $477,020 for 32 kilograms of what he thought was cocaine. After arresting him officers searched his apartment, with assistance and written consent from his 18-year-old niece, and found 13 kilograms of real cocaine. Defendant's niece had access to the apartment to assist defendant with child care.No charges were based on the real cocaine. He pled guilty to attempting to possess cocaine and intending to distribute it and was sentenced to 120 months in prison. His plea agreement provided that he could challenge the search, based on an apparent belief that he might be acquitted of attempted possession if the real cocaine were kept out of the case. The judge denied the motion. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The police had a reasonable belief that the niece was authorized to consent to the search. View "United States v. Garcia" on Justia Law

The target witness learned in 2009 that the IRS had opened a file on him, and that an IRS special agent and DOJ tax division prosecutor were assigned to investigate whether he used secret offshore bank accounts to evade income taxes. Two years later, a grand jury issued a subpoena requiring that he produce all records required to be maintained pursuant to 31 C.F.R. 1010.420 relating to foreign financial accounts that he had a financial interest in, or signature authority over. The requested records are required under the Bank Secrecy Act of 1970. The Government argued that the Required Records Doctrine overrides the Fifth Amendment privilege. The district court quashed the subpoena, concluding that the required records doctrine did not apply because the act of producing the required records was testimonial and would compel the witness to incriminate himself. The Seventh Circuit reversed, finding the Doctrine applicable. View "In re: February 2011-1 Grand Jury Subpoena" on Justia Law

Feldman worked the day shift at Olin. Because of fibromyalgia and sleep apnea, his doctors had advised him to work regular day positions, without rotation and overtime. When Olin realigned its workforce, causing Feldman’s position to require rotating shifts, he tried to work under the new regime for a few weeks, but found it impossible. When he presented Olin with a medical restriction, Olin laid him off. It did not place him in a different position, claiming that no positions were available that did not require overtime or flextime. When a straight-day position opened Feldman successfully bid for it. Since then, Feldman has continued working at the plant. Feldman sued, alleging that failure to offer a reasonable accommodation in the form of a straight-day shift, without overtime, violated the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. 12111 and that, once he returned to work, Olin retaliated against him for having filed administrative complaints. The district court dismissed. The Seventh Circuit reversed. Feldman can prevail if genuinely disputed points are resolved in his favor: whether he is “disabled” under the ADA, and whether he is “qualified” to work certain positions. Feldman’s retaliation claims were properly dismissed for lack of evidence that adverse employment actions were caused by protected conduct. View "Feldman v. Olin Corp." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs were convicted of sex crimes and completed their sentences years ago, but remain in state custody as civil detainees under Illinois’ Sexually Violent Persons Commitment Act, 725 ILCS 207/1-99. They filed claims under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging constitutional problems with the conditions of their confinement. The district court entered summary judgment for the defendants. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Commitment under the Act is civil and may be for purposes such as incapacitation and treatment, but not punishment. Generally persons who have been involuntarily committed are entitled to more considerate treatment and conditions than criminals whose conditions of confinement are designed to punish. Limitations imposed on their ability to interact with other detainees are justified by security concerns, even if not imposed by treatment professionals. Not allowing detainees to communicate by letter using the facility’s internal mail system does not impinge on a constitutional right or constitute punishment. View "Lane v. Winters" on Justia Law

After the corporate office of Steak N Shake restaurants tried to require one of its franchisees to adopt a new policy for menu pricing and promotions, the franchisee sued Steak N Shake in a declaratory judgment action and later filed a motion for a preliminary injunction in order to stop the implementation of the new policy. The franchise, in operation since 1939, is the oldest in the country and previously had the ability to set its own prices. The district court found that in the absence of an injunction, the franchisee would have its franchises terminated and would suffer irreparable harm and granted a preliminary injunction. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. There was sufficient evidence to find, as a threshold matter, that the franchise would suffer irreparable harm if it was forced to implement Steak N Shake’s pricing policy. View "Stuller, Inc. v. Steak N Shake Enter., Inc." on Justia Law

More than 50 times, 2002-2005, May, a pipefitter at Chrysler’s plant, was the target of racist, xenophobic, homophobic, anti-Semitic graffiti. Messages included: “Otto Cuban good Jew is a dead Jew,” and “fuck Otto Cuban Jew nigger lover.” May found several death-threat notes in his toolbox and had his bike and car tires punctured. Sugar was poured in the gas tanks of his cars and a dead bird wrapped to look like a Ku Klux Klansman was placed in his work station. May contacted police and the FBI and complained to Chrysler. Human resources met with tradesmen and reminded them that harassment was unacceptable, a procedure was implemented to document the harassment, efforts were made to discover who was at the plant when the incidents likely occurred, and a handwriting analyst was retained. The harasser was never caught. May sued Chrysler in 2002 under Title VII and 42 U.S.C. 1981. Only his hostile work environment claim survived summary judgment; a jury awarded $709,000 in compensatory damages and $3.5 million in punitive damages. May accepted remittitur to $300,000 and the court vacated the award of punitive damages. The Seventh Circuit The district court affirmed on liability, but reversed for reinstatement of the verdict. View "May v. Chrysler Grp., LLC" on Justia Law