Justia U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Chapman was convicted of six counts of forging checks (18 U.S.C. 513(a)) that were made payable to the IRS and given to him by a client who had hired Chapman to resolve a tax dispute. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence and to the district court’s admission of a previous forgery conviction. View "United States v. Chapman" on Justia Law

Javell, the owner of a mortgage brokerage, and Arroyo, Javell’s employee and loan processor, were convicted of two counts of mortgage-based wire fraud (18 U.S.C. 1343) based on their actions in procuring a fraudulent mortgage during an FBI sting operation. Javell was sentenced to 12 months and one day in prison. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Javell argued the district court violated Bruton, and Javell’s Sixth Amendment rights by admitting the post-arrest statements made by Arroyo and by failing to properly instruct the jury about the rules of non-imputation. According to Javell, Arroyo’s post-arrest statements directly implicated Javell and had the jury not heard those statements, Javell would not have been convicted. Noting a “plethora” of other evidence, including recordings, the court rejected the argument. View "United States v. Javell" on Justia Law

During unrelated federal civil litigation against Illinois Department of Corrections officials, Eichwedel, an inmate proceeding pro se, filed motions for sanctions that the district court denied as “frivolous.” The state revoked six months of Eichwedel’s good-conduct credits. Illinois law establishes penalties for prisoners who file frivolous motions in litigation against the state, 730 ILCS 5/3-6-3(d). A state trial court denied relief; the appellate court declined review. Rejecting a federal habeas petition, the district court concluded that the Supreme Court never has recognized a First Amendment right to file frivolous motions and that the revocation of Eichwedel’s credit was supported by “some evidence in the record.” The Seventh Circuit held that the district court correctly disposed of the right-of-access claim, but certified to the Supreme Court of Illinois the question: As of the date Mr. Eichwedel’s state court challenge to the revocation of his good-conduct credits became final, was the State required to establish, in order to revoke a prisoner’s good-conduct credit, either that the court making the finding of frivolousness had determined specifically that the filing satisfied one of the definitions of frivolousness in 730 ILCS 5/3-6-3(d) or that the court had otherwise made its intent to invoke 730 ILCS 5/3-6-3(d) known? View "Eichwedel v. Chandler" on Justia Law

In 2005, a Union Pacific train derailed in Oklahoma causing extensive damage to both the railroad and the train’s cargo. Kawasaki, K-Line, and Union Pacific sought damages, alleging that Plano’s steel injection molds were improperly packed, broke through their crate, and fell onto the track. The district court granted Plano summary judgment. The Seventh Circuit affirmed in part. Negligence claims were properly rejected, Plano had no indication that the parties with which it dealt would be unable to properly package and transport its steel molds from China to the United States, nor did Plano have any special knowledge of any unique danger the molds would pose during transit. Plano owed no special duty of care to the carriers. There were, however, unresolved questions of fact material to the determination of one contract claim, based on a bill of lading. It was unclear whether Plano or another arranged the molds’ shipment. View "Kawasaki Kisen Kaisha, Ltd. v. Plano Molding Co." on Justia Law

Capeheart is a tenured Justice Studies professor at Northeastern Illinois University and an outspoken critic of the university on a number of issues, including its failure to hire more Latino professors and its willingness to host military and CIA recruiters at campus job fairs. She claims that university officials have defamed her, refused to make her department chair, and denied her an award (among other things) because of her speech. In her 42 U.S.C. l983 claim, she sued University President Hahs and Provost Frank, asking for an injunction against future retaliation, and damages under Illinois law. The district court granted the defendants summary judgment and declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over remaining state-law claims. The Seventh Circuit remanded with instructions to dismiss the federal claims as unripe. The prospect of retaliation by Hahs or Frank is no more than conjecture. The district court incorrectly reached the merits of Capeheart’s federal claim. View "Capeheart v. Terrell" on Justia Law

Winters pled guilty to conspiracy to possess with the intent to distribute large quantities of drugs. The plea agreement provided that the government would recommend a base offense level of 32. But at sentencing the government concurred in the Presentence Investigation Report’s conclusion that Winters was a career offender, which raised Winters’s offense level to 37. The district court set Winters’s offense level at 37, and sentenced him to 165 months’ imprisonment, well below the recommended Guidelines. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting an argument that the government violated the plea agreement. The Supreme Court’s decision in Sykes v. United States, 131 S.Ct. 2267 (2011), overrode that recommendation. The case, decided while Winters’s sentencing was pending, held that felony vehicle flight was a crime of violence for purposes of the career offender provisions. View "United States v. Winter" on Justia Law

Grigsby and coconspirators executed two bank heists, stealing more than one-half million dollars from the bank where Grigsby worked as a teller. Grigsby was indicted on two counts of entering a federally insured bank for the purpose of committing a felony, 18 U.S.C. 2113(a). She pleaded guilty without a plea agreement to the first count and stipulated that she committed the second crime. With that, the government moved to dismiss the second count. In her sworn statement to the court, Grigsby minimized her role, trying to pin most of the blame on her coconspirators. The district court applied a two-level sentencing enhancement for obstruction of justice, U.S.S.G. 3C1.1, and a three-level enhancement for her supervisory role, 3B1.1(b). The resulting guidelines range was 46 to 57 months; the court chose a sentence of 57 months. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the sentence. Both enhancements were based on a factual finding that Grigsby lied during her plea colloquy in an intentional effort to mislead the court; the finding was supported by the evidence and specific enough to withstand clear-error review. The court sufficiently considered the section 3553(a) sentencing factors and was not required to specifically address Grigsby’s routine arguments for a below-guidelines sentence. View "United States v. Grigsby" on Justia Law

Carter and Willis robbed a couple at gunpoint, taking the couple’s vehicle and their belongings. One of the stolen cell phones was enabled with a GPS tracking feature. Police were able to monitor find and arrest them the same night. In a joint trial with separate juries for each defendant, the two were convicted of carjacking, using a firearm during the carjacking, and being a felon in possession of a firearm. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting a challenge to sufficiency of the evidence. The court upheld the district court’s jury instruction, requiring the government to prove that each defendant “intended to cause serious bodily harm when the defendant took the motor vehicle” as consistent with the carjacking statute, which refers to “intent to cause death or serious bodily harm” 18 U.S.C. 2119. View "United States v. Carter" on Justia Law

In 2001, Hall was convicted in state court of murdering his stepson. Shortly after his verdict came down, Hall discovered that one of his jurors had a son that was a fellow inmate of his. Before his trial, the juror’s son informed the juror that Hall was likely innocent, but during the trial, the juror found out that his son and several co-inmates changed their mind about Hall, and thought him guilty. The juror relayed this information to several jurors. The state court rejected Hall’s motion to correct error, and Hall was denied relief on direct appeal. After unsuccessfully seeking collateral relief in Indiana, Hall filed a federal habeas petition, arguing that the state should have carried the burden of proving that the extraneous information that reached his jury was not prejudicial. The district court granted the petition. The Seventh Circuit vacated and remanded, holding that the state court violated a clearly established constitutional right, but did not adequately address the issue of prejudice. The district court erred in presuming prejudice.View "Hall v. Wilson" on Justia Law

Claiming anxiety, depression, suicidal tendencies, insomnia, vertigo, migraine headaches, fibromyalgia, carpal tunnel syndrome, and plantar fasciitis, Farrell, then 33 year old, applied for disability insurance benefits. Her initial application was denied, but the Social Security Administration Appeals Council remanded. The Administrative Law Judge again ruled against her, in part because of her failure to establish definitively that she suffered from fibromyalgia. The Appeals Council summarily affirmed this decision, despite new evidence before it that confirmed the fibromyalgia. The district court affirmed. The Seventh Circuit reversed. The Social Security Administration’s regulations require the Appeals Council to consider “new and material evidence.” The ALJ did not adequately deal with competing expert opinions. View "Farrell v. Astrue" on Justia Law