Justia U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Plaintiffs alleged that the school district practice of holding high school graduation ceremonies and related events at a Christian church rented for the occasion violated the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment and sought preliminary and permanent injunctions, a declaratory judgment and damages. The district court entered summary judgment in favor of the district. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. On rehearing en banc, the court reversed in part. The public school graduation ceremonies in the sanctuary of a Christian church, violated the Constitution. The court noted that it was not making a broad statement about the propriety of governmental use of church-owned facilities, nor was it criticizing cases permitting governmental use, in the proper context, of certain church-owned facilities. When confronted with an Establishment Clause challenge of this nature, the Supreme Court requires examination of the context in which government interacts with a religious organization. Here, the involvement of minors, the significance of the graduation ceremony, and the conditions of extensive proselytization prove too much for the district’s actions to withstand the strictures of the Establishment Clause. View "Doe v. Elmbrook Sch. Dist." on Justia Law

Joseph purchased the BP franchise in 2006 for $400,000. In 2009, Sasafrasnet purchased BP’s interests in the land and a Dealer Lease and Supply Agreement, becoming lessor and franchisor. The DLSA authorizes Sasafrasnet to terminate if Joseph fails to make payment according to EFT policy, causing a draft to be dishonored as NSF more than once in 12 months; Sasafrasnet is not obligated to extend credit, but did deliver fuel before collecting payment. There were several instances of NSF EFTs; Sasafrasnet began to require payment in advance. Later, Sasafrasnet allowed Joseph to resume paying by EFT within three days of delivery, but established a $2,500 penalty for any NSF and stated that pre-pay would resume if he incurred two more NSFs. There were additional NSFs, so that Joseph had incurred nine for amounts over $20,000 and three for amounts over $45,000. Sasafrasnet gave Joseph 90 days’ notice that it was terminating his franchise, listing the NSFs and failing scores on a mystery shopper inspection as bases for termination. Joseph sued under the Petroleum Marketing Practices Act, 15 U.S.C. 2801. The district court denied a preliminary injunction to prevent the termination. The Seventh Circuit reversed, holding that the statute requires additional findings.View "Joseph v. Sasafrasnet, LLC" on Justia Law

Plaintiff sought to develop a rapid, self-administered test to determine a person’s HIV status. The development process included collection of human blood and saliva samples. Plaintiff sued the United States under the Federal Tort Claims Act for the destruction of its blood and saliva specimens by the Food and Drug Administration. The specimens had been seized during a criminal investigation and the freezer in which they were stored broke down. The district court entered summary judgment that the suit arose from a law enforcement officer’s detention of property, excepting the claims from the FTCA waiver of sovereign immunity, 28 U.S.C. 2680(c). The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The government presented uncontroverted evidence that the officer detained the specimens as a law enforcement officer View "On-Site Screening, Inc. v. United States" on Justia Law

Kirkland was convicted of unlawful possession of a firearm by a felon, and based on a finding that he had five “violent felony” convictions, including two drunk driving offenses, the district court sentenced him under the Armed Career Criminal Act, 18 U.S.C. 924(e). After the Supreme Court determined in 2008 that drunk driving is not a “violent felony” as the term is defined in the ACCA, Kirkland filed a petition for relief under 28 U.S.C. 2255. Following remand by the Seventh Circuit, the district court concluded that an enhancement of Kirkland’s sentence under the ACCA was still appropriate based on his three remaining convictions for violent felonies. The Seventh Circuit reversed. The sparse record shed little light on whether two 1985 offenses that occurred on the same day occurred “on the same occasion.” If the “Shepard-approved” documents before a district court are equivocal as to whether the offenses occurred on the same occasion, the ACCA does not apply View "Kirkland v. United States" on Justia Law

Wheeler filed a complaint alleging that prison officials and the prison’s medical provider, Wexford, have refused to provide effective care for his golf-ball-size hemorrhoids, leaving him in excruciating pain, 42 U.S.C.1983. More than 10 months later, the district judge had not screened the complaint under 28 U.S.C.1915A(a) and has denied three motions filed by Wheeler. Defendants have not been served; the litigation is stalled. The Seventh Circuit ordered the district court to proceed. Ten months exceeds any understanding of “as soon as practicable”. Delay is especially hard to understand when the complaint plausibly alleges a serious ongoing injury. Prisoners are not invariably wrong. A district judge should be able to spot a complaint violating Rules 18 and 20 within days of its filing, and solve the problem by severance (creating multiple suits that can be separately screened) or dismissing excess defendants under Fed. R. Civ. P. 21. . View "Wheeler v. Wexford Health Sources, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs Willis and Owens, 14 and 16 years old, respectively, were arrested outside of Willis’s home for allegedly dealing drugs. They claim that after being transported to the police station, they were subjected to a strip search before being confined for several hours. Willis and Owens were released to their families after being charged with conspiracy to deliver a controlled substance and were ordered to appear at juvenile court a few weeks later. The charges were eventually dropped. Willis and Owens filed suit against the two arresting officers, alleging false arrest and an illegal search under 42 U.S.C. 1983, and malicious prosecution under Illinois state law. The jury returned a verdict for defendants on all claims. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting challenges to evidentiary rulings concerning plaintiffs’ knowledge of suspicious activity and of drug sales and drug-selling techniques on the block. View "Willis v. Lepine" on Justia Law

The Union established two funds for its members—a Pension Fund and a Health & Welfare Fund. DLF entered into a Memorandum of Agreement with the Union, under which DLF agreed to be bound to all Collective Bargaining Agreements between the Union and various employer associations in the geographical jurisdiction of the Union. Under the CBA, DLF is required to make fringe benefit contributions to the Funds on behalf of members of the Union. An audit of DLF’s payroll records showed that DLF had failed to make contributions on behalf of Mata, a cement mason who also performed other work (such as painting), for 1,119.5 hours in 2007 and for 234.5 hours in 2008, a total $11,955.05 in fringe benefit contributions. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the Funds, The Seventh Circuit affirmed rejecting DLF’s argument that, under the MOA, it is not contractually bound to make contributions for non-bargaining unit work. The MOA binds DLF to the CBAs and establishes the type of employee covered under the CBA. It was not intended to, and does not, define bargaining unit work for purposes of fringe benefit contributions. View "McCleskey v. DLF Constr., Inc." on Justia Law

Shideler suffers osteogenesis imperfecta, “brittle bone disease.” In 2006, at age 48, he applied for Social Security Disability Insurance benefits, 42 U.S.C. 423(d), alleging an onset date of 1995. His date last insured was 2000. The ALJ found that despite Shideler’s limitations, there were a sufficient number of jobs in the regional economy available to a person with his restrictions, and denied his application. The Appeals Council denied review. The district court and Seventh Circuit affirmed. The record supported the vocational expert’s testimony concerning available jobs as a clerk, assuming certain restrictions: never climb ladders, ropes, or scaffolds and only occasionally climb ramps or stairs; never crouch, kneel or crawl; never perform overhead reaching; avoid exposure to extreme heat and cold; and perform work that includes occasional, but not frequent, use of fingers. Despite his testimony that he had broken at least 55 bones over the course of his life, the record showed that Shideler had only four surgeries and made a full recovery. The record contained no evidence that Shideler visited any doctors between May 2000 and December 2006. View "Shideler v. Astrue" on Justia Law

The sheriff’s department ran a supervision program for non-violent pretrial defendants to reduce jail overcrowding and provide supervised employment, job training, and substance abuse treatment. Passananti was deputy director from 2002 until 2007, when county-wide budget cuts eliminated the position. Passananti sued, claiming sexual harassment by her supervisor and that she was fired based on her sex. A jury awarded her $4 million in compensatory damages against Cook County, and $70,000 in compensatory damages and $30,000 in punitive damages against the supervisor. The district court granted defendants judgment as a matter of law. The Seventh Circuit remanded for entry of a judgment of $70,000, assuming: that the supervisor repeatedly called Passananti a “bitch” in front of co-workers; that he fabricated an accusation that she had had sexual relations with a supervisee; that, as a result, Passananti was temporarily transferred and ultimately sustained a five-day unpaid suspension. The court reversed on the sexual harassment claim and reinstated the verdict as to liability, but affirmed on the discriminatory termination claim, which lacked evidentiary support. The county is the proper defendant on that claim under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act. Punitive damages are not available against the county itself. View "Passananti v. Cook County" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, hired in 2003 by Northwestern University, was denied tenure in 2007 and fired in 2008. The district court dismissed her sex discrimination suit under Title VII, 42 U.S.C. 2000e, finding that only the denial of tenure occurred within the 300-day window for filing a charge of discrimination, and finding that no reasonable jury could infer that plaintiff was denied tenure because she is a woman. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, noting plaintiff’s history with respect to publication and obtaining grants. View "Blasdel v. Northwestern Univ." on Justia Law