Justia U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Defendant employed plaintiff as a security supervisor. After she complained that her supervisor, Spann, made sexually offensive remarks and favored males, Spann gave her negative evaluations and accused her of misconduct, including theft. Defendant transferred her to a non-supervisory position at a distant location. Spann told her to turn in keys and empty her locker. Believing that she had been fired, she did not return. In her 42 U.S.C. 2000e-3(a) suit, the judge instructed the jury that to find for plaintiff it had to find that a decision-maker fired plaintiff because she was female or because she complained about sexually harassing comments. In response to a request for clarification, the judge indicated that the decision-maker reference meant that "he was the sole decision-maker." The jury responded "no" to the question corresponding to the decision-maker instruction. The Seventh Circuit reversed, calling the "cat's paw" theory of liability "a dreadful muddle" and "judicial attractive nuisance," referring to an employee being subjected to adverse employment action by a supervisor who has no discriminatory motive, but who has been manipulated by a subordinate with such motive. Injecting “sole decision-maker” into deliberations created confusion, Spann was not a cat’s paw; "he was the monkey."

The employer operates a municipal landfill and had five permanent employees, including Jarvis, the "Landfill Supervisor." Jarvis and others discussed unionizing, but the company asserted that Jarvis was ineligible for inclusion. The Regional Director of the NLRB found that Jarvis was not a supervisor. Eight days before the election, Jarvis was terminated for what was later called "an egregious violation" in failing to cover the garbage. At the time, Jarvis was told that there was a reduction in force. Regardless, Jarvis cast a vote, and the result was 3-2 in favor of unionizing. The company refused to bargain; an ALJ found that Jarvis was improperly discharged. The NLRB affirmed. The Seventh Circuit denied the company's appeal and granted enforcement of the NLRB orders. Jarvis lacked authority "responsibly to direct" other employees (NLRA, 29 U.S.C. 152(11)) and was discharged based on protected union activity.

Officers obtained a warrant to search defendant's home, executed it five days later, arrested and charged defendant with possessing 100 or more marijuana plants with intent to distribute, being a felon in possession of a firearm, and maintaining a place for manufacture and distribution of marijuana. The district court rejected motions to suppress that challenged statements in the affidavit: about finding a marijuana stem during a "trash pull," about the existence of PVC piping at the house, that the affiant received information from the power company about power usage, and about defendant's criminal history. The Seventh Circuit affirmed defendant's conviction, without reaching arguments about electricity usage and criminal history. Remaining elements of the affidavit supported a finding of probable cause.

In 2009, lender issued plaintiff a four-month trial loan modification, under which it agreed to permanently modify the loan if she qualified under Home Affordable Mortgage Program guidelines, implemented by the Department of the Treasury to help homeowners avoid foreclosure during the decline in the housing market. Plaintiff filed a putative class action, claiming that she did qualify and that lender refused to grant her a permanent modification. She alleged violations of Illinois law under common-law contract and tort theories and under the Illinois Consumer Fraud and Deceptive Business Practices Act. The district court dismissed, finding that HAMP does not confer a private federal right of enforcement action on borrowers. The Seventh Circuit affirmed in part and reversed in part. Plaintiff stated viable claims under Illinois law for breach of contract or promissory estoppel, fraud, and unfair or deceptive business practices. Claims of negligent misrepresentation or concealment were not viable. HAMP and its enabling statute (12 U.S.C. 5219(a)) do not contain a federal right of action, but neither do they preempt otherwise viable state claims.

In 2003, the airline established guidelines that address accommodating employees who, because of disability, can no longer do essential functions of their current jobs, even with reasonable accommodation. The guidelines specify that the transfer process is competitive, so that an employee in need of accommodation will not be automatically placed into a vacant position, but will be given preference over similarly qualified applicants. The EEOC challenged the policy under the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. 12101. The district court ruled in favor of the airline. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting an argument that the Supreme Court's 2002 ruling, U.S. Airways, Inc. v. Barnett, invalidated a prior holding that the ADA does not mandate reassignment.

Environmental groups obtained an injunction against timber harvest projects planned for the Chequamegon-Nicolet National Forest. The district court lifted the injunction after finding that the defendants took appropriate corrective action to comply with the National Environmental Policy Act, 42 U.S.C. 4321. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting an argument that a project proposed after presentation of draft environmental impact statements should have been included in the cumulative impacts analysis of the final EIS. The Forest Service's failure to supplement was not arbitrary; the agency complied with applicable rules by making clear that it lacked sufficient information to meaningfully discuss the subsequently-proposed project.

Defendant pled guilty to knowingly possessing a firearm while being an unlawful user of controlled substances, 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(3) and was sentenced to 46 months' imprisonment. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, upholding application of a 4-level increase under U.S.S.G. 2K 2.1(b)(6) for using or possessing the firearm in connection with another felony offense--discharge of the firearm in a residential neighborhood with others present, a felony under Illinois law. The court rejected defendant's claim that the shooting was self-defense.

Defendant was convicted of a drug offense and is in prison in Texas. The district court sentenced him to 262 months in prison as a career offender under USSG 4B1.1, assuming that a prior walkaway escape from a halfway house was a qualifying felony. Absent career offender status, the guidelines range would have been 120 to 150 months. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. His attorney failed to file a petition for certiorari. The Supreme Court later held, in another case, that walkaway escape is not a crime of violence. After a complicated series of motions under 28 U.S.C. 2255 and 28 U.S.C. 2241, involving a Texas district court and the Seventh Circuit, the Seventh Circuit denied pending motions. The court noted that defendant would not be sentenced as a career offender today and likely would receive a much lower sentence; taxpayers are footing the bill. There is no judicial procedure to remedy the situation; only the executive branch can grant relief. The court called the claims being "batted around" between circuits with differing views of how the merits may be heard "an untenable and unseemly waste of judicial resources."

The Illinois company sells title insurance through its attorney title agent program, in which it pays the consumer's real estate attorney to conduct title examination and determine whether title is insurable. Plaintiffs contend that the payment is designed to compensate for referrals, not actual services, and that the program violates Section 8 of the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act, 12 U.S.C. 2601(a), which prohibits kickbacks and fee splitting. The district court twice denied class certification under FRCP 23(b)(3), concluding that an individual determination of liability would be required for each class member. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, noting that class actions are rare in RESPA Section 8 cases and that plaintiffs cannot establish the sole recognized exception, namely that the company split fees with attorneys who performed no services on a class-wide basis.

Redbox rents DVDs, Blu-ray discs, and video games from automated retail kiosks and was sued under the Video Privacy Protection Act, 18 U.S.C. 2710. The district court held that Act provisions requiring destruction of records containing personally identifiable information can be enforced by suit for damages. After deciding to accept the interlocutory appeal because it will materially advance the ultimate termination of the class action, the Seventh Circuit reversed. The court noted the placement of the damages remedy in the statute, after description of a prohibitions on knowing disclosure of personally identifiable information, but before prohibition on use of such information before tribunals or the record-destruction mandate. The court also noted the "unsuitability" of those provisions to damage awards.