Justia U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

In 2008, acting on a tip, police obtained a warrant and raided a house where defendant and others were staying. After apprehending defendant on his way out, police searched and found a pistol and a crack cocaine close to defendant's personal effects in a room where he was alleged to be staying. He was convicted of possessing more than five grams of crack cocaine with intent to distribute (21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1)), possession of a firearm in furtherance of a drug crime (18 U.S.C. 924(c)(1)(A)), and possession of a firearm by a convicted felon (18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1)) and was sentenced to 20 years in prison. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the firearm conviction and vacated the drug convictions. The court upheld admission of evidence that defendant had the pistol in his possession two months earlier. The officers could rely in good faith on issuance of the search warrant. The court improperly admitted evidence of a 2000 conviction for felony possession of cocaine with intent to distribute in violation of the character evidence prohibition of Rule 404(b).

Plaintiff was terminated from her position as a lead technologist in a medical radiology department. She admits that there were issues with her job performance, but claimed discrimination on account of her race (white) because the employer terminated her employment rather than demoting her as it had some employees of other races. The district court entered summary judgment for the employer in her suit under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. 2000e, and 42 U.S.C. 1981. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, noting that the plaintiff did not provide direct or indirect evidence of a discriminatory reason for the decision to terminate her position.

Insurers sought a declaration that they had no duty to defend or indemnify in tort suits brought against the insured village, concerning discovery of "perc," a carcinogenic common dry cleaning solvent, in one of its wells and the village's continued use of the well without disclosure. The district court, relying on a pollution exclusion in the policies, granted summary judgment for the insurers. The exclusion refers to "actual, alleged or threatened discharge, dispersal, seepage, migration, release or escape of 'pollutants'" and excludes from coverage expenses for "cleaning up ... or in any way responding to, or assessing the effects of pollutants." After exploring the reasons for the exclusion, the Seventh Circuit affirmed. The court rejected an argument that this was not a pollution case, because the amount of perc in the water was below the maximum level permitted by environmental regulations. The complaints actually filed "describe in copious detail the conduct giving rise to the tort suits, and in doing so inadvertently but unmistakably acknowledge the applicability of the pollution exclusion."

Defendant and fellow gang members were tried for racketeering conspiracy. The others were convicted, but the court declared a mistrial as to defendant. When his retrial case was given to the jury, the government submitted a redacted indictment, removing allegations against former co-defendants. The Seventh Circuit affirmed his conviction, rejecting an argument that the redacted indictment violated the Grand Jury Clause of the Fifth Amendment. The redacted indictment did not broaden the possible bases for conviction nor did it remove any allegations needed for conviction.

Petitioner, serving a life sentence in Illinois, suffers a chronic medical condition and other ailments that require him to take several prescription drugs daily. After he became ill because someone accidentally gave him another inmate's medication, petitioner decided to educate himself. He ordered six books from a prison-approved bookstore, including: Carpe Diem: Put A Little Latin in Your Life; Diversity and Direction in Psychoanalytic Technique; and Neurodevelopmental Mechanisms in Psychopathology. After screening, a prison review officer decided that he could not have Physicians' Desk Reference and the Complete Guide to Prescription & Nonprescription Drugs 2009. The prison rejected a grievance and sent the books to petitioner's family. Petitioner's pro se 42 U.S.C. 1983 complaint was dismissed. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, noting the rational connection to legitimate prison interests and petitioner's lack of a property interest.

The company operates stores. The union was concerned about use of nonunion contractors who did not pay prevailing wages for construction and remodeling of stores. Unsatisfied with the company's response, the union urged a consumer boycott. Union representatives distributed handbills that were "extremely unflattering" outside the stores. Some pictured a rat to represent the company. The company ejected the representatives from the property. The NLRB issued a complaint alleging violation of the NLRA, 29 U.S.C. 158(a)(1), for discriminatory practice in prohibiting the union from handbilling while permitting nonunion solicitations and distributions. An ALJ found that as a nonexclusive easement holder at 23 of the stores, the company did not have a state property right to exclude handbillers, and had violated the Act. The Board affirmed. The Seventh Circuit affirmed and granted the Board's petition for enforcement.

Defendant pleaded guilty to possessing a firearm despite his status as a felon, 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1), and was sentenced, as a "career offender," to 100 months' imprisonment. The Seventh Circuit affirmed use of his Indiana conviction for conspiracy to commit robbery as a predicate "crime of violence" under the Guidelines. The court noted that the Guidelines contain different language than the Armed Career Criminal Act, under which a "violent felony" is an offense in which violence is an element. An application note concerning inchoate offenses is unique to the Guidelines.

Defendants plotted with others to rob a cocaine stash house at gunpoint, but the stash house did not actually exist, and their partners were an undercover agent and a paid informant. The informant, Ringswald, generated most of the evidence against them and played a significant role at their trials, but, although available, was not called by prosecutors to testify. The government introduced his story through recordings and narrative from investigators. Prosecutors asserted that none of his out-of-court statements was offered for its truth. Defendants were convicted of drug and gun charges. Each was sentenced to 25 years' imprisonment. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. While the handling of Ringswald's statements, some of them "obvious hearsay," raise concerns about the Confrontation Clause, any error was harmless in light of "overwhelming evidence."

Defendant, convicted of conspiracy to possess and distribute cocaine, 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1) and 846, was sentenced to 85 months in prison. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting a challenge to the conspiracy conviction. The court noted advantages to charging conspiracy. Although the relevant quantity for sentencing is limited to the defendant's jointly undertaken activity, U.S.S.G. 1B1.3(a)(1)(B), the conspiracy charge covers a greater quantity than the amount sold by a single defendant Evidence of prior crimes is less likely to be barred by Rule 404(b)(1) in a conspiracy case; prior crimes are likely germane. Out-of-court statements by a conspirator are freely admissible and the evidentiary burden often is lighter than for proving multiple charges of distribution. Charging conspiracy can avoid a statute of limitations defense. There must be more than a sale of drugs to support an inference of conspiracy, however, but the evidence showed that defendant had a continuing relationship with his wholesaler, involving sales on credit, which gives rise to an inference of conspiracy. The relationship involved mutual support and protection grounded in family, not a common feature of wholesaling.

The brokerage entered into agreements with customers that set a fee for handling, postage, and insurance for mailing confirmation slips after each securities trade. Plaintiff filed claims of breach of contract and unjust enrichment, seeking class certification and recovery of fees charged since 1998. The brokerage removed to federal court under the Class Action Fairness Act, 28 U.S.C. 1332(d), or the Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act 15 U.S.C. 78p(b) and (c) and 78bb(f), and obtained dismissal. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, first holding that SLUSA did not apply because any alleged misrepresentation was not material to decisions to buy or sell securities, but CAFA's general jurisdictional requirements were met. The agreement did not suggest that the fee represents actual costs, and it was not reasonable to read this into the agreement. Nor did the brokerage have an implied duty under New York law to charge a fee reasonably proportionate to actual costs where it notified customers in advance and they were free to decide whether to continue their accounts.