Justia U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

In 2006, plaintiff, then in ninth grade, was reported as having a knife. The school board held a hearing and entered an expulsion order. Plaintiff was conditionally reinstated for the next school year. In 2007 an administrator learned that the statement, "Only one bullet left, no one to kill but myself," appeared on plaintiff's backpack. Three more incidents involving threats or physical violence followed. Following meetings, he was permanently expelled and enrolled in private school. The state superintendent reversed the expulsion, but plaintiff remained in private school. Seen using the public school gym facilities, plaintiff was asked to leave; he became agitated and confrontational. The school barred him from the premises and he was subsequently cited for trespass. The district court entered summary judgment for the district with respect to his many claims under 42 U.S.C. 1983. He appealed with respect to the ban on entering school grounds. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. As a member of the public, plaintiff does not have a protected liberty interest in accessing school grounds; defendants had no obligation to provide him with process in connection with the ban.

Petitioner, serving a 60-year sentence for attempted murder, burglary-battery, and bail jumping, received full collateral review by federal courts, and his first application under 28 U.S.C. 2244(b) for permission for a second collateral attack was denied. Intending to file a second 2244(b) application, he asked to be excused for untimely filing and for an order requiring the prison to allow him expanded use of the copier. The court rejected those claims, but exercised its discretion to excuse petitioner from compliance with Rule 22.2(a)(4) and (5), requiring submission of copies of documents from prior cases, and Appellate Rule 21(d), requiring submission of multiple copies of pleadings. Analysis of timeliness must wait for the papers to which the question applies. Petitioner adequately alleged that prison action frustrated his attempt to file an application, but did not identify underlying legal claims frustrated by the delay.

Petitioner, a Mexican citizen who has lived in the U.S. for many years and is a lawful permanent resident, was ordered removed because of two Illinois convictions for possessing and trafficking in cocaine. He sought cancellation of removal, based on having lawful permanent resident status for at least five years and having resided here for at least seven years without conviction of an aggravated felony, 8 U.S.C. 1229b(a). The BIA affirmed denial, citing petitioner's long history of arrests and convictions. The Seventh Circuit denied an appeal, rejecting a claim that the BIA overlooked mitigating circumstances in the form of family hardship. Petitioner's parents, wife, and children are U.S. citizens and do not plan to relocate to Mexico if the petitioner is sent back there. His parents claim that they would be afraid to visit because of violence in Mexico.

The LLC was organized in 1999 to own and operate 100 fast-food restaurants. Khan owned 40% of the common units. Remaining common units, and all preferred units, were owned by Sentinel. Plaintiffs, restaurant managers, claim that they accepted lower salaries because Khan told them that he would acquire full ownership and would reward top managers with equity. In 2005, Khan became the sole equity owner, but did not distribute common units to any managers. Plaintiffs calculated that the price paid for Sentinel's interest implied that the business was worth about $48 million; in 2005, 20 managers qualified for units, so each lost about $1.2 million. The district court held that plaintiffs had not adequately estimated damages. The Seventh Circuit reversed, stating that value is what people will pay. The judiciary should not reject actual transactions prices when they are available.

While the FBI executed a search warrant at his father’s business, officers looked for defendant at his father’s house. They climbed to the deck and, through a window, saw defendant asleep, with a pill bottle nearby. They telephoned the father and stated, incorrectly, that the bottle was next to defendant. The father gave permission to enter. Officers woke defendant and began questioning. He stated he had child pornography on a laptop in his car and agreed to provide evidence from his apartment, though agents told him that he did not have to do so. Driving to the apartment with officers, he used his cell phone. His father told him not to talk. After entering the apartment, agents read defendant his Miranda rights. He admitted operating a server for child pornography, having pornography on his computer, and transferring child pornography to an external drive. He signed consent forms, after being advised that he could refuse the search. The district court suppressed evidence and statements obtained in the father's home and car ride, but did not suppress evidence obtained at the apartment. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Apartment evidence was sufficiently attenuated from the original illegal entry that it was purged of unconstitutional taint.

Plaintiff was hired as a teller in 1980 and promoted to branch manager in 1995. She received an overall rating of "improvement needed" on 2004 and 2005 performance evaluations, based on complaints from customers and employees about negative attitude and unprofessional behavior. Complaints continued until she was terminated in 2006 at age 44. The district court entered summary judgment for the bank on her retaliation claims under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. 621. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, holding that plaintiff did not show retaliation for her objection to age discrimination. Complaints about pension plan contributions and about staff cutbacks did not qualify. She filed a claim with the EEOC after she was fired.

A fight broke out during a New Year's party at a pub. Several patrons were wounded and a security guard was killed. Plaintiff, an off-duty police officer whose wife was a manager at the pub, was present and was later arrested. After the charges were dropped, he sued for false arrest (42 U.S.C. 1983). The district court denied defendant's motion for a finding of qualified immunity. The Seventh Circuit reversed. While there was not "arguable probable cause" for the murder charge, the charge of assisting a criminal was supported by the plaintiff's "hazy" and changing account of events and a videotape of events.

Plaintiff worked as a manager for defendant, a food broker, from 2001 until she quit in 2007. She sued under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the Equal Pay Act, 29 U.S.C. 206(d), claiming that the company maintained a hostile work environment, in which conditions for women were inferior to those for men, and paid women less than men for the same work. The district court granted summary judgment to the company. The Seventh Circuit remanded with respect to claims about salary, holding that the evidence was sufficient for a reasonable jury to find discrimination rather than random assignment of salaries. The court affirmed with respect to hostile environment, noting that the offender responsible for most of the obnoxious conduct had been disciplined and had quit two years before plaintiff left.

For about seven years, defendant aided undocumented immigrants in filing claims for Illinois unemployment benefits, charging a fee of $80 plus one benefit check, and using social security numbers of unsuspecting, law-abiding citizens. She arranged with a state employee to process the applications as though the undocumented aliens were citizens. She was convicted of eight counts of mail fraud and sentenced to 96 months' imprisonment. The Seventh Circuit affirmed application of sentencing guideline enhancements: for being an organizer or leader of a criminal activity that involved five or more participants or was otherwise extensive, for unauthorized use of any means of identification unlawfully to produce or obtain any other means of identification, and for an offense with 50 or more victims.

Defendant was convicted as felon in possession of a firearm, 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1), a user in possession of a firearm, 922(g)(3), and possession of marijuana and cocaine base, 21 U.S.C. 844(a). The Seventh Circuited affirmed, upholding the court's decision to permit an FBI agent and an Illinois state trooper to testify as both expert and fact witnesses. The trooper's challenged testimony did not rise to the level of expert opinion. The court took precautions with respect to the FBI agent: the government laid a proper foundation; defendant had full opportunity to cross-examine; most of the government's questions eliciting expert testimony signaled to the jury that the agent was relying on his expertise; and the court gave the standard jury instruction for opinion testimony requiring special knowledge or skill, informing the jurors that they could disregard the testimony and give it whatever weight they thought it deserved.