Justia U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

The village, on the Mississippi River, experienced a 500-year rain in 2007. Debris carried by the water clogged the trestle beneath the railroad bridge, causing runoff to back up and inundate the village. Residents sued the railroad, alleging faulty design and maintenance of the trestle. The district court dismissed for failure to state a claim, holding that Wis. Stat. 88.87 provided the exclusive remedy and that relief was foreclosed under that statute because plaintiffs had not filed a timely notice of claim. The statute imposes a duty on railroad companies that construct and maintain railroad grades in or across drainage courses not to impede the flow of surface water in an unreasonable manner and grants injured landowners the right to sue for equitable relief and inverse condemnation but not damages. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Plaintiff forfeited claims that section 88.87 did not apply, so the court declined to address preemption by the Federal Railway Safety Act.

Plaintiff, hired by IDOT in 1989, was suspended in 2003, pursuant to a "last chance" agreement, for fighting in the workplace. There had been prior disciplinary measures. In 2005, plaintiff was involved in a worksite altercation with a co-worker and a supervisor. IDOT initiated discharge proceedings. Plaintiff disputed that he had physical contract with his supervisor, but did not alleged that the attempt to discharge him was retaliation for his filing a race discrimination charge in 2001. An ALJ conducted a hearing at which plaintiff was represented by counsel and concluded that plaintiff had engaged in an altercation but that discharge was not warranted. A state trial court overturned the decision and sustained the discharge. Three years later, after obtaining a right to sue letter from the EEOC, plaintiff filed a complaint under 42 U.S.C. 2000e-3(a). The district court dismissed, citing res judicata. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting his argument that the retaliation claim does not arise from the same set of operative facts as the claim made in the state court. The claim could have been raised in that forum.

Rice, charged with attempted bank robbery, was known to have schizophrenia, and shortly before his death, was found incompetent to stand trial. Although seen by mental health professionals while detained, Rice often refused to take medications, eat, or bathe. He was hospitalized at psychiatric and other medical facilities several times and was awaiting placement at a state psychiatric facility. Rice died, about 15 months after arriving at the jail, of psychogenic polydipsia (excessive water drinking), a disorder known to manifest with schizophrenia. His estate filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging deliberate indifference. The district court entered summary judgment against the estate, which filed a second suit, reasserting state wrongful death claims previously dismissed. The judge dismissed, citing collateral estoppel, reasoning that a previous finding as to foreseeability of the cause of death precluded recovery on state claims. The Seventh Circuit reversed in part, holding that a material dispute of fact precluded summary judgment on one of the 1983 claims: that conditions of confinement were inhumane. The district court erred in dismissing state claims; the prior finding concerning foreseeability was not preclusive with respect to those claims.

Employers must maintain a log of work-related deaths, injuries, and illnesses, 29 C.F.R. 1904.4(a); an incident is "work-related" if "the work environment either caused or contributed to the resulting condition." Employees in the company's packing department fill containers, a process requiring repetitive hand movements, and pronation. When an employee developed lateral epicondylitis, painful swelling of ligaments and tendons around a joint, in her right arm, the company did not log the injury. The Department of Labor assessed a $900 penalty for failing to log a work-related injury. An ALJ sustained the penalty. The Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission declined review. The Seventh Circuit vacated, holding that substantial evidence was not enough to sustain the administrative decision. The ALJ was required to take account of competing evidence and inferences; the ALJ ignored strong indications that its favored witness was wrong. The court noted that inclusion of the work-relatedness requirement, requiring employers to judge the source of injury, "is a puzzle."

Sanchez rose through the ranks of Chicago politics and became Commissioner of Streets and Sanitation. He was a leader of the Hispanic Democratic Organization, and, acting as a city official and a political operative, participated in a scheme to award city jobs to campaign workers in violation of orders and consent decrees, known as the Shakman decrees, enjoining the city from patronage hiring for most positions. Del Valle managed campaigns staffed by Sanchez's branch of the HDO and had significant influence in choosing individuals for positions. On retrial, Sanchez was convicted of mail fraud, 18 U.S.C. 1341 and Del Valle of perjury, 18 U.S.C. 1623. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting arguments concerning the court's handling of testimony about driving while intoxicated and arguing with a police officer; denial of severance; and the government's failure to prove economic loss. City jobs are money or property for purposes of mail fraud and the indictment sufficiently alleged deprivation of money or property.

Hanners, then a Master Sergeant with the Illinois State Police, used his work computer to send an email to 16 fellow employees, including pictures and descriptions of "fictitious Barbie Dolls," depicting stereotypical area residents. After investigation, an EEO officer concluded that, although the email related to race, sexual orientation, parental status, pregnancy, family responsibilities, and the characteristics of gender, no person receiving it reported being offended. The EEO officer recommended discipline for Hanners and three employees who had forwarded the email. The disciplinary review board recommended, and the director imposed a 30-day suspension. Hanners's promotion rating was reduced. The district court granted summary judgment for defendants in his suit under 42 U.S.C. 1981, 1983. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Hanner did not establish that individuals outside the protected class (Caucasians) received systematically better disciplinary treatment or identify any instance where defendants engaged in behavior or made comments suggesting discriminatory attitude against Caucasians generally or against him because he is Caucasian.

Following a vote by employees of the truck transportation company, the NLRB certified a local union as representative for the employees. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, upholding the Board's decision that a ballot with irregular markings should be counted as indicating the clear intent of the voter. The ballot, which had an apparent erasure of a vote for a competing union, was the deciding vote.

Defendant, convicted of unlawful possession of a firearm, 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1), was sentenced to 113 months. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, upholding the court's refusal to exclude evidence regarding gang affiliation. The evidence was admissible to show the defense witness's bias in favor of his fellow gang member. The court attempted to reduce prejudicial impact by directing that the proper name of the gang not be used, denying admissibility of gang tattoos, and reserving the ultimate question of admissibility until after hearing direct examination of the witness. The court directed that the government could ask questions on the subject only if the defense witness first raised it. The jury was instructed that membership in a street gang could not be considered in finding that defendant was more or less likely to have committed the charged offense.

In 1989 Dominguez was arrested and in 1990 he was convicted of home invasion and sexual assault. In 2002 he was exonerated by DNA; in 2005 he received a pardon. Under Illinois law, his claim for malicious prosecution accrued in 2002. Under federal law, constitutional claims (42 U.S.C. 1983) accrued in 1989 and 2002. Wrongful arrest claims accrue on the date of arrest, but wrongful conviction claims accrue when conviction is invalidated. The Seventh Circuit affirmed an award of about $9 million for malicious prosecution and concealment of exculpatory evidence. The city has been insured by different companies and each asserted that the policy for another year applied. None provided a defense. The district court held that the issuer of the "occurrence" policy in force at exoneration must defend and indemnify. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The city's misconduct occurred in 1989 and 1990, but the policy does not define the "occurrence" as misconduct by a law-enforcement officer. It defines the occurrence as the tort under state or federal law, and, in both, the tort occurs witn its last element, exoneration. Until then, Dominguez could not establish "malicious prosecution" or "violation" of section 1983.

In 2009, fire severely damaged the insureds' home. They submitted a claim to under their homeowners’ policy the next day. The insurer began requesting documents, authorizations, and interviews and learned that the insureds had at least two businesses, held numerous personal and business accounts, and were involved in several lawsuits. A fire investigator concluded that the fire was intentionally set. The insurer requested additional documents: detailed phone records, bank histories, tax returns, and mortgage information and reminded the insureds that proof of loss was due by May 2. The insurer granted extensions; on the day of the final deadline the insureds delivered almost 1,000 pages of documents. Several months later, the insurer had not received most of the requested documents or an explanation why they could not be produced. After initially acknowledging their failure to produce the documents, the insureds attempted to impose a deadline for settlement of the $2.6 million claim. The district court entered summary judgment for the insurer in the insureds' breach of contract suit. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The insureds failed to perform the specific "duties after loss" listed in the policy.