Justia U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Plaintiffs were involved in a physical altercation with employees of a nightclub. Plaintiffs sustained visible injuries. Club employees took them outside, handcuffed them and called the police. The officers were apparently unwilling to listen to plaintiffs' side of the story; they were taken to a squad car and placed in the rear seat, though they were never told they were under arrest. Both were charged with assault and battery. Although there were surveillance cameras, tapes were never requested and were destroyed before plaintiffs filed their suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983 against the city, officers, the club, and its owner. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of all defendants, holding that the club and owner were not functioning as state actors; that plaintiffs failed to show a conspiracy between the city and the club; that there was probable cause to arrest plaintiffs; and that probable cause defeats a claim of malicious prosecution. The Seventh Circuit affirmed.

Plaintiff sued Allstate on behalf of a putative class, alleging a nationwide pattern or practice of sex discrimination in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. 2000e, and the Equal Pay Act, 29 U.S.C. 206(d). She alleged gender-based earning disparities based on salary, promotion, and training policies that left significant discretion in the hands of individual managers. The district court denied class certification. In response to enactment of the Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act of 2009, Pub L. No. 111-2, plaintiff again moved for class certification, focusing on Allstate's uniform compensation policies. The court again denied certification, citing lack of common issues. On appeal, plaintiffs argued disparate impact, claiming that a policy of awarding merit increases based on a percentage of base pay and of comparing salaries to its competitors caused gender-based disparities in earnings. The Seventh Circuit affirmed denial of class certification, stating that plaintiffs did not meaningfully develop the disparate impact claim before the district court, where plaintiffs argued only a pattern-or-practice claim, a type of intentional discrimination.

In 2008, defendant was in the U.S. illegally and, at the direction of another, purchased a house for the purpose of obtaining multiple home equity lines of credit. He submitted loan applications that contained false statements about citizenship, employment, and intent to reside in the house, and concealed other loan applications He pled guilty to engaging in a scheme to defraud financial institutions and to obtain monies and funds owned by and under the custody and control of the financial institutions by means of materially false and fraudulent pretenses, representations, promises, and omission, 18 U.S.C. 1344. He was sentenced to 51 months and ordered to pay $337,250 in restitution. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the restitution order, rejecting an argument that he could not be ordered to pay restitution for conduct to which he did not plead guilty. The transactions to which he pled guilty resulted in no actual loss because he was arrested before the loans were funded. The court noted that his plea declaration described the scheme as a whole and the ultimate loss to the lender.

In 1989, petitioner illegal entered the U.S. from Mexico. He married another illegal alien in 1992 and they have three children, 5-18 years old, who are U.S. citizens. In 2000 INS commenced removal. Petitioner sought cancellation of removal under 8 U.S.C. 1229b(b)1. An immigration judge found that petitioner had established requisite continuous physical presence and good moral character, but failed to show that removal would result in exceptional and extremely unusual hardship to his children. The BIA affirmed. The Seventh Circuit denied an appeal. The ALJ’s manner of questioning and exclusion of testimony from one of petitioner’s daughters did not deprive petitioner of a full and fair hearing.

Plaintiff suffered an on-the-job injury. The following day, managers decided to terminate her position as part of a national reduction in force. Informed of this decision upon her return from medical leave, plaintiff filed a workers’ compensation claim and, later, sued the company for terminating her in retaliation for exercising workers’ compensation rights. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the employer. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, noting that the company established nondiscriminatory reasons for its decision. Plaintiff did not show a causal link between her decision to seek medical attention and the termination.

Plaintiff first sought treatment in 1988, at age 27, experiencing double vision, eye strain, and facial numbness, and was diagnosed with abducens nerve palsy of the left eye. He continued to work as a welder until 2004, when symptoms forced him to sell his business. In 2007, he applied for disability insurance benefits, alleging onset in 2004. In 2010 an ALJ rejected the claim, concluding that plaintiff; she noted plaintiff’s complaints of headaches, but concluded that they must be non-severe. The district court upheld the denial. The Seventh Circuit remanded to the Social Security Administration, holding that the ALJ’s credibility determination was not supported by substantial evidence.

Three individuals (once known as the "Bad Boys' of Chicago Arbitrage") established "Loop" as a closely-held corporation for their real estate holdings in 1997. A family trust for Loop's corporate secretary (50% owner) owns Banco, which gave Loop a $9.9 million line of credit in 2000. On the same day, Loop subsidiaries entered into a participation agreement on the line of credit through which they advanced $3 million to Loop, giving the subsidiaries senior secured creditor status over Loop's assets. The now-creditor subsidiaries were also collateral for funds loaned Loop. In 2001 Loop received a margin call from Wachovia. The Banco-Loop line of credit matured and Loop defaulted. Banco extended and expanded the credit. Loop’s debt to Wachovia went unpaid. Loop invested $518,338 in an Internet golf reservation company; moved real estate assets to Loop Properties (essentially the same owners); and paid two owners $210,500 “compensation” but never issued W-2s. Wachovia obtained a $2,478,418 judgment. The district court pierced Loop’s corporate veil, found the owners personally liable, and voided as fraudulent Banco’s lien, the “compensation” payments, and payments to the golf company. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, except with respect to the golf company.

Defendants were convicted of conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute and attempt to distribute five kilograms or more of cocaine. 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1) & 846. Baker was also convicted of use of a telephone in commission of the conspiracy, 21 U.S.C. 843(b). The Seventh Circuit affirmed, upholding the district court's denial of a motion for disclosure of the identities of all confidential informers. The court also upheld a three-level sentence increase (U.S.S.G. 3B1.1(b)), rejecting an argument that it was based on unreliable testimony.

Romasanta worked in Chicago as an expediter, helping developers obtain construction permits. In testifying against Curescu, a developer, she admitted bribing 25 to 30 city employees between 2004 and 2007. She paid an $8,000 bribe to a zoning inspector on behalf of Curescu. Convicted of bribery of an agency that receives federal assistance, 18 U.S.C. 666 and conspiracy, 18 U.S.C. 371, Curescu was sentenced to six months and the zoning inspector to 41 months in prison. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting various challenges to testimony and to the court's refusal to severe the cases.

Plaintiff, a part-time mail handler for the USPS since 1987, injured his back on the job in 1998. He returned to "light-duty" work until 2003, when he reinjured himself at work. Except for one week, he did not return to work nor did he provide documentation concerning his injury. In 2005, a supervisor notified him that he would be terminated. Plaintiff's union filed a grievance and the settlement required plaintiff to see a doctor and either return to "full duty" or apply for disability retirement by a certain date. Physicians cleared him to work with several permanent restrictions. A USPS physician determined that plaintiff was unfit for "full duty." He was terminated for violation of the agreement. The EEOC found no discrimination. He filed a claim that, although he was not legally disabled, he was "regarded as" disabled. The district court granted the defendants summary judgment. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. After determining that the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. 12112(a), prior to 2009 amendments, applied, the court found that plaintiff did not establish that USPS regarded him as disabled. Plaintiff lacked standing to challenge the "100% healed" requirement of the settlement agreement under the ADA or the Rehabilitation Act.