Justia U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Defendant, a medical doctor, was convicted of distributing fentanyl, a Schedule II narcotic controlled substance, 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1) and obtaining morphine by misrepresentation, fraud, and deception, 21 U.S.C. 843(a)(3) and was sentenced to 48 months. The Seventh Circuit affirmed.The government was not required to present expert testimony, in light of overwhelming evidence of defendant's unprecedented and undocumented prescriptions of profoundly addicting and potent painkillers, which he personally administered in multiple, private houses and hotel rooms The district court properly enhanced his sentence for obstruction of justice because defendant lied to the U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration agents.

As Graham entered a public library, her purse, containing $5,000 in cash, was grabbed. She struggled with the snatcher. The robber shot Graham in the head and her mother in the chest, before fleeing. Graham described the attacker to police officers, but did not say that she knew her assailant. A neighbor, visiting the women in the hospital, told police that he had heard a rumor that Phillips, who lived in Graham's neighborhood, had been watching currency exchanges and robbing people who cashed tax-refund checks (as Graham had done). Graham later identified Phillips from a photo array and a lineup. Phillips had a strong alibi and there was no other evidence against him. After his acquittal, he filed suit (42 U.S.C. 1983) against the village and officers. The district court entered summary judgment for defendants, holding that the identification established probable cause. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Mentioning Phillips' name to the victim, who claimed she did not know him, did not taint the identification.

Hernandez caused a severe auto accident that closed northbound I-57 for several hours. With traffic not moving, four hours later, a truck rear-ended plaintiff's vehicle, more than four miles away, killing one occupant and seriously injuring his brother. Among others, plaintiff brought a personal-injury suit against Hernandez and related entities on the theory that Hernandez proximately caused the second accident. The district court entered summary judgment for Hernandez and the other defendants. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. There was a four-hour, four-mile gap and the truck driver's behavior was remarkably different than that of other drivers who approached stopped traffic.

Indiana State Prison maintains an inmates' recreation fund, required by Ind. Code 4-24-6-6(a), to accrue money from sources outside the state budget, such as profits from a prison commissary. Prison officials are to use this money for the inmates' benefit by purchasing recreational items or using funds for a purpose not covered under existing state appropriations. Petitioner's pro se 42 U.S.C. 1983 suit claimed that for 10 years, prison officials have misappropriated proceeds by uses ranging from diverting money for personal uses, to using the fund for purposes already covered by existing allocations, such as purchase of devices enhancing security. The district court screened and dismissed under 28 U.S.C. 1915A (b)(1), finding that petitioner did not have a statutorily protected property interest in the fund. Neither the Constitution nor federal statutes mandate that state penal facilities maintain a recreation fund or dictate how money in such funds be spent, The state statute did not give inmates a property interest in the fund. The Seventh Circuit affirmed

Based on his role in operating an online pharmacy that did not require prescriptions, defendant was convicted of conspiracy to import controlled substances, 21 U.S.C. 963 and 18 U.S.C. 2, conspiracy to possess controlled substances with the intent to distribute 21 U.S.C. 846 and 18 U.S.C. 2, and conspiracy to launder money, 18 U.S.C. 2; 1956-1957 with intent to promote the importation of controlled substances. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, upholding admission of expert testimony by a pharmacologist who testified about the classification of various drugs, their side effects, and the medical supervision needed to prescribe them. Although the testimony had only minimal relevance, the threshold for relevance under Rule 401 is quite low. Parts of the testimony related to side effects and birth defects should have been excluded under Rule 403 because the probative value was negligible, but the error was harmless given the weight of the evidence.

Defendant was arrested while officers executed a warrant at his apartment, and, based on items found and statements to officers, was charged with possession of cocaine base with intent to distribute, possession of Ecstasy with intent to distribute, and possession of a firearm by a convicted felon. After denial of a motion to suppress, the case was dismissed without prejudice under the Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. 3162(a)(2). The grand jury returned another indictment, based on the same circumstances. Defendant was convicted of possession with intent to distribute 50 grams or more of crack cocaine, 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(A), and possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1). He was sentenced, as a "career offender" and applying an obstruction of justice enhancement, to 300 months' imprisonment. The Seventh Circuit granted a motion to expand the record. Defendant had good reason not to raise his suppression argument before the same judge in the second proceeding. The argument was not waived and consideration will require an expanded record.

Defendant pleaded guilty to distributing cocaine and was sentenced to life in prison. The Seventh Circuit affirmed in 2000. Defendant's collateral attack under 28 U.S.C. 2255 was unsuccessful. Almost a decade later, he filed a motion, asking the court to reopen the case. The judge treated it as a successive collateral attack, and dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. Defendant filed notice of appeal 186 days later, after the time allowed by 28 U.S.C. 2107 and Fed.R.App.P. 4(a)(1)(A), unless the appeal is saved by Rule 4(a)(7). If Rule 4(a)(7) requires a separate document, in addition to entry of the order on the docket, the date of "entry" is postponed until the district court complies with Rule 58 (requiring entry of a separate judgment), or 150 days have passed, whichever happens first. The district judge did not enter a Rule 58 judgment. If one was required, the time for appeal started 150 days after March 14, 2011, and the appeal was timely. The Seventh Circuit dismissed the appeal. Disposition of a motion filed in a 2255 proceeding, long after final judgment, does not require a separate Rule 58 judgment.

Taxpayers purchased a three-acre lakefront property in Chenequa, Wisconsin, demolished the house and built another. They donated the house to the local fire department to be burned down in a firefighter training exercise and claimed a $76,000 charitable deduction on their 1998 tax return for the value of the house. The IRS disallowed the deduction. The decision was upheld by the Tax Court. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, finding that the taxpayers did not show a value for their donation that exceeded the substantial benefit they received in return. When a gift is conditional, the conditions must be taken into account in determining fair market value of the donated property. Proper consideration of the economic effect of the condition that the house be destroyed reduces fair market value of the gift so much that no net value is ever likely to be available for a deduction.

Petitioner entered a blind plea of guilty with respect to gang-related murders in 1992 and a state court entered judgment on two counts of intentional murder. She was sentenced to life imprisonment, the mandatory minimum for double homicide. After exhausting state court remedies, she filed a petition for habeas relief, alleging ineffective assistance of counsel. The district court concluded that many of the claims were defaulted and that others failed on the merits. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Petitioner preserved only questions of whether her attorney was ineffective for failing to investigate a particular witness; failing to obtain psychological evidence to support an argument that her confession was involuntary; and failing to recognize that another witness had made inconsistent statements and had motive to lie. All fail on the merits; there was no reason to believe that any of the alleged deficiencies changed the outcome.

In 2006, plaintiff was a citizen of California and agreed to relocate to Illinois to work for defendant. When he quit about five months after moving, his family was still in California. He filed suit in state court, seeking relocation benefits the company allegedly promised. The company, which has its principal place of business in California removed to federal court, asserting that plaintiff was a citizen of Massachusetts. Plaintiff had a home in Massachusetts when the case was removed, was registered to vote there, and had a Massachusetts driver's license. The district court ordered arbitration under one of the contracts between the parties. The Seventh Circuit affirmed dismissal and denied sanctions. Relocation benefits are "employment related" and subject to arbitration under the agreement. The court noted that the company also failed to follow the rules. The company "should be able to tell the difference between residence and domicile, and should not have any difficulty complying with Rule 38."