Justia U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

The owner of retail liquor stores and two consumers challenged the constitutionality of an Indiana state law that prohibits shipment of wine to customers by motor carriers, such as UPS, Ind. Code. 7.1-3-15-3(d). The Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court's rejection of the challenges. The law may prevent the store from enlarging its sales area to encompass parts of Indiana remote from Fort Wayne; that is an effect on intrastate commerce, not interstate commerce. Plaintiffs did not establish even an incidental effect on interstate commerce The court also noted that the law is "within the Twenty-First Amendment's gravitational field," which includes matters relating to transportation of liquor.

A supervising building inspector was convicted of conspiracy to commit bribery, 18 U.S.C. 371, and two counts of making false statements to federal agents, 18 U.S.C. 1001(a)(2) and was sentenced to a total of 60 months' imprisonment. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The district court properly allowed testimony about the 2005 gift list of a city businessman; the testimony was probative of intent and not so prejudicial as to cause the jury to decide the case on an improper basis. Although the court erred by admitting the list itself as a business record, the error was harmless. The court properly barred recordings between defendant and one of the witnesses who testified against him, which contained self-exculpatory statements. The court properly held defendant accountable for more than $112,500 in bribes, which resulted in an eight-level increase to the USSG offense level.

A former inmate sued an officer who ordered forcible shearing of plaintiff's dreadlocks (42 U.S.C. 1983). The district judge dismissed. In an opinion that included a picture of the the late musician Bob Marley (a Rastafarian), the Seventh Circuit reversed. Claims for damages under the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act, 42 U.S.C. 2000cc, would fail based on sovereign immunity (official capacity) and because the Act does not create a personal capacity cause of action against state employees. Illinois inmates are allowed to have any length of hair that does not create a security risk, but the officer told plaintiff that only Rastafarians were allowed to have dreadlocks. A ban on long hair, even if motivated by sincere religious belief, would likely pass constitutional muster, but this was a case of "outright arbitrary discrimination" rather than failure to accommodate religious rights. There was no articulated ground for a Rastafarian exception. Even "Heretics have religious rights" and plaintiff claimed that dreadlocks are, for him, religious observance, though dreadlocks do not have symbolic significance for African Hebrew Israelites of Jerusalem as they do for Rastafarians. There is no suggestion that allowing plaintiff's dreadlocks would create a "wildfire of idiosyncratic observances," or that defendant acted on a reasonable belief of a security threat.

The County Sheriff terminated plaintiff's probationary employment as a deputy based on violations of standard operating procedures, failure to follow orders, and insufficient commitment to the job. He sued under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. 2000e and 42 U.S.C. 1981, claiming he was fired because he is black. The district court entered summary judgment for the Department. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Plaintiff's circumstantial evidence of discrimination fell short of supporting an inference that he was terminated because of his race. No evidence suggests that the sheriff or other decision-makers participated in any of the alleged racially charged behavior: watching Blazing Saddles in the workplace and giving plaintiff racially tinged nicknames. Although plaintiff identified several white deputies who were retained despite performance problems during their probationary employment, their misconduct was not comparable to his, so they cannot be considered similarly situated.

The Federal Trade Commission found that a merger between a health system and a hospital violated the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. 18. Plaintiffs sought treble damages and certification of a class of patients and third-party payors who allegedly paid higher prices for care. Under FRCP 23(b)(3), a class may be certified only if questions of law and fact common to members predominate over questions affecting only individuals in the class. Plaintiffs proposed to rely on economic and statistical methods used by the FTC and defendant's economic experts to analyze antitrust impact. The "difference-in-differences" method estimates price increases resulting from exercise of market power rather than from other factors. The district court denied certification, concluding that the expert had not shown that his methodology could address impact on a class-wide basis. The Seventh Circuit granted interlocutory appeal, vacated, and remanded. Although plaintiffs' expert initially believed that the health system did increase prices uniformly across all services, he acknowledged that it might not have done so, and explained how his methodology could show impact to the class despite such complications. The degree of uniformity the court demanded is not required; "it is important not to let a quest for perfect evidence become the enemy of good evidence."

Plaintiff filed an employment discrimination suit, alleging race discrimination and retaliation, 42 U.S.C. 1981 and 42 U.S.C. 2000e. She failed to file a timely response to her employer's motion for summary judgment and the court granted the motion. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, holding that the district court was within its discretion in denying an extension. Plaintiff's counsel offered no explanation for missing the filing date by more than a month. There was no direct evidence of discrimination or retaliation; there was evidence of legitimate, non-discriminatory reasons for any salary differences among workers in plaintiff's position. Plaintiff never complained to her employer that any actions taken against her by co-workers or by anyone at the company were related to race and nothing about cited incidents gave any hint that race was at issue.

Defendant Avery pled guilty to crack cocaine distribution, 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1); he appealed the denial of his request to withdraw his guilty plea, calculation of the crack cocaine quantity attributed to him, and his 262-month sentence. Defendant Redmond pled guilty to crack cocaine distribution conspiracy, 21 U.S.C. 846, and appealed only his 240-month sentence. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, but remanded for the limited purpose of allowing the court to reconsider Redmond's sentence and determine whether it might be inclined to impose a different sentence, knowing the full extent of its discretion. Avery was not entitled to withdraw his guilty plea based on the crack cocaine quantity attributable to him, which was reasonably calculated, or on the enhancement for career offender status.

Petitioner, age 13, entered from Pakistan on a visitor's visa in 1979. The 1986 Immigration Reform and Control Act, allowed aliens who entered before 1982 and have remained continuously present to apply for legalization (8 U.S.C. 1255a). His 1987 attempt to apply was rejected because of a brief trip to Pakistan. The practice, "front-desking," was challenged in court. While litigation was pending, petitioner applied for amnesty and obtained work authorization. In 1992, he was convicted for possession of a concealed hunting knife. Returning from Canada while driving his truck route in 1995, petitioner was found to have a voter's registration stating that he was a citizen, but was allowed to reenter. He filed application under the Legal Immigration Family Equity Act, applicable to members of front-desking actions who establish continuous residence from 1982 to 1988. INS commenced deportation, aware of the pending amnesty application. The BIA dismissed an appeal. The Sixth Circuit denied review. In 2005 petitioner voluntarily appeared and was detained for four years. USCIS denied the 1997 amnesty application and the LIFE application. The AAO dismissed appeals; BIA reissued its 2001 deportation decision. The Seventh Circuit vacated. AAO failed to make an individualized decision about continuous presence and was not entitled to rely on the 1991 conviction as a ground to deny legalization.

The EEOC filed suit on behalf of two servers, alleging that the servers were sexually harassed (Title VII, Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. 2000e) while employed at the franchise restaurant. A jury found hostile work environment and awarded compensatory damages to both and punitive damages to one plaintiff. The Seventh Circuit affirmed in part. A rational jury could have found: that plaintiff was subjected to severe and pervasive harassment; that defendants did not exercise reasonable care in instituting an effective sexual harassment policy with a reasonable complaint mechanism and in taking corrective action; that the policy was ineffective in advancing education and protection of employees rights; and that certain policy language was inserted to discourage complaints. Because the district court injected a new theory of the case after the time that defendants could present rebuttal evidence, and because the district court reserved ruling on an issue ultimately found to be a question for the jury, the district court’s ruling with respect to corporate liability was reversed and remanded.

The Postal Service terminated plaintiff's 32 years of employment as a clerk, claiming that it fired her because she told her psychiatrist she was having thoughts of killing her supervisor, and it believed she posed a danger to fellow employees. Plaintiff is an African-American woman and claimed discrimination and retaliatory discharge. In support of her disparate treatment claims she presented evidence that two white male employees at the same facility had recently threatened another employee at knife-point, yet received only one-week suspensions from the same manager who fired her. The district court granted the Postal Service summary judgment. The Seventh Circuit reversed, stating that the similarly-situated inquiry is flexible, common-sense, and factual. A reasonable jury could infer, in light of all the circumstances, that an impermissible animus motivated the firing. Plaintiff's evidence could also demonstrate pretext.