Justia U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff, a financial advisor, sued her employer for allegedly discriminating based on her gender and retaliating against her because of her complaints of gender discrimination in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the employer. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. There was no evidence that a realignment of territories or disciplinary action against plaintiff were based on her gender. While both inappropriate and condescending, a supervisor referring to plaintiff as "cutie" 5 to 10 times over the course of two months was not sufficiently severe or pervasive to create a hostile work environment by itself, especially since it is undisputed that he stopped when asked. Plaintiff did not prove constructive discharge. The supervisor's patently offensive response to her resignation, "good riddance bitch," was not direct evidence of gender discrimination.

Convicted of producing sexually explicit photographs of his minor daughters which later crossed international boundaries, (18 U.S.C. 2251(a)), defendant was sentenced to a prison term of 38 years. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The district court properly allowed one of defendant's daughters to testify that he had touched her inappropriately one to two years before he took the photographs charged in this case and excluded from evidence a number of photography books from his collection containing photographs of nude families and children, as well as the proffered testimony of an expert concerning the practice of nudism. The court also upheld the judge's instruction to the jury that evidence of a defendant's flight from prosecution could be considered as evidence of his consciousness of guilt. The sentence was reasonable.

Plaintiff, a law firm marketing director, took leave under the Family Medical Leave Act just before the birth of her child and continuing after the birth. While she was on leave, her supervisors informed her that her position was eliminated as part of an organizational restructuring and terminated her employment. She filed suit, alleging pregnancy discrimination under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended by the Pregnancy Discrimination Act; interference with rights under the FMLA; retaliation under the FMLA; and a violation of her right to a bonus under the FMLA. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants. The Seventh Circuit reversed.Statements allegedly made by the human resources director, fell within the scope of the h.r. director's employment and should have been admitted as nonhearsay under Rule 801(d)(2)(D). Those statements provided direct evidence of discriminatory intent and of a connection between taking leave and termination.

Petitioner, a citizen of Morocco, entered the U.S. as a visitor in 1998, married a citizen. and adjusted his status to that of a lawful permanent resident on a conditional basis. When he filed an I-751 petition to remove the conditions on his residency, he falsely represented that he and his wife were living together. The falsehood came to light, and in 2006, he pled guilty to conspiracy to commit application fraud and was convicted under 18 U.S.C. 371 for conspiring to violate 18 U.S.C. 1546(a). An immigration judge found petitioner removable and denied a petition for waiver under 8 U.S.C. 1227(a)(1)(H). The Board of Immigration Appeals dismissed an appeal, finding that petitioner was removable as a result of his conspiracy conviction and was not eligible for waiver. The Seventh Circuit denied appeal. A conviction for conspiracy to violate 18 U.S.C. 1546 is grounds for removal under paragraph (3) of 8 U.S.C. 1227(a), and not under paragraph (1), so petitioner is ineligible for a 1227(a)(1)(H) waiver.

Plaintiff filed a charge with the EEOC accusing her employer, the Department of the Navy, of discriminating on account of race, sex, national origin, age, and disability. The EEOC found the charge unsupported. In the district court, neither party conducted discovery. Plaintiff sought judgment on the pleadings. The district judge denied the motion. After more than a year of inaction, the district judge dismissed the case for want of prosecution. Plaintiff's lawyer then filed an ex parte motion for relief from judgment, but did not serve the motion on his adversary or explain why a secret motion was authorized. The district judge denied the motion. Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting an argument that Local Rule 41.1 (the basis for dismissal for want of prosecution) violates the due process clause as "almost unintelligible." The court characterized the appeal as frivolous, stating that It bypassed the only possible argument:that the district judge abused his discretion by dismissing the suit without first warning about the risks of procrastination. The court gave plaintiff's attorney 21 days to show cause why he should not be subject to monetary sanctions for filing a frivolous appeal and violating Circuit Rule 30, and why he should not be censured, suspended, or disbarred on account of his apparent inability to practice competently and diligently in the federal courts.

Defendant, convicted of two murders and of the rape and aggravated kidnapping of another individual, unsuccessfully seeking post-conviction relief in state courts. The district court denied a petition for a writ of habeas corpus. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The Illinois Supreme Court’s determination that recantation by a witness/participant was incredible was not against the clear and convincing weight of the evidence; the court's refusal to consider evidence of other incidents of coercion by the same state agents was not unreasonable within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. 2254(d)(2). Any Brady violation that occurred with the state's failure to disclose pending drug charges against a victim/witness was not material because it would not have changed the outcome. The court also rejected an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, based on the attorney's failure to investigate a defense based on voluntary intoxication and an unreasonable belief of self-defense.

Mother applied for supplemental security income on her daughter's behalf shortly before daughter's s eighteenth birthday, claiming that daughter was disabled by a combination of mental impairments (including bipolar disorder) and by physical impairments resulting from a 2005 car accident. An administrative law judge found the collective impairments severe but not disabling. The Seventh Circuit reversed and remanded. The ALJ did not properly analyze the opinion of a treating psychiatrist and did not adequately question vocational experts with respect to limitations on her concentration, pace, or persistence.

Petitioner entered the U.S. from Mexico illegally and married another undocumented alien. Their three children are U.S. citizens. Removal proceedings began after he was convicted for DUI at least four times, for driving without a license three times, and for other driving offenses. An immigration judge denied a petition for cancellation of removal, finding that petitioner lacked the requisite "good moral character." The Board of Immigration Appeals agreed. The Seventh Circuit dismissed for lack of jurisdiction, noting its bewilderment at an attempt to argue due process. Aliens do not have a liberty or property right in cancellation of removal; it is a discretionary matter. The determination of good moral character is not a matter of law, but an administrative decision not subject to judicial review.

Defendant left his seriously dysfunctional home at age 14 and began living with an adult who sold him to older men for sex. They were joined by two young girls. The four engaged in group sex. Defendant was convicted of first degree sexual assault of a child, based on oral sex performed on defendant (then age 15) by a 12-year-old, and sentenced to 40 years. Wisconsin state courts rejected his claims of ineffective assistance of counsel. The district court denied a petition for habeas corpus. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting an argument that defendant received constitutionally ineffective assistance from his trial counsel, who failed to request a jury instruction including the statutory words defining the charged offense: "either by the defendant or upon the defendant's instruction." The state court determination that any error was not prejudicial was not unreasonable, in light of the circumstances surrounding the incident and the possibility that the statutory language court be read as covering situations in which a defendant allowed the sexual conduct. The court noted that it was not unmindful of the circumstances that led defendant to the situation and that it trusted the parole board to take those circumstances into account.

Purchasers sued the manufacturer, claiming that their motorhome had numerous defects and that defendant misrepresented the size of its engine. The district court entered summary judgment in favor of defendant. The Seventh Circuit reversed in part. There was evidence that the purchasers gave defendant an opportunity to cure, as required for Indiana law claims for breach of implied and express warranties and federal claims under the Magnuson-Moss Act, 18 U.S.C. 2310(e). Evidence also supported a claim that defendant committed an "uncured" deceptive act under the Indiana Deceptive Consumer Sales Act in representing the engine size. Federal regulations prohibited defendant's designation of the vehicle, which was completed during the 2008 production cycle and had the characteristics of a 2008 model year, as a "2009," but there are disputed questions of fact surrounding information defendant disclosed to the purchasers. The district court properly entered summary judgment on claims for fraud and for commission of an "incurable" deceptive act under Indiana law because the evidence does not support that defendant acted with intent to deceive.