Justia U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff sued under the Telephone Consumer Protection Act, 47 U.S.C. 227, seeking to enjoin defendant from sending unsolicited text messages to cellphone users and damages. He estimated that more than 1,000 people had received these messages and requested damages fixed by the Act, $500 for each violation. The court could award three times that amount, up to $1,500 for each violation, if it determined that defendant acted "willfully and knowingly." Within a month, defendant sent a letter offering to settle the case by giving plaintiff and up to 10 other affected people $1,500 for each text message received, plus court costs, and offering to stop sending unsolicited text messages to mobile subscribers. Plaintiff did not respond. The district court dismissed. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, holding that the offer mooted the claim. To allow a case, not certified as a class action and with no motion for class certification even pending, to continue in federal court when the sole plaintiff no longer maintains a personal stake would defy the limits on federal jurisdiction.

The Illinois Attorney General filed suit against eight manufacturers of LCD panels for violations of the Illinois Antitrust Act, claiming that the defendants unlawfully inflated prices on LCD products sold to the state, its agencies, and residents. The complaint sought injunctive relief, civil penalties, and treble statutory damages for the state as a purchaser and, as parens patriae, for harmed residents. Defendants removed the case to federal court under the Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, 28 U.S.C. 1332(d), 1453. The district court granted a motion to remand. The Seventh Circuit denied appeal, rejecting defendants' characterization of the parens patriae case as a disguised class action or mass action.

After falling from a three-foot-high mini-scaffold and injuring his hand and knee, plaintiff brought a product liability action against the manufacturer of the scaffold. The district court granted defendant's motion to bar the trial testimony of plaintiff’s expert witness and granted summary judgment after concluding that plaintiff could not prove his case without expert testimony. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. After concluding that that the expert's education and experience rendered him qualified to testify, the district court properly focused on methodology, and was within its discretion in concluding that it fell short under the Daubert factors. Summary judgment was appropriate; plaintiff did not produce sufficient evidence that the mini-scaffold was defective at the time it left defendant' control.

Workers filed numerous class actions alleging that the company improperly classified them as independent contractors rather than employees. The Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation (JPML) consolidated more than 70 cases and transferred them to the Northern District of Indiana pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 1407. After five years that judge granted the company summary judgment on state-law claims in the Kansas case and on parallel claims in most of the other pending cases, while granting summary judgment to plaintiffs on some claims in a few cases. There is no final,appealable judgment in 12 cases. Rather than proceeding under FRCP 54(b), so that plaintiffs would have to appeal immediately in those cases to the same circuit, the court transferred the cases with remaining claims back to the original courts. The JPML agreed and the Seventh Circuit denied the company's request for mandamus to require the district court to enter partial judgments and allow appeal under FRCP 54(b).

Plaintiff's suit against the municipality and officials alleged that his water was shut off without due process and that he was singled out as a "class of one" for irrational or political reasons in violation of the equal protection clause. After surviving a motion to dismiss, the case was assigned to a magistrate judge, based on the written consent of all parties. With seven extensions, discovery continued over 15 months, with plaintiff alternately pro se and represented by counsel. He was represented by counsel when he consented to proceed before the magistrate and during consideration of defendants' summary judgment motion. When the magistrate cut off discovery, with permission for one more deposition, plaintiff appealed. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, finding that all parties consented to assignment to a magistrate and that all rulings were within the court's discretion.

Husband and wife operated a mortgage fraud scheme that bought residential properties and sold those properties to nominee buyers at inflated prices. They provided lenders with false information about buyers' finances, sources of down payments, and intentions to occupy the residences. The scheme involved 37 separate transactions and resulted in net loss of more than $700,000 to various lenders. After the scheme collapsed, they went bankrupt but were not immediately prosecuted. Wife worked as a nurse in a pediatric intensive care unit. Husband worked as a installer and technician. They raised their three children and became fully engaged in their community. On the day before the ten-year statute of limitations would have expired, the government charged them with wire fraud, 18 U.S.C. 1343, and two counts of bank fraud, 18 U.S.C. 1344. They pled guilty to a single count of wire fraud, and were sentenced based on the 2010 USGS, wife to 41 months in prison, and husband to 63 months, and ordered to pay more than $700,000 in restitution. The Seventh Circuit remanded, stating that the sentencing judge failed to consider adequately unusually strong evidence of self-motivated rehabilitation. For this reason, we vacate their sentences

Defendant was convicted of aggravated driving while license revoked, 625 ILCS 5/6-303(a), (d-3) (2008), a Class 4 felony carrying a mandatory minimum sentence of 180 days' imprisonment. He was taken into custody on February 17; on March 7, he was sentenced to 18 months' imprisonment. The Department of Corrections originally calculated a tentative release date as November 17, reflecting the February 17 custody date and statutory good-time credit of one day per day of sentence. Because the full award of 180 days of additional good-time credit would bring defendant below the mandatory minimum sentence of 180 days, defendant was only awarded 87 days of meritorious good-time credit. In defendant's suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, the district court granted summary judgment in favor of the state employees after defendant failed to respond to their motion for summary judgment. The Seventh Circuit affirmed on the basis that defendant did not sue the proper parties. None of the named state employees were responsible for the purported constitutional deprivation.

The district court dismissed a claim of breach of fiduciary duty, filed by owners of common stock in a closed-end investment fund, under the Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act of 1998, which prohibits securities class actions if the class has more than 50 members, the suit is not exclusively derivative, relief is sought on the basis of state law, and the class action is brought by "any private party alleging a misrepresentation or omission of a material fact in connection with the purchase or sale of a covered security." 15 U.S.C. 78bb(f)(1). The Seventh Circuit affirmed, finding that the suit alleged misrepresentation and misleading omission. The law is designed to prevent plaintiffs from migrating to state court in order to evade rules for federal securities litigation in the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995.

Plaintiff, a correctional officer, is a veteran of the Persian Gulf War, and suffered from post-traumatic stress disorder for years. After an argument with his wife, plaintiff left his home and drove around the area, frequently calling his wife and at least once suggesting to her that he might commit suicide. His wife called the police; the dispatcher put out a report that plaintiff was suicidal, was on medication, and had access to weapons. Plaintiff was asleep in his car when officers found him. After two hours of surveillance, officers called in a specialized team, CIERT. A CIERT armored vehicle was moved into position, spike strips were put behind the parked car, and an officer shot "pepper balls" into the car, before officers removed plaintiff. Plaintiff filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983 claiming excessive force and brought state law claims for battery, false arrest, and willful and wanton misconduct. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of defendants, none of whom had authority over CIERT. The Seventh Circuit affirmed.

In pleading guilty to four felony charges, defendant admitted that he had forcibly detained a 17-year-old boy, threatening to kill him if he resisted or tried to escape, and raped him. Charges that defendant had raped a 13-year-old boy were dismissed. The Indiana state judge imposed a sentence of 50 years in prison in light of defendant’s prior felony convictions. Direct appeal and collateral attack in state court were unsuccessful. Defendant claimed ineffective assistance of counsel, in that his attorney did not explain the possible sentence before he accepted a plea. A federal district judge denied habeas corpus. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Although defendant may have established prejudice by claiming that he would have demanded a trial, if correctly informed, the state judge gave him the information allegedly omitted by defense counsel.